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Abstract
Economic Control and Urban Growth
David R. Wheeler
Submitted to the Department of Economics and the Department
of Urban Studies and Planning in February, 1974, in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy.
This thesis examines the impact of corporate headquarters
activity on patterns of growth and structural change in Ameri-
can urban areas. In Chapter I, a theory of entrepreneurial
profit maximization under imperfect information is used to
explain both the appearance of large multi-divisional firms
and the growth of headquarters agglomerations in urban areas.
In subsequent chapters, a series of econometric exercises are
employed in developing the implications of the theory.
Chapters II and III examine the implications at the micro
level. A dynamic econometric model is used to show that
corporate headquarters location decisions have significant
effects on the social and economic structures of individual
urban areas. In addition, it is demonstrated that induced
structural changes have both positive and negative impacts
on the prospects for further headquarters in-migration. A
simulation exercise is used to determine whether induced
headquarters location patterns are self-reinforcing over time.
The pattern of micro-level interaction suggested by the
dynamic feedback model is used to motivate an examination of
impacts at the macro level in Chapters IV and V. The evolving
pattern of hierarchical corporate organization is shown to
result in a corresponding functional hierarchy of urban areas.
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The primary support for this contention comes from a cross-
sectional study of urban areas in 1960. Further substantiation
is provided by a study of evolving urban hierarchy patterns in
six American regions from the mid-nineteenth century to 1970.
Thesis Supervisor: John R. Harris
Title: Assistant Professor of Economics and Urban Studies
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Chapter I
Economic Information Processing and the Urban System
I-l Walras' Auctioneer in Three Dimensions
Location theorists have always argued that Walrasian
general equilibrium is simply not general enough. In order
to understand the economic system, they contend,
one must locate it in three-dimensional space. One finds
it difficult to argue with this assertion. Urban economics,
in fact, seems to have been born in the realization that
entrepreneurial profit-maximizing calculations are affected
by friction in space. Most work has proceeded on the as-
sumption that the Walrasian system, adjusted for three
physical dimensions, could serve as an adequate basis for
understanding the economy.
One problem, however, continues to nag at workers in
the field: In adjusting the Walrasian system for three
dimensions, they are forced to admit the existence of a
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fourth. For that powerful spirit, the Walrasian auctioneer,
must now be awarded even more magical properties. Undaunted
by such tiresome three-dimensional phenomena as spatial
friction, he obtains access to the fourth dimension and is
therefore capable (to our dull vision) of appearing every-
where simultaneously with the latest price-quantity quotations.
Of course, we may assure ourselves, the economy cannot
be seen in such simple terms: The beauty for the theorist
lies in the realization that the spatial economy operates
"as if" such an auctioneer existed. But such assurances
remain unconvincing. It seems likely that true progress in
economics will depend upon purging this phrase "as if" from
the lexicon. Before we assume, then, that some transcendental
roadrunner serves as the message-bearer in a spatial economy,
we might take time to ask: How do things seem, really, to
work? That is the purpose of this paper. We would like to
investigate the structure of information processing in the
economy. Then, as an exercise in "meta-economics", we would
like to ask how the information system itself affects the
structure and growth of urban areas. It will be the conten-
tion of this paper that such effects are important.
The approach will be rooted in a theory of the firm
which emphasizes profit-maximization in imperfect informa-
tion and capital markets. Rational adjustments by profit-
maximizing firms in markets subject to imperfect information
are seen from this theoretical perspective as a basis for
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both the growth of large, multi-unit firms and the develop-
ment of a hierarchy of large, urban agglomerations in the
United States.
After the theory has been developed in a fairly complete
fashion, this study will employ a series of econometric ex-
ercises to test the fundamental tenets of the theory. In
addition, the consequences of the theory for the pattern of
urban development will be fully explored with the aid of
these econometric studies.
In conclusion, this thesis will examine a set of his-
torical statistics which may throw some light on the effect
of the development of economic control systems on the spatial
structure of the national economy since the mid-nineteenth
century.
1-2 Information and the Structure of Economic Decision-Making
In order to discuss the handling of economic information,
unfortunately, we are forced to do away with another "as if".
Although useful for purposes of Walrasian exposition, the
notion of atomistic production units will not serve us well
in this case. Some economists may argue that the economy
operates "as if" such atomistic production prevailed univer-
sally, but most would agree that we must look elsewhere for
a realistic picture.
During the past century, the multi-unit corporation has
risen toward status as the dominant organizational mode in
the majority of manufacturing sectors. At present, this
- 15 -
organizational form is extending its hold in the service
sectors, as well. More and more units of production have
been absorbed into organizational networks which are capable
of organizing information and directing capital flows on an
unprecedented scale.
At some point in the evolution of our economic system,
atomistic production units may in fact have dominated the
economy. During that period, if it existed, only a small
and well-defined set of prices concerned the individual
entrepreneur. As the scale of organization grew, however,
production and information-handling became specialized
activities. With the development of a transcontinental
telephone system, the physical separation of the two activi-
ties began. Decisions of the local unit manager, formerly
made independently but in substantial ignorance of condi-
tions "in the large", had to yield to the sheer competence
of managerial groups whose vision could be transcontinental
in scope.
The advent of electronic data processing in recent years
has greatly speeded this process. Consider the following
statistics:
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Table I-1
Employees in Central Administrative Offices and
Auxiliaries of Manufacturing Corporations, 1954-1967.
Year Employees('000) Change from % of Total
Preceding Year('000) Employment
1954 453 - 2.8
1958 602 149 3.8
1963 726 124 4.3
1967 830 104 4.3
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census of Manufactures,
1967 (Washington: USGPO, 1967).
It is clear that a tremendous surge in "control" activity
(by which we mean central administration and information pro-
cessing) was underway in the early 1950's. One cannot be
sure about the net change in employment, since each indepen-
dent company must have had a staff engaged in control activi-
ties. What makes the phenomenon interesting to us is the
change in the composition of this activity. It became cen-
tralized to a striking degree.
We are now in a position to suggest an answer to the
question: How might the process of information handling in
the economy best be described in brief? No one would seri-
ously claim that the atomistic producer has disappeared from
the scene. Certainly, then, one important component of the
information process is still the immediate adjustment of
- 17 -
small firms to changing conditions of demand and supply in a
reasonably competitive environment. We would be making a
serious mistake, however, if we limited our view to such
small organizations. The dominant position in our national
economic information system, rather, is occupied by a rela-
tively small number of units which control huge resource flows
and absorb information which has utility for long-run as well
as short-run decision-making. If we wish to be brief, we may
confidently assert that anyone interested in the bulk of
economic information flows has only to look at the activities
of these control units and the organizations which service
them. A brief tour of the statistical landscape should prove
persuasive on this score.
In 1963, according to the economic census of that year,
there were 17,569 central administrative offices and auxil-
iaries employing a total of 1,213,408 people. A large pro-
portion of the relatively small number of control units were
in fact branch offices of large firms and were thus not the
loci of major decision-making. Of all control units sur-
veyed 60% employed only 6% of the control unit work force.
By contrast, 449 large units accounted for approximately 42%
of total employment in control. This complements the fact
that in 1963, 494 multi-unit firms employed 10.1 million
people directly, and decisions made by their boards of direc-
tors certainly exercised a profound influence on the economic
- 18 -
status of many additional millions.1
Clearly, such scope of decision-making authority demands
the presence of a system of information processing which
dwarfs anything yet encountered in the United States, with
the possible exception of the military establishment. Rather
than masses of tiny economic units whose interrelations are
extremely complex, we see the landscape absolutely dominated
by a mere handful of units whose lines of communication with
their subordinate units can clearly be seen.
We have now isolated those economic units which seem
most important in the channeling of market information. Before
proceeding further, we will require an analytic framework
within which to analyze the growth and behavior of such units.
Since we wish to relate the growth of multi-unit firms to
growth and changes in the national system of cities, we want
an analytic perspective which is quite broad. Both corporate
growth and urban growth are to be subsumed under a more gen-
eral analysis of the efficient structuring of information
search activity in a competitive economy. Some discussion
of the literature on corporate and urban growth may prove
relevant to the task at hand. This chapter will therefore
move in the following sequence: The literature on corporate
1U.S. Department of Commerce, Special Report: Central
Administrative Offices and Auxiliaries, 1963, (Washington:
USGPO, 1963)
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growth will be examined, and it will be asserted that current
ideas need to be supplemented by a theory of efficient in-
formation-gathering. A simple but general theory will be
proposed, and some results derived. After a review of the
urban growth literature is seen to reveal a similar lack of
emphasis on the economic role of information, the theory will
be extended to cover some aspects of urban growth.
1-3 Why Large Firms?--The New Industrial State and Its
Predecessors
In introducing the theory of firm growth, it is natural
to mention John Kenneth Galbraith. Professor Galbraith has
been the central figure in the recent controversy concerning
corporate growth and behavior. The vigor of his critics
(notably Professor Solow) must stem in part from Galbraith's
rather blunt assertion that acceptance of his ideas amounts
to an overturning of conventional micro theory.2 In order to
see whether this is true, let us consider the following sum-
mary of his ideas:
...mention has been made of machines and sophisticated
technology. These require, in turn, heavy investment
of capital. They are designed and guided by technically
sophisticated men. They involve, also, a greatly in-
creased elapse of time between any decision to produce
and the emergence of a salable product.
From these changes come the need and opportunity
for the large business organization. It alone can
2John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State,
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), pp. 401-412
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deploy the requisite capital; it alone can mobilize
the requisite skills. It can also do more. The
large commitment of capital and organization well
in advance of result requires that there be fore-
sight and also that all feasible steps be taken to
insure that what is foreseen will transpire...Nor
is this all.. .Along with prices and costs, consumer
demand becomes subject to management. 3
Thus, according to Galbraith, the growth of large firms
has been the direct result of:
a). The clear advantage of risk-pooling for the investor.
b). Adam Smith's fundamental principle--Efficiency stems
from the division of labor which, in turn, is directly related
to the extent of the market.
c). The market power associated with vertical integra-
tion.
d). The endogeneity of consumer tastes.
Of these four central ideas, only d) is in any sense
new. If accepted, it would shatter the determinacy of Wal-
rasian general equilibrium. Small wonder that Professor
Solow spends much verbiage on this point (and little on the
others) in his critique, published in The Public Interest.4
While fascinating, this controversy need not detain us, since
Galbraith never really argues that corporate giantism had its
genesis in the control of consumer demand.
3Galbraith, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
4Robert M. Solow, "The New Industrial State, or Son of
Affluence," The Public Interest, No. 9 (Fall, 1967).
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The other three ideas have been around for a long time.
No one (including Galbraith) has been able to demonstrate
that risk-pooling leads to large industrial corporations,
rather than large banks. Galbraith's defense is as follows
(the author's comments are in parentheses):
Capital use is large. No form of market uncer-
tainty is so serious as that involving the terms and
conditions on which capital is obtained. Apart from
the normal disadvantages of an uncertain price, there
is danger that under some circumstances no supply will
be forthcoming at an acceptable price (If this is the
case, assuming equal rationality and risk preference,
why should the corporation undertake the proposed in-
vestment with its own funds?) ... and unlike supplies of
raw material or even labor, the supplier of funds is
traditionally conceded some degree of power. This
dilutes the authority of the planning unit. 5
This entire paragraph boils down to nothing more than
the assertion that planning units have a preference for
autonomy. An interesting thesis, but wholly unsubstantiated
in the text.
While Galbraith makes some passing reference to vertical
integration and market power, the real basis for his argument
lies in Adam Smith's first principle: The division of labor
is limited by the extent of the market (i.e. the mechanism
through which it is organized). Galbraith seems to think
that he has been innovative in pointing out that this prin-
ciple applies to brainwork (analysis and coordination) as
well as mechanical processes. Thus:
5Galbraith, op. cit., p. 39.
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The notion of division of labor, an old one in
economics, is a rudimentary and partial application
of the ideas here outlined...However, the subdivision
of tasks to accord with area of organized knowledge
is not confined to, nor has it any special relevance
to, mechanical processes. It occurs in medicine,
business management, building design...and every other
problem that involves an agglomerate of scientific
knowledge.6
Again, there is nothing new in this. Early oligopoly
theorists were quite concerned with the implications of
Smith's principle for efficient firm size in a market econ-
omy. They were aware that this principle applied to coor-
dinating activities, as well as mechanical processes. Num-
erous references to the problem may be found in articles by
Chamberlin, Kaldor, E.A.G. Robinson, and Stigler.7  The
consensus of early oligopoly theorists was that economies of
specialization are eventually dominated by problems of coor-
dination arising from increasing complexity.
This insight has been made more rigorous through the
introduction of information-theoretic concepts. Lawrence
Hirschhorn, in a recent doctoral dissertation, has
6 Ibid., p. 13.
7 See, for example, George Stigler, "The Division of Labor
is Limited by the Extent of the Market," Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. LIX (June, 1951); Edward H. Chamberlin, "Propor-
tionality, Divisibility, and Economies of Scale," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. LXII (Feb., 1948); Nicholas Kaldor,
"The Equilibrium of the Firm," Economic Journal, (March, 1934);
and E.A.G. Robinson, "The Problem of Management and the Size
of the Firm," Economic Journal (June, 1934).
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demonstrated that the deterioration of communicated informa-
tion with internal specialization will result in inventory-
building as a buffer against uncertainty by sub-units. At
some point, buffer costs outweigh the benefits of speciali-
zation. 8
In attempting to explain firm growth, then, oligopoly
theorists from Chamberlin to Galbraith have leaned quite
heavily on the economies of internal specialization. Un-
doubtedly, their argument is substantially correct. In
ignoring the external linkages of the firm, however, it
remains incomplete. Oligopoly theory has remained bound to
the notion of Walras' auctioneer as the firm's link with its
external environment. This is not the best picture of real-
ity, and the introduction of information-gathering as an
activity of the firm seems appropriate. In attempting to do
this, we immediately discover another powerful stimulus to
the growth of large firms.
1-4 Equilibrium Under Oligopoly in an Information Economy
We have set ourselves the task of exploring the rela-
tionship between the economics of information-gathering and
the growth of the profit-maximizing firm. The following ex-
tensive passage from Yankee City, by W. L. Warner, serves as
an admirable introduction to the subject:
8Lawrence Hirschhorn, Toward a Political Economy of
Information Capital, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, M.I.T.
(September, 1971).
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CHAPTER 11--YANKEE CITY LOSES CONTROL OF ITS FACTORIES
... In the early days of the shoe industry, the
owners and managerial staffs of the factories, as
well as the operatives, were residents of Yankee
City; there was no extension of the factory social
structure outside the local community.
Yankee City at the time of our study had partly
lost control of its shoe factories through the dev-
elopment of absentee management and absentee owner-
ship... shoe factories A, B, and C...are all located
in Yankee City. A and B are locally owned and inde-
pendent, but factory C is owned by outside interests
which also own shoe factories X and Y, located in
other communities, and a chain of retail shoe stores
also located outside Yankee City. Factories C, X
and Y and the chain of retain stores are all managed
from one main office in New York City.
Similar manufacturing processes are used in the
three Yankee City factories, and the operatives in
all three factories occupy similar low levels in the
business hierarchy. The managers' function as or-
ganizers of production is likewise similar in the
three factories. In formal internal organizations
the three Yankee City shoe factories are, therefore,
essentially similar. The differences between the
locally-owned and managed factories (A and B) and the
absentee-owned and managed factory (C) are to be
sought in the manner in which they are related to
the community and the outside world.
The managers of the locally owned, independent
shoe factories A and B direct the external relations
of their factories from their offices in the local
community. Besides their concern with the internal
organization of their factories, they must procure
supplies of material and equipment, secure a market
for their shoes, and obtain whatever financial aid
the factory needs in the form of either capital or
credit. The manager of the absentee-controlled and
owned factory C, however, is concerned only with the
internal organization of the factory he controls;
all the external relations of this shoe factory are
ordered from the New York office of the large enter-
prise of which it is but one production unit.
This arrangement gives shoe factory C a distinct
business advantage over the locally owned factories
A and B, because vertical extensions comparable to
those we have described for the shoe industry have
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occured also in the case of many of the organizations
with which the head of a shoe manufacturing enterprise
must maintain close relations. Many of the producers
of the materials and equipment needed in the manufac-
ture of shoes have expanded like the shoe business
into large enterprises within main offices in New York
City...
Thus the top executives in the New York office of
the large enterprise that controls factory C are able
to establish and maintain close social relations with
the heads of many of the outside organizations on which
a shoe factory must depend for maintenance of its pro-
duction...The managers of the locally owned shoe fac-
tories A and B, on the contrary, cannot establish these
close social relations with outside organizations.
They must spend most of their time in the factory of-
fice and establish outside contacts by mail or wire;
only occasionally can they go to New York or elsewhere
to establish personal relations with organizations
whose cooperation is essential to the business welfare
of their factories.. .All of these advantages enable
shoe factory C to maintain more continuous production
closer to its capacity, making it a more efficient
unit than either of the locally owned and managed fac-
tories A and B. 9
The important point in Warner's observation is that the
management of a small firm must be concerned with external
linkages as well as internal operations and is therefore
handicapped. Smith's principle seems to apply to informa-
tion-gathering. In the analytic exercise which follows, the
viability of this principle will be rigorously demonstrated.
Keeping in mind our desire to extend any theoretical
insights to the analysis of urban growth, we will seek to
analyze market search by the firm within a very general
framework. To begin with, then, we construct the following
9William L. Warner, Yankee City (New Haven: Yale Univ-
ersity Press, 1963), pp. 301-310.
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highly simplified picture of an economy. Rather than specify-
ing the location of raw materials, transport links, population,
etc., we will simply call the economy a "decision environment."
Distributed within this environment are a multitude of dis-
crete information sources which are important to economic
actors. Among these sources are the prices of commodities
at various points in space, the qualities and quantities
available, the tastes and incomes of various population
groups, the input demands of various industries, etc. The
total number of such sources is clearly large, but the num-
ber of interest to any individual actor will not be so large
as to be intractable. We are interested in analyzing the
process through which each actor searches the relevant
sources (Henceforth, we will call them environmental "taps").
Let us suppose that the decision environment consists of
a set of m "taps," n industries, and k firms within each in-
dustry (We will simplify the analysis by holding k constant
across industries. None of the results derived are changed
fundamentally by this assumption).
In the initial period, we assume that all k firms in
each industry are independent units operating competitively
(k is assumed to be large, so that atomistic competition is
approximated). In our economy, however, there is no Wal-
rasian auctioneer assembling market information costlessly.
Rather, the k entrepreneurs in each industry must themselves
search the relevant subset of environmental "taps" for super-
- 27 -
ior (i.e. profit-maximizing) market arrangements. The prob-
lem of the entrepreneur is to locate those taps which repre-
sent maximal output prices and input qualities, and minimal
input prices. We will indulge in a further simplification
by assuming that only price taps are sampled (This assumption
keeps the analysis uncluttered but essentially the same. It
will be dropped at a later point).
As previously noted, we regard each category of environ-
mental tap (i.e. the price of steel ingots) as a variable
distributed randomly over space. The mean distance between
any two taps will be taken as a constant. Therefore, the
entrepreneur can be thought of as expending one standard
time unit, t, in extracting information at each tap. For
any entrepreneur, then, the cost of examining p taps will be
pt. The question of benefits accruing to extensive tap-
search is somewhat more complex. In what follows, we will
show that the benefits increase at the margin with search,
but that the marginal increase becomes smaller.
Consider a unique tap, Si, which represents an input
price and which is distributed randomly over space and can
therefore be considered a random variable in the sampling
process (no assumption need be made about the shape of its
distribution of values). For any random variable x, the
formula for the probability density function of the rth
observation from the maximum, given p observations, is:
- 28 -
(1) F(x) = p(P~)Fp-r (1-F)r-lF'dp
r-l
Since the entrepreneur who is searching the set [S.] is
interested in maximizing his profits, he will want to locate
the smallest possible price, S . In p observations, the mini-
mum value can be characterized as the pth observation from the
maximum. Substituting into (1), we can determine the prob-
ability density function for the minimum price (S.), given
a search of p prices:
(2) F(S.) = p( %)FP (1-F) ~1F'dp = p(l-F)PF'dp
-1 p- 1
In order to evaluate the benefits accruing to extended
search, we need to ask what will happen to the expected
value of (S ) as the entrepreneur searches a progressively
larger subset of [S.] . We know that the expected value of
a random variable can be found by taking the following in-
tegral:
(3) E(x) of xF(x)dx
where F(x) is the probability density function of x. Given
a set of p input prices, S., therefore, the expected value
of S is
cop-1l:(4) E(S.Jp) = 0 f S.F(S.)dp = p 0 S.(1-F) F dp
where p is a discrete integer variable. It can be shown that
for all p > 0, [E(Si|p+l)-E(S. Ip)] < 0 , so AE i ) /Ap < 0.
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The expected value of the minimum input price declines
with the size of the set searched (i.e. with the number of
entrepreneurial time units, t, spent in search).
It can also be shown that for all p > 0, [E (S. Ijp+2) -
E(S Ip+l)] - [E(S. I p+l) - E(S. Ip)] < 0 , so A 2E (S. )/Ap2 < 0.10
Abbreviating E(S 1 p) as SiE, we have the following:
(5a) S. = S. (p)
-iE -iE
(5b) SiE '(p) < 0
(5c) SiE (p) < 0
Let S. be the output price which concerns the entrepre-
J
neur, with Sj symbolizing the maximum expected value of S..jE j
By reasoning analogous to that employed above, we can prove
that:
(6a) jE (P) > 0
(6b) SjE" (p) < 0
Given L inputs (including capital and labor), the net
revenue of the kth firm in industry n is
(7) Rk= jE
L
=Q- S. *I.
-ili
where
1 0 See George Stigler, "The Economics of Information,"
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXIX (November, 1961).
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Q = the number of units of output
I. = the number of units of the ith input
From (5) and (6), we know that
L
(8) Rkn(P) (p) Q - i S (p)
Thus
L
(9a) R '(p) = '(p) Q - E S.' (p) I.
Since . '(p) > 0 and S '(p) < 0 , all i,
(9b) R'kn(P) > 0
and since T."(p) < 0 and S.,"(p) < 0 , all i,
J -1
(9c) R" kn~p
Measured in the standard way, the net revenue of the firm
increases with entrepreneurial search, but by decreasing in-
crements at the margin. In order to complete the profit cal-
culations of the firm, however, we must include the cost of
entrepreneurial search. In the spirit of Chamberlin, Hirsch-
horn, et. al., we regard entrepreneurial time as a normal
productive factor (i.e. subject to dimishing returns) when
it is applied to internal operations. Thus, allocation of
managerial time from production to search will entail ef-
ficiency costs which increase at the margin. The firm can-
not escape the problem by hiring more skilled managers.
Trained managerial talent is a factor whose short-run supply
is relatively inelastic. Thus, the purchase of more mana-
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gerial talent will also entail increasing costs at the margin.
If we define C (p) as the cost of managerial search time,kn
then,
(10a) Ckn(O) =0
(10b) C kn'(p) > 0
(10c) C "nI(p) > 0
We now define the full profit function of the firm:
(11) fkn = R kn(p) - Ckn
As a reasonable condition, we assume that R kn(0) = 0
so that the existence of the firm requires p > 0. A further
condition for the existence of the firm is then
(lla) Rkn(P) - Ckn (p) > 0 , 0 < p < t
The condition for profit maximization is
(12) rkn' (p) = 0 , or Rkn'(p) = Ckn' p
Thus far, we have limited our discussion to the role of
information-gat'hering in the economic life of the individual
firm. Information-gathering is treated as an essential com-
ponent of profit-maximizing activities whose benefits are
positive and decreasing at the margin. At the same time, we
have shown that search costs increase at the margin. The
profit-maximizing firm can move to equilibrium by equating
marginal search benefits (measured as increments to net
revenue) to marginal search costs.
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In each industry, then, we can envision k firms in com-
petitive equilibrium at some positive level of p for each
firm. In effect, these are the shoe plants A and B in War-
ner's Yankee City. In order to prove that the economics of
search stimulate the growth of large firms, we will now show
that atomistic competitive equilibrium is inherently unstable.
The reason for this instability lies in the nature of informa-
tion. Information differs drastically from other factors of
production in that, once gathered, it can be shared widely at
near-zero cost. Although information-gathering conforms to
the classical postulates of scarcity, then, information it-
self does not. In atomistic competitive equilbrium, of
course, such information transmission will not occur. If
the gathering firm is in equilibrium at a positive search
level, its free publication of gathered information would
result in its being driven out of business by competitors
whose costs were lower. We may formalize this dilemma in
the following way: Consider the case of the nth industry,
which contains k identical competitive firms. In equili-
brium, the industry's total profit is:
(13) n (1) = kRkn(p) - kCkn(p) = k[Rkn(p) - Ckn(P)]
Suppose, however, that gathered information is freely shared
among the k firms. Then the industry's total profit becomes
(14) n(2) = kRkn(p) - Ckn(p)/k
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Comparing the two, we have
(15) 71(2) - Tr (l) = kRkn(p) - Ckn(p)/k - [kRkn p)
kCkn(p)] = kR kn(p) - C kn(p)/k - kR kn(p) +
Ckn(p) = kCkn kn (p)/k
= Ckn(p)[k-i/k] > 0 , k > 1
For the industry as a whole, the implication is clear:
Atomistic competition is less profitable (and therefore less
efficient) than collusion when profit calculations are ex-
panded to include search costs. From the perspective of the
individual firm, this is also true. For the kth firm under
information sharing,
(16) 7kn = Rkn(P) 
- Ckn(P)
where i is the number of firms sharing price information.
(16a) rkn/3 = C kn(p) 2 > 0
(16b) 32 kn/3.2 = -2C (p)/.3 < 0
i kn i
The benefits to an indefinite increase in i are positive
(although they decline at the margin). From the perspective
of the individual firm or the industry, it is optimal to set
i = k. Equilibrium is unstable at i = 1, but may persist as
a classic example of the prisoner's dilemma. It is in the
interest of each firm to share information, but it is not in
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the interest of any firm to initiate the sharing. In such a
situation, the collapse of the industry toward an oligopolist
or monopolist structure must be the expected long-run out-
come. If any agent can amass sufficient capital to join
two firms together, the industry is shaken out of its equil-
ibrium position. It will regain equilibrium only after a
massive consolidation of ownership has led to extensive in-
formation sharing. Our theoretical structure suggests one
of two outcomes -- either the original joint firm will expand
to a position of total monopoly, or two or more oligopolies
will dominate the industry. In order to see the picture
clearly, we must pause here to develop a model of the multi-
unit firm.
1-5 The Limits to Firm Size: Specialization Benefits vs.
Communication Costsll
In thinking about the evolution of the control structure
with respect to the widening of control over production units,
we are explicitly thinking about the growth of an hierarchical
organization. Technical and economic data are constantly ex-
changed by the plant units and their control units. As pre-
viously noted, the latter take on the task of sampling the
market environment and calculating optimal patterns of pro-
duction and investment. They may further specialize into
research and development, marketing strategies, etc. The
llThis section draws heavily on Hirschhorn, op. cit.
- 35 -
argument concerning information and risk-pooling applies
equally to the control organization.
The primary determinant of the form of an hierarchical
control structure, however, is quite different. This struc-
ture depends upon the effective collapse of information as
it moves upward in the organization. Each unit is fully
occupied with the collection and assessment of information
which is relevant to its operation. It is obvious that all
the details of operation at the plant level cannot be trans-
mitted effectively upward through the hierarchy. If each
factory unit did so, decision units at even the first level
in the hierarchy would be absolutely swamped with information.
Some information must inevitably be lost in transmission. At
the same time, the information which the control unit receives
must be effectively processed. The number of subordinate
units which a control unit is capable of handling is in fact
a function of information-processing technology at any point
in time. This state of technology can be summarized by
referring to the span, S, of the organization. The "span"
refers to the number of sub-units any unit in the organiza-
tion is capable of directly controlling.
This concept of span is an extremely useful one and will
be employed extensively in what follows. For purposes of
abstraction, we will assume that this technically-determined
span applies to all levels of the organization. With this
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convention, it is possible to derive some simple properties
of hierarchical structures of the type in question.
Let j be the hierarchic level of the unit in question
(We will adopt the convention of numbering up from the low-
est, or plant units). Therefore, the number of plant units
under the control of a unit at level j is
(17) N. = Si
J
Similarly, the number of decision nodes,- M. , beneathJ
unit j is:
(N.j-1) (Sj-l)
(18) M. = /(S-l) = /(S-1)
J
Conversely, given the number of plant units in any organ-
ization, with fixed span, we can deduce the number of hier-
archic levels which characterize the organization:
(19) L = log N
It is possible to use these simple mathematics in trac-
ing the evolution of an hierarchic structure over time.
We know that if N* is the total number of plants in an
organization, then the number of decision nodes at level j
is given by:
(20) M. = N* - S1
J -1
If the number of factories under organizational control
rt
grows steadily at rate r, so Nt = N e , then at any point in
time the number of units at level j is
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(21) M. = {N ertSl-i
Jt 0
with the notation { } referring to the integer i such that
0 < [{N e rtSl-} - ii <
In order to examine the basic economics of the control
organization more fully, we must adopt one more convention.
We maintain our assumption that all factory units n. produce
the same output q.. We regard the value of each factory to
the organization as R., the net revenue attributable to plant
operations. Since this level for each plant is dependent upon
the calculations of its control unit, we will assign to each
control unit a "decision value" equal to the total net
revenue of the plants under its direct control. Thus, at
decision level j,
(22) R. = R N. = R S
J J
where R is the net revenue attributable to each plant unit
under the control of the decision unit at j.
As Hirschhorn has noted, however, we cannot only think
of the net revenue imputed to the decision unit at j because
of efficiency gains. Given the fixed span implied by commun-
ications technology at any point in time, continued absorp-
tion of plants by the organization implies the growth of
control units (at each hierarchical level) at the same rate.
Deterioration in the quality of internal communications must
inevitably set in. Buffering through inventory-building by
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sub-units will be the result. A complete imputation of pro-
fitability for the control unit at level j must include
these communications costs. In order to determine the limits
to organization size, we will consider the case of the single
central headquarters at hierarchic level j*.
(23) 7T. = R* - C.*(M.,)
(23a) R., = R -
(23b) M = (N .- l)/(S-l)
Since S and R are taken as fixed over the relevant time
span, we have:
(24) 7T .* = R..(Ni ) - C.(N.)
J J J J J
(24a) R .' (N *) > 0 R "(N.*) < 0
(24b) C.,'(N.*) > 0 C.,"(N.*) > 0
J J J J
24(a) follows from (16a) and (16b), while (24b) follows
from Hirschhorn's analysis. Graphically, then, the economics
of firm size can be represented in the following way:
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Figur'e I-l
Costs and Benefits of Firm Size
Rj J.
MRj*
N**
The most efficient size for the firm is N.,*, the point
J
at which the marginal revenue attributable to ownership ex-
pansion equals the marginal cost attributable to communica-
tions difficulties. In the absense of anti-trust legislation,
etc., competitive equilibrium in an industry which originally
has k firms depends upon the relative sizes of k and N.
If 2N.** > k > N.** , two firms should remain, each con-J J
trolling approximately k/2 plants. If 3N.** > k > 2N.
J J
then three approximately equal-sized firms should remain,
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and so on. Given the wide variance between industries in the
number of environmental "taps" required, technologies, etc.,
it is not surprising that equilibrium is regained with dif-
ferent numbers of giant firms dominating the industry. The
fundamental principle (movement from unstable to stable
equilibrium) seems valid, since the collapse of atomistic
competition has occurred in every major industrial category
since the mid-nineteenth century.
We have now brought our analysis of search to the point
where some of the ideas may be applicable to the theory of
urban growth. Before attempting a synthesis, however, it
will be necessary to review the current status of urban
growth theory to determine whether an analysis from the
perspective of information economics has already been at-
tempted.
1-6 Information and Urban Growth
We want to employ information economics in explaining
the growth of urban places and the emergence of a functional
hierarchy of cities in the U.S. To do this requires little
more than adapting certain well-developed analytic approaches
by including market information as a tradeable commodity.
The most promising approach seems to involve a general-
ized and dynamic version of central place theory. Central
place studies, initiated by Christaller and extensively dev-
eloped by Brian J. L. Berry and his associates, attempt to
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explain the size, number, and spatial distribution of towns
as the result of overlapping efficient market sizes. 1 2
Martin Beckmann has characterized the fundamental insight of
central place theory as follows: "The characteristic property
of a hierarchical system of production and distribution points
is that each commodity is produced in places of some level and
in all places of a higher level. Thus, the range of products
(found in a center) increases as one moves up the hierarchy."1 3
Like export-base theory, conventional central place theory
has the disadvantage of being totally demand-oriented. It is
also largely descriptive, and therefore has been little used
as the basis for explanations of urban growth. The most hope-
ful extension of urban growth theory in recent times has been
toward a dynamic central place theory which incorporates sup-
ply-side considerations. Wilbur Thompson has provided the
most general summary of this approach. 4 In Thompson's view,
any economic region contains an implicit hierarchy of central
places which represents the most efficient market structure
1 2 See Walter Christaller, Central Places in Southern
Germany, trans. by C. Baskin, (Prentice Hall: Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., 1966), and Brian J. L. Berry, "City Size Dis-
tributions and Economic Development," Economic Development
and Cultural Change, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 573-88.
1 3Martin Beckmann, Location Theory, (New York: Random
House, 1968), p. 77.
14Wilbur Thompson, A Preface to Urban Economics, (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), pp. 11-27.
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for the region. Cities within the region grow through a
complex interaction between demands emanating from their
hinterlands and internal structural evolution which con-
stantly generates new activities. Not all cities can con-
tinue growing at the same rate, however. In the hierarchy
of central places toward which the region is evolving, few
cities are needed in the upper strata. Thus, the continuing
growth of cities in an economic region depends upon success
in capturing higher-order functions at the expense of compe-
titors.
In general, this seems an excellent start toward an
accurate characterization of the urban growth process. We
will build on Thompson's idea by incorporating the notion
of a market in information. Our purpose will be to show
that under appropriate conditions there exists an implicit
hierarchy of central places for the gathering and dissemina-
tion of information. The continued growth of large cities
in the U.S. is, in part, a reflection of the existence of
such a hierarchy.
In attempting to incorporate a market for information
into the theory of urban growth, we have little prior work
to build on. Richard Meier has introduced the concept but
has made no attempt to develop it rigorously.15 Alan Evans
1 5 See Richard Meier, A Communications Theory of Urban
Growth (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1962).
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has recently introduced "business services" into an analysis
of urban size hierarchies, but these services are regarded as
being homogeneous across cities. Since our notion of implicit
hierarchy is completely antithetical to the notion of homo-
geneous sets of business services, Evans' results are not
very helpful.1 6
We must strike out on our own, then. In order to do so,
we will use the same theoretical framework that was used in
the analysis of corporate growth. By developing the theory
in a different but complementary direction, we will be able
to discern how the two growth patterns have interacted.
In what follows, we will provide an economic rationale
for the emergence of units which specialize in the collec-
tion, processing, and transmission of information. It will
be shown that the efficient interaction between information
service units and the corporate control units which purchase
their output requires the emergence of a size hierarchy of
clusters in which the two activities co-locate.
1-7 The Emergence of An Information Market
In order to see why clusters of information services may
form, let us consider the circumstances under which it be-
comes economically efficient for firms specializing only in
the processing of information to come into existence.
1 6 Alan W. Evans, "The Pure Theory of City Size in an
Industrial Economy," Urban Studies, (February, 1972), pp.
49-78.
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As multi-unit firms begin to consolidate their position
in various industries and input-output linkages become rela-
tively dense, we should begin to notice increasing overlap
in the information desired by large firms in different in-
dustries. Several industries will share inputs and may ship
outputs to a common customer. As markets overlap, similar
accounting, legal, and economic consulting services will be
needed. Our task is to show that such a situation can quite
easily dictate specialization in information-processing as
an efficient solution.
We return to our original characterization of the econo-
my as a set of m environmental taps and n industries. For
analytic convenience, we let each industry be absorbed by
one firm which owns and controls k plants. We assume that
there is one search cost function for all of the n industries:
(25) C(p)/k = c(p)
Each industry is interested in k discrete types of in-
formation, whose sources are scattered randomly over space.
If we suppose for the sake of simplicity that the relation-
ship between search and expected information state is iden-
tical for all environmental variables, then the cost of search
for each industry is simply
k - c(p)
where p is the equilibrium number of entrepreneurial time
units spent in search for each optimal variable level. In
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such an economy, there will be some redundant sampling of
information. Given our condition of m taps and k unique
sets of information demands, the possible number of indus-
tries in the economy is simply
(26) ) (m)!
If the number of industries, n, is equal to the possible
number of industries, (m) , then each information tap will be
sampled [( ) - m-l)] times. To see why, let us choose ak 9,
simple example.
Suppose that the economy contains five environmental taps
and five industries, each of which must sample four discrete
types of information. Since
m 5 51 5
k 4 411! -
the economy contains the maximum number of industries. We
want to take any of the five taps and determine how many
times it will be sampled under these circumstances. Accord-
ing to our formula,
(27) Duplication (D) = (m) - m-) = ( - 4
5k 4'4
5! _ 4! _4 4!-0= 5-1 = 4
This result is quite sensible. If five taps are taken
four at a time in unique combinations, then any one tap will
only be left out of one combination. Our general formulation
proves to be quite useful.
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In general, the economy will not have the maximal number
of industries. Given n = ( ) industries, we are interested
in determining the expected value of D for each variable.
The calculation is straightforward:
m-1
(28) D = n (m in- n nml
E mi- 
m
nn! (m-!) k
n n nm n-l
!mM-9.)!
= n - [ n-(m-9,)] n - n- + n- _ /m
m m m
For the moment, we can regard the total decision environ-
ment (m taps) as fixed and regard n and k as variables. We
therefore have
(29) DE /
(29a) D E'(n) > 0
(29b) DEI(,
The larger the number of industries in the economy and
the greater the information demands per industry, the greater
the expected redundant sampling of any information source.
For any source to be considered part of the decision environ-
ment, it must be utilized by at least one industry. There-
fore, DE > 1.
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Now, consider the case of the entrepreneur who is con-
templating the establishment of an information firm. His
firm will collect and transmit data on the state of informa-
tion sources to users in various industries. He knows that
for each source, his cost will be c(l) (We assume that his
search cost function is the same as that of the industries
themselves). We know that he will be able to charge at most
c(l) to each customer, since that would be the cost were the
client firm itself to undertake search. Therefore, the ex-
pected revenue of the information firm will be
RE = DE-c(l) = /m c(l)
where n9/m is the expected number of customers per period.
For the information firm, then,
(30) i = RE _ C = n /m-c(l) - c(l)]
= c(l)n9 /m-1] > 0
The situation which held true for each industry also
holds true among industries. Competitive equilibrium is
unstable under the assumption of autonomous information
search. The economy will operate more efficiently under
some specialization in search activities. In our example,
given k sources searched,
(31) 
_f = c(9)[np/m-1]
(31a) c' (M > 0
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(31b) T,- '() > 0
Again, from this perspective there is no upper limit to
the number of sources which one firm can profitably sample.
As in the case of the firm, the picture must be completed by
introducing the tradeoff between the quantity and precision
of information handled. Communication-buffer costs will
determine some upper limit to the size of information service
firms.
1-8 Service Clusters: The Benefits of Co-Location
At this point, we must partially abandon the level of
abstraction which has been pursued thus far and consider the
specific environment in which the multi-unit firm handles
problems of search and investment decision-making. It is
clear that the reason cited by Stigler as the basis for
local markets -- minimization of search costs -- also applies
to activities at the decision level of the firm. If there
exist large agglomerations of "information sources" --
organizations which collect, process, and transmit types of
information as a market activity, then the following would
seem to provide a powerful argument for co-location with these
sources. Imagine that the national economy contains a set
of information service clusters, Ic, which are distributed
over space. We will rank these clusters by size, so that
I < I c+l (I = c-i , where i is a "unit information
cr c+1 c c c
service" in the cluster).
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As is generally the case with location economics, the
clusters Ic persist because of transportation costs. In this
case, the product which is transmitted is information. There
are, of course, numerous devices for transporting information,
and it would probably be possible to give a rough characteri-
zation of the "channel capacity" of each medium in terms of
usable bits of information transmitted per unit time period.
For our purposes, however, it seems sufficient to note that
there is a near-unanimous consensus among business executives
that face-to-face contact is infinitely superior to other
modes as a means of transmitting information. This is due to
the ability of human beings to exchange information simultan-
eously on many levels, both visual and auditory. At the
current level of technical development, it seems justifiable
to assert the vast superiority of face-to-face contact with
information services. In the exchanging of information, then,
human transport costs are almost surely the most important
factor. There is a quantum advantage in the transport costs
associated with co-location with a service cluster. In an
uncertain market environment subject to frequent and impor-
tant changes, reaction speed becomes an extremely important
factor. Here again, the speed with which personal contacts
can be arranged in one service agglomeration provides an im-
portant competitive advantage.
It seems quite likely that the decision unit will choose
to co-locate with an Ic. The question of an appropriate size
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for Ic , given the level j of the decision unit, remains.
We will assume for the present that communication within
Ic is instantaneous and costless, while communication between
Ic's is so expensive as to be unavailable as a behavioral
option. Consider the case of any decision variable (e.g.
input and output prices, technical data, etc.) whose value
must be determined through exterior consultation. Each case
will have its own peculiarities, and there will therefore be
a non-standardized set of information services required. It
seems intuitively clear that the larger Ic , the closer the
organization will come to locating the optimum set of services
for any particular requirement.
Returning to our abstract model of corporate organization,
we augment the imputed profitability for a decision unit at
the jth hierarchic level in the nth industry:
(32) R. = R(N.,I )Jn j c
The following marginal conditions hold:
(32a) jn/D c > 0 jn/Ic 2 < 0
In effect, consultation with information units in I
replaces information search by the firm itself. Since search
by the firm exhibits diminishing returns at the margin (See
(5a-6(b)), so does search in the form of consultation.
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1-9 The Cost of Co-Location
Our specification is not yet complete, however. Thus
far, we have considered only the benefits associated with
co-location with service agglomeration I c. There are also
costs, of course. It is clearly in the interest of each ic
to minimize its distance from the center of the agglomeration
Ic' in order to minimize the average transportation cost to
any decision unit u. . The consequence of this fact is the
J
central city skyline of large urban agglomerations. The
bid-price function observed for these agglomerations will in
general be a reflection of the following demand-supply inter-
action.
Assume a single-centered city with all decision units
located at the center. Given the number of information units,
Ic , we can envision the demand and supply curves for "space
services" (land plus office structure) in the following way:
(33) Demand equation: r = r (d)
c c
where d = the distance from the city center
r = the unit rental which the i is
c willing to pay c
(34) Supply equation: r = r [d,b (I)]
c c c
where bc the cost of constructing the service
space
The space service supplier must be compensated both for
the land rent associated with building location and the costs
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of constructing the building itself. In order to determine
the basic statics of the system, it is important to realize
that both demand and supply equations can be fully specified
only with the addition of the number of i already in I .
c c
This is simply because the urban space which is to be filled
by the i is three-dimensional -- Provision of space takes
c
place at the extensive and intensive margins. Thus, in re-
duced form,
(35) rc = rc (dR , C)
J N
where R = E E R., for N industries and
T j=l i=l 13 J hierarchic levels
This formulation has some similarity to the Alonso model
of land-use and bid-rents, with the obvious difference that
we must provide for expansion in the third dimension. Fol-
lowing Alonso, we can assert:
3r 32r
(36) Dr < 0 2 < 0
(6) > 0 r 0
2
(36a) 0 r2=r
(36b) > 0 D r> 0
2
We know that 3 > 0 because the costs of tall building
I
construction are increasing at the margin. Thus, we can posit
a function
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(37) r = r (d,R ,Ic
c C T C
The corrected profitability function for a decision unit
at the jth level in the nth industry (where j* is fixed) is
(38) i. = R(N.,I ) - C(I )Jn j c c
(38a) R'(N.) > 0 R"(N.) < 0
J J
(38b) R'(I) > 0 R"(Ic < 0
C'(I ) > 0 C"(I ) > 0
As a final step in the analysis, we recall that
(17) N. = Si
J
Since we regard S as a technologically-determined variable
which is fixed in the short run, we can deduce:
(39) dN. d 2N.
J.3 > 0 2 > 0d. 2J d.
We can substitute j for N in (38):
(40) 7r. = R(.,I ) - C(I )Jn j c c
From (16b) we know that 32jn/3N 2 < 0 is reflected in
asymptotic decline. d N > 0, on the other hand, represents
d. 2
J
an exponential rate of increase. Thus,
(40a) 0 0
J J
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We have now assembled all the theoretical equipment nec-
essary to examine the relationship between city-size hier-
archies and the processing of information. To review briefly,
we have examined market competition in a non-Walrasian informa-
tion economy and deduced that unstable atomistic equilibrium
in such an economy must almost inevitably give way to a stable
equilibrium with a few large multi-unit firms dominating each
industry. The technically-limited capacity to process all
relevant data results in hierarchic organization and a maxi-
mum span of control for each decision unit in the firm.
The phenomenon of redundant environmental sampling across
industries results in the emergence of specialized information
services. The profit-maximizing locational solution for de-
cision units and information services is spatial clustering,
since communication time is thereby minimized. Clustering
entails costs as well as benefits, however. We will now
bring these elements together to prove the following asser-
tion: The interplay of benefits and costs can be shown to
imply a hierarchy of cluster sizes which maximizes system
efficiency. For ease of exposition, we will translate the
general profit function for a decision unit at level j to the
following explicit function which preserves all the appropri-
ate marginal conditions:
-(I 61(41) 'w. = R.(l-e ) - CoeJn 3
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Here we are regarding R. as reflecting the "perfect"
J
information level associated with an infinitely large Ic. It
should be noted that
2
j/3> 0 j < 0 , as in (40) Simi-
2I
larly, with C(I) = Coe6I, Dc I > 0 and D2c/D 2 > 0. From
(22) we know R. = RN. = RS.
J ] ]
- (42) T. = RS3(l-e ) - Coe6I
Applying the standard condition for profit maximization,
3ffr. /3I =Jn RS e - 6Coe 
6
j* -I* SI*
RS e - 6Coe
SRS e (3+6)I*
6C
0
I -[logSi + log(SR) + log(6C
[logSj + b - c]
a
a = 6+
b = log(SR)
c = log(6C )
(42a) = >
3 aS
all constants
0
3 *I* - _ j(42b) 2j- < 0
* as j-
= 0
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These results suggest the following relationship between
the profit-maximizing levels of j and I
Figure 1-2
Hierarchic Level and Optimal Cluster Size
Ic*
2 j*'
The optimal size of a service agglomeration increases with
the hierarchic level of the decision unit which is making a
location choice.
I-10 Control Unit Location as an Inducement to Service Cluster
Growth
So far, we have found that the optimal cluster size from
the perspective of a decision unit rises with the hierarchical
level of that unit. We have yet to determine what the conse-
quences of the unit's location decision will be. In order to
P
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examine these consequences properly, we must turn our atten-
tion back to the nature of the information-processing firm.
In an earlier section, we found that specialization in
information processing could yield positive profits because
of redundant sampling by large firms. For a firm i which
c
transmits the state of p information taps to customers, we
know from (30) that
(43) 7r. = R - C = c(p) [ M - 1]
In addition, the firm ic must pay the cost of co-locating
with other decision units and information units in i . Thus:
c
(44) Tr. = i. - C(I ) =c(p)[nt/ 
- 1] -C(I )
Suppose competing information units are in equilibrium at
zero profit:
(45) c*(p)[pnZ/ 
- 1] = C*(Ic
If residual profits were greater than zero, with no bar-
riers to entry, we would expect new firms to enter the informa-
tion market. Thus,
(46) i = F(7. )c i
F' > 0 F" = 0
With p, k , and m held constant, we can now consider the
consequences of the arrival of a new decision unit in the clus-
ter I c. Since n increases, redundancy increases, and
c(p) [ / 1 l] > C(I ). From (46), we will now have i > 0.
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Only when the size of the cluster increases space services
rental sufficiently will the cluster return to zero-profit,
zero-growth equilibrium.
I-11 Hierarchical Development and the Limits to Urban Growth
The time has come to see what this theoretical structure
can contribute to the theory of urban growth. If we put the
elements of our analysis together, a very clear picture of the
dynamics of information cluster growth emerges. Our theory
implies that the period of collapse in atomistic competition
should be paralleled by the development of a size-hierarchy
of information clusters. As multi-unit firms with fixed con-
trol spans grow progressively larger, higher-order decision
units will appear in the system. As these units appear, they
will choose to locate in the largest and most intensively
developed information centers. The imputed profitability of
the highest-order decision units will be so high that they
will not regard space rental as a constraint, even in the
largest information centers. As the system collapses into
oligopolist structure in a large number of industries, then,
two things will be happening: (1) The largest information
centers in a region will get larger, as the influx of high-
order decision units stimulates the growth of more information
services; (2) All decision units in these centers will pay
more rent as a result of increased competition for central
city space.
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Over time, we would expect a system of information centers
to form a hierarchy of sizes. Low-level decision units in
cities which are not chosen as higher-order centers will prob-
ably stay put, since moving costs plus higher rents will not
justify the incremental benefits to moving. For a considerable
time, lower-order units in the higher-order centers will also
stay put because incremental benefits will outweigh moving
costs plus the rent differential. As progressively higher-
level decision units come into existence, then, a perfect
example of Thompson's evolutionary central-place hierarchy will
be in effect.
The crucial point to notice here, though, is that the
driving force which underlies the whole system does not lie
in the internal characteristics of the information clusters
themselves. It lies rather in the scale economies of produc-
tion and control. The three key parameters in our system of
analysis are:
1). The rate of economic growth.
2). The plant size at which net scale economies (scale
economies minus organizational costs) are maximized.
3). The firm size at which the marginal benefits from
information-sharing equal the marginal cost attribut-
able to communications difficulty and inventory buf-
fering.
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Our analysis implicitly assumes that most production fac-
ilities reach a maximally efficient scale long before the
market is saturated. This assumption seems fully justified,
especially when transport costs are included in profitability
calculations. The implication is that with a positive rate of
economic growth, the number of plants in each industrial sec-
tor will expand. With the span of control fixed by technology,
this implies a steady expansion in the number of control units.
Their location decisions will in turn fuel the growth of a
hierarchy of information clusters.
The most important question which immediately arises is
whether there is an upper limit to this process. The answer
is clearly yes. Recall from (42) that
* > 0 32 * < 0
J J
From (5) and (6) we can infer (for any economic unit)
2
Jn/ > 0 Jn/ 2 < 0
where p is the extent of search.
At the same time, we know that i = F(Tr. ) and
c l
2
3c/ > 0 3 c/ 2 > 0
c c
Given diminishing marginal increments to co-location be-
nefit measures and increasing increments to the cost measure,
the growth of even the largest information cluster must halt
- 61 -
at some point. The precise point at which this occurs will
depend heavily upon parameter (3).
Since R. = RN. = KS , the net revenue imputed to a de-] J
cision unit grows exponentially with its hierarchical position.
If the level of an existing decision unit is sufficiently high,
it can absorb tremendous rental costs in exchange for more
varied information services. Clearly, then, the maximal size
for information clusters in the system will take a substantial
jump every time j* increases by one in the system. Parameter
(3) determines the maximum level of j* dictated by internal
communications constraints. Business history in recent years
suggests that (under current technology) the limit of efficient
firm size has been reached. The rash of failures in the wake
of the conglomerate boom of the 1960's suggests that expansion
past one or two two-digit SIC categories is not profitable for
most firms. As a consequence, the process of hierarchical
growth seems to be stabilizing in American multi-unit firms,
with a maximum j of four or five and an average span of four
or five (Thus, about 54 = 525 factories per central headquar-
ters for the biggest firms).
Thus far, we have spoken solely of information clusters,
rather than cities. Clearly, though, such clusters represent
a substantial proportion of central business district activity
in most cities. When we couple our "external dynamic" of corp-
orate growth to Wilbur Thompson's "internal dynamic" of urban
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development, our hypothesis implies continued rapid growth of
the largest cities in the system until the maximum level of
corporate hierarchy in the system has been attained. Once the
resulting burst of growth in large CBD's levels off, however,
our theory suggests the emergence of a new phenomenon: The
progressive decentralization of decision-unit activity and a
relative decline in the growth rate of larger urban areas.
The key is once again to be found in equations (5) and (6).
At a given hierarchic level j, incremental search benefits
decrease at the margin. As the maximum level of hierarchy
in the system becomes fixed, new units emerging at this level
will crowd into existing large centers until the diminishing
marginal benefits are exceeded by rising marginal costs from
space competition. At this point, lower-order centers will
begin to attract higher-order decision units and grow more
rapidly. The phenomenon may be replicated in cascade fashion
down the hierarchic ordering, with centers at each level stimu-
lated to more rapid growth by the influx of units which had
formerly located in higher-order centers.
1-12 Conclusion
The theory which has been developed above suggests some
important propositions which should be testable. Among the
more interesting of these are the following:
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1). The location of decision units in multi-unit firms
is not at all an haphazard phenomenon. Rather, existing loca-
tion patterns reflect a series of economic decisions concerning
costs and benefits, appropriately defined.
2). The consequences of these location decisions for the
spatial structure and functioning of the national system of
cities are non-trivial. The economic power in the hands of
such units, in fact, is so considerable that the resulting
pattern of development may well have become the most important
determinant of central city growth and development in recent
years.
3). In a "developing" information economy, the progres-
sive appearance of higher-order decision units with exponen-
tially-increasing imputed profitability should cause a rapid
increase of service activity in the largest urban centers.
In such an economy, one might well expect to find rate of
growth related positively to city size.
In a "mature" information economy, with the maximal hier-
archic level attained, the phenomenon should be inverted. New
higher-order decision units will begin locating in lower-order
centers, with the result that the largest urban areas will no
longer exhibit the most rapid rates of growth. We will now
turn to the problem of testing each of these three propositions.
Chapter II
The Locational Economics of Information and Control
II-1 Introduction
The next two chapters will examine the causes and con-
sequences of control unit movements in the United States.
In Chapter II, a control unit location decision function
will be specified and estimated. Changes in control unit
activity from time (t-1) to t in particular metropolitan
areas will be specified as the result of control unit ob-
servation of comparative metropolitan attribute levels at
(t-1). This procedure (estimating changes as a function of
levels) implies a system which is in dynamic disequilibrium,
since instantaneous equilibrium would require changes in
control location to be a function of short-run changes in
environmental attributes.
Once the decision function has been estimated, Chapter
III will be concerned with embedding the function in a model
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of metropolitan growth. It will be shown that induced con-
trol unit movements set in motion a series of growth proces-
ses in the metropolitan area. Several of these processes,
in turn, will change the attribute levels which originally
induced an influx of control activity. Some attributes will
become even more favorable for control unit location, while
others will become less so.
After estimating the entire model, therefore, we will
be able to examine corporate control movements as part of a
feedback system. Through simulation, it will be possible to
see whether such movements are self-reinforcing or self-
damping.
11-2 Quantifying Control Unit Costs and Benefits
In order to estimate a location decision function for
control units, we must broaden the simplified theoretical
structure developed in Chapter I. A whole complex of fac-
tors bear on the costs of operation in the short and long
run, and control units will attempt to locate themselves so
that these costs are minimized. The following factors should
logically be considered:
1). Economies of agglomeration -- These simply repre-
sent the advantage of co-location with an information clus-
ter. The trade-off between benefits and costs has already
been discussed.
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2). Internal operating costs -- Two factors are of
primary importance here: Personnel costs and office main-
tenance costs. Under "personnel" we include all who are not
defined by the organization itself as part of the management
group. Clearly, the lower the average salary which must be
paid these personnel (assuming equivalent productivity levels)
the lower the operating costs for the unit.
By office maintenance costs we mean the unit rental rate
for floor space. The two main determinants of this rental
are the wage bill of construction labor and the land rental
rate.
3). Long-run costs -- Here we enter the arena of the
intangible. Several non-pecuniary considerations must be of
importance in the total cost calculation. These factors can
generally be divided into two types: Those associated with
high-level manpower costs and those associated with the
firm's operating environment.
Corporate salary policy for high-level personnel must
be a source of embarrassment to the neoclassicst. Most
multi-divisional corporations pay salaries on a set schedule
-- that is, no allowances are made for regional differences
in the cost of living. It seems plausible to argue that
under such a rigid pricing system, long-run quantity ad-
justments will take the place of price adjustments. Almost
all control units are associated with multi-divisional
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operations which are continental in scale. Thus, fixed salary
scales are likely to be very similar across these organizations,
so that money wages are relatively invariant. Real wages, of
course, will vary with differential costs of living, and exec-
utives in the market for control-unit employment will be af-
fected by the real wages associated with different locations.
In a competitive environment, the need to attract executive
talent will make the locational advantage of high real-wage
areas an important factor in corporate profit calculations.
Living costs cannot be measured solely by the Consumer
Price Index, however. Any sensible calculation of personal
costs by business executives will include the physical and
social characteristics of the headquarters city. We hypo-
thesize that the following phenomena may have an influence
on personal cost calculations:
1). Crime rates -- It is arguable that below a certain
threshold, crime rates are not sufficiently threatening for
inclusion in cost calculations. In recent years, however,
some cities have been characterized by levels of criminal
violence which obviously exceed this threshold.
2). Climate -- The threshold phenomenon probably oper-
ates here also. A large range of cities may have climates
which are indistinguishably "tolerable", while some will be
recognized as having exceptionally "good" or "bad" climates.
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Because the executive market is characterized by high levels
of information and mobility, the local climate is undoubtedly
an amenity factor which affects market decisions.
3). Cultural life -- Given the fact that business execu-
tives are members of the upper socio-economic stratum, we can-
not ignore the general impression of the state of cultural
activity in a particular area (The skeptical reader should
consider his own market behavior and then consider the probable
convergence of his social attitudes with those of the average
Harvard Business School graduate). In an era of leisure con-
sciousness, this factor may well be of considerable importance
to any member of the socio-economic elite.
4). Pollution-levels -- Not least among probable en-
vironmental influences is the level of air pollution prevail-
ing in a certain area. Again, this may well be a threshold
phenomenon, with little discrimination over a broad middle
range. Lengthy residence in Youngstown, Ohio (rumored to
be one of America's few "two-shirt-a-day" areas), however,
will doubtless lead to a measurable shortening of the expec-
ted life span. At the present level of environmental con-
sciousness, pollution levels should have some impact on the
calculation of real locational cost.
In summary, then, executive calculations of "real bene-
fits" will include the following considerations:
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1). The crime rate
2). Climate
3). Cultural life
4). Air pollution level
We now turn to a consideration of non-pecuniary factors
which affect the market environment of the control unit. If
their own literature is to be believed, corporations attach
significance to the effect of headquarters location on "cor-
porate image". While puzzling to the outsider, this pheno-
menon appears quite tangible to business executives. Two
factors seem generally rated as important in judging differ-
ent cities:
1). Dynamism -- It seems important to corporations to
be associated with cities which are "forward-looking" or
characterized by high growth rates in some definable sense.
2). Current prestige as an "elite" center -- This
notion seems to revolve around the presence of high levels
of control activity. Areas which are thus "important" a
priori are considered "safe" from the standpoint of corpo-
rate prestige.
Thus, we would expect both fast-growing areas and areas
with significant control activity to be attractive, ceteris
paribus.
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11-3 An Econometric Model of the Location Decision Function
Our approach to this problem inevitably suffers from the
lack of some important data and from an inexact conception of
the underlying structure of the market process involved. We
are going to attempt to deduce the importance of various
decision factors by observing the change in control unit
activity which characterizes each of a set of cities. The
following is the general form of the function to be estimated:
(Ct Ct-l) = fX + E
where (Ct - Ct-1 ) represents the change in control unit activ-
ity from time (t-l) to time t and Xt-l is the vector of at-
tributes at time (t-1) which determine the decision to locate.
The calculated change (Xt X t-) represents the summa-
tion of a set of decisions whose outcome can be represented
as 1 (to locate in a particular city) or 0 (not to locate
there). Therefore, generalized least squares estimation of
a linear probability model would be appropriate if available
data separated control unit inflows from outflows. Unfor-
tunately, the available data yield only the resultant of the
two processes. Ordinary least squares seems to be the best
technique, given the data limitations.
We propose to use ordinary least squares in estimating
the following location function:
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( C(a.C)i - a C )it-l) = fXt-l + e
J
Xt-1 is the vector of attributes at time (t-1)
3 is the matrix of coefficients to be estimated
We assume E ( e ) = 0, with e representing the result of
random differences in control unit characteristics.
The a.'s represent weights which must be used in regis-
J
tering the importance of different control unit size classes.
It is necessary to weight control units by size class because
the location equation is to be embedded in a dynamic model of
urban interaction which can be used for simulation. For
reasons which will be discussed below, all urban activity
equations which include the number of corporate control
units as a right-hand variable must use the weighted sum as
the appropriate measure of the "importance" of corporate
control activity. For compatibility, the control location
equation is also estimated using weighted sums.
The following equation is estimated:
(a C )il970 - =)i966 1 +
J J
62*Ri1 96 6 + 3*PLSil966 + 64*CLIil966 +
5 *CUil966 + 6 (C )i966 + j7 *CWi1 9 6 6 +
J
68 *POPil 9 6 6 + 69*PRil966 + l0 *LDil966
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An explanation of symbols, data collection, and aggrega-
tion procedure follows:
1). E(a.C.) - Z(a i.C.)i -- This represents the
. jJ il970 j j il966J
net change in the weighted number of control units present in
city i in 1966 and 1970. Control units in manufacturing,
mining, and transport, communications, and utilities were
used in this study. The time period chosen, four years,
was the shortest which was feasible, given the quality of
the control unit data. The reason for this lies in the inter-
action between the data variations and the weighting method
employed.
Control unit data are drawn from the Department of
Commerce publication, County Business Patterns. Statistics
on number of control units and number of employees are avail-
able yearly by standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA).
For our purposes, the number of control units is the impor-
tant variable. These are enumerated by employment size
classes, and for the purposes of this study the five largest
classes were considered:
A). 20 to 50 employees
B). 50 to 100 employees
C). 100 to 250 employees
D). 250 to 500 employees
E). More than 500 employees
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The introduction to this paper provides evidence which
suggests that class E units are considerably more important
than the rest and that there is a descending level of impor-
tance as we move down through employment size-class levels.
The following weighting rules were adopted as providing an
adequate adjustment for the relative importance of control
units in different size classes:
aA = aB = 1.0
aC = aD = 5.0
aE = 25.0
Before analysis was undertaken in this study, yearly data
were collected for the period 1962 to 1970, with the hope that
a year-by-year decision model could be constructed and esti-
mated using techniques to pool cross-section and time-series
data. Unfortunately, the interaction between short-term
size-class enumeration and the method of weighting employed
leads to considerable spurious fluctuation in the data over
such a short period. Suppose, to take an extreme case, that
in year (t-1) city C has three control units with barely more
than 500 employees. Suppose, in addition, that marginal ad-
ministrative changes cause two to have slightly less than 500
employees in year t. This marginal change will result in a
drop in the weighted number of units from 75 to 35, although
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such a drop has no basis in realtiy. It may be argued that
this difficulty provides a very good case for using total
control employment rather than total units weighted by size
class.
For our purposes, however, this will not do. In a city
such as Detroit, a national administrative consolidation by
General Motors for independent reasons could cause an abrupt
rise of several thousand in the number of control employees.
Since we are interested in the determinants of control unit
location, then, our purpose may not be well served by looking
at employment statistics. A more practical procedure is
simply to consider a decision period sufficiently long that
spurious data fluctuations are dominated by real changes.
A further objection to this approach might be that
secular increases in control unit size will result in a
spurious jump in the weighted number as more units pass the
500-employee level. It should be clear that the use of a
constant term in the estimation takes care of this problem.
We will discuss the right-hand variables by subject
class:
Short-run maintenance costs:
1). CWi1 9 6 6 -- The weighted average of clerical wage
rates in city i in 1966. The data are drawn from the annual
Survey of Labor Statistics. This is used as the best index
of non-executive personnel costs, and given the large clerical
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staff employed by control units, this factor must be important.
Because of pronounced data collinearity, we also have to
let this variable represent the influence of construction labor
costs on office rent. As might be expected, clerical wages
are also collinear with cost-of-living indices. Although it
is unfortunate that we cannot separate the influence of these
factors precisely, we know that they all move together for
obvious reasons and that we can at least be clear about the
general nature of the factor whose influence we are measuring.
2). POPil966 -- Population of SMSA in 1966. As previ-
ously noted, this variable should serve as an excellent proxy
for central city land rental rates. Dependable statistics
for the latter are simply unavailable (For additional evi-
dence that population serves as an excellent proxy, see the
section on metropolitan land values).
Long-run cost considerations:
Personal cost factors:
1). Ri 1 9 6 6 -- The number of armed robberies committed
per hundred thousand population in 1966, as reported in the
Uniform Crime Statistics of the FBI for that year. The use
of this particular crime category requires justification. We
know that crime rates affect personal safety calculations
after they have passed some threshold level. We are inter-
ested here in the type of crime which would bear most heavily
on the cost calculations of executive recruits. This sort of
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crime should have two dominant attributes:
a). It should be "violent".
b). It should be a "class" crime in the sense that its
incidence shows a disproportionate number of upper-class
victims and lower-class committors.
It seems that armed robbery is by far the best candidate
for use as an index. Murder and aggravated assault are largely
confined within socio-economic groups. Given the heavy pre-
ponderance of males in executive ranks, rape is clearly not
much of a factor (Most executive families live in the suburbs).
Armed robbery is clearly a "class" crime in the sense that
the rational street criminal will rob the most affluent in-
dividual who happens to be accessible.
2). CUi1 9 6 6 -- An index of the state of cultural activ-
ity in SMSA in 1966. This admittedly crude index is simply
a weighted combination of employment in two categories in-
cluded in County Business Patterns:
a). Museums, Art Galleries, and Zoos
b). Producers, Orchestras, and Entertainers
The employees in category a) were given twice the weight
of employees in category b) to compensate for the relative
"labor intensity" of the latter. One who considers himself
culturally "aware" will no doubt scoff at such a mechanistic
indicator. Perhaps before doing so, he should look at the
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weights of the eleven most important cities as determined by
this index:
1). New York 16000
2). Los Angeles 5800
3). Chicago 5500
4). Philadelphia 2000
5). Boston 1500
6). San Francisco 1100
7). Cleveland 1100
8). St. Louis 800
9). Houston 800
10). Seattle 800
11). Minneapolis 800
The critic may find this ranking quite close to what he
would have supposed on the basis of general knowledge. Two
main points must be made in defense of this approach:
a). Any community which employs a thriving arts commun-
ity will inevitably project the spirit of this community into
museums, galleries, etc. The more and varied the artists,
the wider the variety of such institutions.
b). We are concerned here, not with the "true" state of
the arts in a particular community, but in the executive's
perception of this state. This information is apt to be pre-
cisely the kind we have used in constructing our index. Busi-
ness managers are not, after all, generally privy to the most
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advanced thinking in the artistic community. They are, rather,
attracted to the external forms of culture through a compli-
cated interaction between social class and personal taste.
This tie between the socio-economic elite and the artistic
community seems to be a fairly consistent historical pheno-
menon, rooted no doubt in the fact that the rich have the
time and the wherewithal to enjoy art, and the artist needs
money in order to function.
3). CLIil966 -- An index of climatic advantage. No
ideally weighted combination of temperature, humidity, and
precipitation is available. Therefore, although individual
climatic preferences display considerable variance, it seems
reasonable to suppose that most people would prefer a rela-
tively warm climate, ceteris paribus. For the purposes of
this study, then, the mean number of heating degree days,
drawn from the Statistical Abstract of the U.S. (1966) was
used as the climate index. (Note: "Heating degree days"
simply represents the number of daily degrees under 600 F.
in a given year.)
4). PLSil966 -- An index of the level of air pollution.
The geometric mean measure of suspended SO2 was chosen as the
best index for the present purposes. Since even yearly
averages for pollution data tend to fluctuate widely, an
average of readings for the period 1962 - 1970 was used as
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the best approximation to the "true" sulphate count in 1966.
Of several possible pollution indices, So2 suspension was
chosen principally because it has been counted for years as
a form of serious pollution whose detrimental consequences
for personal health are widely suspected. It should thus be
firmly rooted in the public consciousness as a health hazard
and one might reasonably suppose personal cost calculations
to be affected by it.
External environment factors:
1). Z(a C )il966 -- The inclusion of total weighted
control units is intended to serve two purposes. First, it
serves as an index of the "prestige" consideration formerly
mentioned. Secondly, it serves as the best available index
of the attractiveness of the information unit cluster in
each city (In this connection it should be noted that the
number of control units in cities is highly collinear with
employment in the sort of business services which would be
classed as "information units"). Because collinearity pre-
vented the use of both variables, it was decided that the
weighted sum of control units was the superior index for our
purposes.
2). PRi1 9 6 6 -- This is an i.ndex of the image of each
SMSA as a "growth center", another element of attractiveness
which is often mentioned in business literature. It is simply
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the ratio of population in 1900 to population in 1966.
One further device was employed to improve the quality
of the estimate. As previously noted, three different econo-
mic categories were employed as sources of control-unit data.
Of these categories, the bulk of control units were drawn
from manufacturing. It seems reasonable to suppose that one
additional factor which has influenced the location of manu-
facturing control units is the present distribution of indus-
trial plant. The majority of main plant facilities for indus-
tries with the greatest number of control units (automobiles,
heavy metals, machinery) are disproportionately concentrated
in the Great Lakes Region. To test whether continued control-
plant ties are important, then, a dummy was included for
location in the Great Lakes Region (This is LD il966 in the
specified equation).
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11-4 Results
The estimated equation is the following:
CHANGE IN CONTROL ACTIVITY
EQUALS
1322.49
T-STAT (4.6)
BETA COEF. (.00)
.05839
(3.1)
(.27)
.14402
(-.6)
(.10)
.02085
(2.3)
(.61)
.00513
(-.7)
(-.06)
.22922
(3.0)
(.93)
10.36880
(-4.4)
(-.43)
.02810
(-2.1)
(-.52)
- 322.8760
(-3.9)
(-.31)
* ARMED ROBBERY INDEX (R6 )
* SULPHATE POLLUTION (PLS i66
* CULTURAL LEVEL (CUi6 6)
* LEVEL OF CLIMATIC "UNPLEASANTNESS"
(CLIi6 6)
* INDEX OF SIZE OF CURRENT CONTROL-
SERVICES CLUSTER (Z(a C ) i66j
* CLERICAL WAGE LEVELS (CW. )i66
* POPULATION IN 1966 (PROXY FOR LAND
PRICE) (POP i66)
* (POPULATION 1900/POPULATION 1966)
(PRi66
86.47850 * LOCATION IN GREAT LAKES REGION
(2.9) (LD i66(.25)
+
+
+
+
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R2 (Corrected for degrees of freedom) = .94
Degrees of freedom = 8
F-Statistic (9/8) = 30.6 (Significant at the 1% level)
The only anomaly in this equation is the positive, sig-
nificant coefficient on the armed robbery index. We have
noted that armed robbery certainly enters personal cost cal-
culations as a negative factor. However, we have reason to
suspect that an underlying factor may be attractive to both
control units and armed robbers -- specifically, an income
distribution skewed toward the upper end. The average execu-
tive is likely to find a large executive community attractive,
ceteris paribus, and the attraction for the potential robber
is clear. Unfortunately for our estimate, this phenomenon
appears to dominate the negative impact of armed robberies
themselves.
In a later section of this paper, some attempt is made
to quantify the impact of control unit activity on metropoli-
tan area socio-economic structure. In order to test the idea
that control units are positively associated with armed rob-
beries through the impact of the income skew, changes in
control unit activity were included in an estimate of changes
in armed robbery rates. One would expect control unit changes
to serve as a good proxy for changes in the relative size of
the upper portion of the income distribution given managerial
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salary scales. Our results suggest that this is indeed the
case.
We conclude that armed robbery itself is not particularly
important as a decision factor but that the income distribu-
tion which it partially reflects does have an effect.
The rest of the equation appears to be as expected.
The relative impact of the right-hand variables on the loca-
tion decision can be inferred from the following table of
Beta coefficients:
Table II-1
Importance of Decision Factors
(Ranked by Beta Coefficients):
POSITIVE BETA
Control cluster size .93
Cultural level .61
Armed robbery index .27
Great Lakes location .25
NEGATIVE BETA
Population in 1966 (Rental proxy) -.52
Clerical wage level -. 43
(Population 1900/Population 1966) -. 31
Pollution level -.10
Climatic unpleasantness -. 06
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These results must be quite pleasing to the economist,
since they suggest that the most powerful influences on the
location decision are the short-run economic factors. Our
indices of clerical wages (CW i66) and rentals (POP i66) emerge
as the most important cost factors. Relative rates of growth
in the twentieth century (PR i 6 6), a factor in "prestige"
calculations, are important, but less so. The long-run cost
impact of climate and pollution may well be taken into account,
but are clearly less important.
On the benefit side, the greatly preponderant factor is
the size of the control cluster. Prevailing cultural levels
seem of secondary importance (although quite significant)
while the "country-club" phenomenon associated with positive
income skew (as indexed by armed robberies) seems to be con-
siderably less important in the process.
11-5 An Alternative Specification
It seems appropriate to estimate an alternative specifi-
cation which incorporates the non-linearities derived from
theoretical considerations in Chapter I. In this alternative
specification, one benefit measure and one cost measure will
be changed.
Recall that the measure of imputed benefits for a par-
ticular control unit is R(j, I )
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where j = the hierarchic level of the unit in question
I = the size of the information clusterC
We know that D> 0, 0. Since AC(=Ea C.).) represents
JI
a response to perceived benefits and costs, we should also
observe DOC) > 0, 2 (AC) < 0. In order to test for this, we
DC ~ 3C2
substitute the logarithm of C for C in the regression. The
logarithm is an appropriate transformation, since if AC = SX +
a(logC) + E, DAC = > 0 2 2 - < 0.
C3C 
One measure of costs also should incorporate an explicit
non-linearity. This is total population, which is used as an
index of rents at the city center. A simple measure of popu-
lation suffers from the fact that SMSA's differ considerably
in population density. Ceteris paribus, we would expect the
more populous of two equal-sized SMSA's to have higher rents
in the central business district (This result follows directly
from a simple Alonso model of the bid-rent function). By
similar reasoning, we would expect the smaller of two equally-
populous SMSA's to have higher rents in the CBD. Since we
are forced to use population as an index of CBD rents, it
seems appropriate to standardize SMSA populations for area
in some way.
Our approach will be to define a "standard area" SMSA
to which different populations will be assigned for different
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SMSA's, depending upon the ratio of their areas to the "stan-
dard area". The larger the SMSA in question, ceteris paribus,
the smaller the population assigned to the standard area and
the lower the imputed rent at the city center. In order to
maintain the normal concavity (outward) of the bid-rent func-
tion, we will also make the assignment procedure explicitly
non-linear (i.e. as the radius of a city with fixed population
becomes smaller, the imputed CBD rent goes up more than prop-
ortionally).
While computing the "standard population" which will
serve as an index of CBD rents, we will also be interested
in the "residual population" which is simultaneously imputed
to each SMSA. Clearly, this residual will also represent
negative externalities (ceteris paribus) such as additional
costs of pollution, congestion, etc. Since this residual
will represent the difference between actual population and
"standardized" population, it will also be explicitly speci-
fied as non-linear in form. There are several plausible ways
in which to approach the problem of calculating the standard
populations. For the present purposes, the following approach
has been adopted:
1) Let V = F(r)
V = CBD rental level
r = constant-population radius
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F' < 0 F" > 0
2) We assume that all SMSA's are circular, so that an
approximate radius can be extracted from the area statistic.
Let r. = radius (in miles) of SMSA.
Di = population density of SMSA
M = some arbitrary constant, reflecting the
degree of non-linearity of the relation-
ship between CBD rental and density
PR = "residual population"
PS = "standard population" -- the index of CBD
rental
P. = actual population of SMSA.
We assume a standard radius of two miles.
*2
P R= 47r - D. [M - (M - 1) /r
R 1
P = P. - PS 1 R
This standardizing technique was designed to maximize
ease of calculation. It preserves the correct relationship
between standardized population magnitudes, even though their
calculated values may seem initially to be perverse. Thus,
for r = 2, (the standard radius), PR Pi and P = 0. Re-
flection should make it clear that 0 is the maximum value of
P5  in this system, and that the minimum value will be a
negative number, while the converse holds for P R* Since the
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relative magnitudes are correct, however, estimated t-ratios
will be unaffected. In order to reflect a fairly pronounced
degree of non-linearity, M is set at 10 for the calculation
of P and PR'
The alternative specification incorporates both PR and
P . As we have noted, P is calculated as a non-linear vari-
able. Our theory also suggests a non-linear association be-
tween control unit costs and residual population (PR ). In
order to test for this, separate regressions were run incorpo-
1.3 1.4 2
rating (Py 1.3 (PR) , and (PR) . A look at the associated
F-statistics and sums of squared residuals indicates that
(PR) l.3 represents the best fit.
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Results
CHANGE IN CONTROL ACTIVITY
EQUALS
R .4
979.69 958.15 975.05 1002
(3.4) (3.4) (3.3) (3 .4)
.063 .062
(3.8) (3.7)
.267 .336
(1.4) (1.5)
.049
(6.1)
.003
(-.4)
.055
(5.2)
.003
(-.4)
.064
(3.7)
.140
(.8)
.041
(6.8)
* ARMED ROBBERY INDEX
* SULPHATE POLLUTION
* CULTURAL LEVEL
.003 * LEVEL OF CLIMATIC
(-.4) "UNPLEASANTNESS"
+ 55.16
(3.5)
- 9.58
(-4.4)
- .052
(-3.7)
- 392.41
(-4.2)
+ 91.81
(3.4)
- .135
(-3.7)
.98
7
32.70
57.43 58.37
(3.6) (3.5)
9.57
(-4.4)
.058
(-3.8)
9.84
(-4.5)
53.69
(3.3)
9.67
(-4.3)
* LOG OF CONTROL
CLUSTER SIZE
* CLERICAL WAGE LEVELS
.064 .048 * "STANDARDIZED"
(-3.5) (-3.6) RENT
405.18 427.41
(-4.3) (-4.8)
87.68 82.77
(3.3) (3.1)
.041
(-2.7)
.98
.011
(-2.6)
.98
7 7
34.04 32.23
389.21
(-4.0)
93.53
(3.4)
(-2.
298
4)
98
7
31.25
LAND
* RELATIVE AGE OF CITY
* LOCATION IN GREAT
LAKES REGION
*(PR
R2
Degrees of Freedom
F-Statistic (Always
Significant at 1%
Level)
+
+
+
.064
(3.8)
.183
(1.0)
.044
(6.6)
.003
(-.4)
(PR) ( R) l.3 (R)2
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It seems that the alternative specification is better.
The F-statistic is larger and the fit is generally improved,
as indicated by the larger t-ratios of the estimated coeffic-
ients.
It is instructive to consider the (ceteris paribus) shape
of the imputed agglomerative benefit curve. We have estimated
AC = aX + a(logC) + E
.it 3AC =awith3C C
The estimated value of a is approximately 57. Let us
consider the imputed slope for the two extreme values of C
in the system:
Miami: C = 12
3(AC) - 5.0
DC 1
New York: C = 2508
3(AC) % .02
9C
For Miami, which is near the origin, the slope is quite steep,
indicating substantial benefits to increasing C. For an
information cluster as large as New York, on the other hand,
there seem to be practically no agglomerative benefits to
further increases in C.
Chapter III
Control Movements as a Feedback System
III-1 A Dynamic Model of the Decision Environment
We thus conclude Part I of this study. It is to be hoped
that the reader has been persuaded that observed patterns of
control unit movement are quite consistent with a model of
rational decision-making in which both short-run and long-run
costs are considered. But we cannot be satisfied with having
investigated the decision function empirically. We now pro-
ceed to look into a second, related question. What impact
does the movement of control units have on the decision vari-
ables themselves?
We posit a decision model of an explicitly dynamic type:
(C t - C t-1) = SXit-1
(Xit -x it-1) = yit ~ it-1 '
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where one Yit may well be C t'
Thus, the internal changes in structure associated with
growth over a certain time period in a metropolitan area will
have an observable impact on the prospects for future growth
in an environment of large geographically mobile economic
units which are continually calculating costs and benefits.
111-2 Elements in the Feedback System
We are interested in modeling changes in the key vari-
ables which influence short-and long-run cost calculations:
The crime rate; pollution levels; cultural levels; the clerical
wage rate; and supporting services. Our interest in looking
at a system of equations which explain the shifts in internal
structure is two-fold:
1). It is intrinsically interesting to observe the in-
teraction between social and economic dynamics in changing
the structure of metropolitan areas.
2). We are interested in the "feedback loop" from head-
quarters location decisions to observable social and economic
consequences to further location decisions.
We hypothesize a feedback system which incorporates all
the elements of the headquarters location decision in the fol-
lowing (partially simultaneous) system of equations:
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EQUATIONS
1). APLS
2). AS
3). AUR
4). APAY
5). APOP
6). AR
= F(AMAN, AAGE)
= F(APOP, APAY, ASReg
= F(AMAN, APOP, [UR - URt-l], U
= F(AHQ, AMAN, AS, APAYReg
= F([POPt - POPt-l, [POPt-l - PO
PAY t-], [MANt - MANt-l [UR
APAY, APOPReg
= F(AHQ, AMIF, GR, APA, APU, APB)
7). ACU = F(APAY)
8). ARET = F(APAY,
9). AFIR = F(AHQ,
10). ACW = F(AFIR,
ACWReg
11). ABS = F(AHQ,
RReg
Pt-2] I
- URt-l
APOP)
APAY, APOP)
APOP, [CWt - OW t-l [CWt-l
ARET, AFIR)
[PAYt
'
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EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
1). Manufacturing Activity (MAN)
2). SMSA Age (AGE)
3). Past Population (POPt-l, POPt-2)
4). Regional Unemployment Rate (UR Reg
5). Lagged Clerical Wage Rate (CWt-1)
6). Regional Tertiary Sector Employment (S Reg)
7). Regional Income (PAY Reg)
8). Regional Population (POP Reg)
9). Regional Clerical Wage Rate (CW Reg
10). Median Family Income (MIF)
11). Population Growth Rate (GR)
12). Proportion Addicted to Narcotic Drugs (PA)
13). Proportion of Families Receiving Incomes of Less Than
$3,000/yr. (PU)
14). Proportion of the Population Which is Black (PB)
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ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
**l). Sulphate Pollution Rate (PLS)
2). Employment in Tertiary Sector (S)
3). Unemployment Rate (UR)
4). Total SMSA Wage Income (PAY)
**5). Population (POP)
**6). Armed Robbery Rate (R)
*7). Level of Cultural Activity (CU)
8). Employment in Retail Activities (RET)
9). Employment in Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (FIR)
**10). Clerical Wage Rate (CW)
*11). Employment in Miscellaneous Business Services (BS)
* -- Positive Feedback Effect
** -- Negative Feedback Effect
(A) represents the change in the vari-
able in question from 1966 to 1970
This system of equations represents the direct and indir-
ect effects of corporate headquarters location on the social
and economic structure of an SMSA.
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In the preceding section, a theory of decision unit
rationality with respect to location was tested and found to
be consistent with the available data. This section will be
devoted to examining the structural shifts which result from
headquarters location decisions. It seems that decisions
which are rational from the perspective of currently observ-
able phenomena may in turn have consequences over a subse-
quent period of time which render the original perspective
obsolete. The location of a headquarters unit in a particu-
lar SMSA sets off a chain of consequences, some of which en-
hance the economic position of the unit and some of which
detract from that position. The most interesting issue
associated with this phenomenon is the question of whether
SMSA growth induced by corporate headquarters activity is,
on balance, self-damping or explosively self-reinforcing.
After all the relevant equations have been estimated, we will
select various SMSA's and simulate their future headquarters
status to determine whether they appear likely to exhibit
continued steady growth or whether self-damping tendencies
will result in a re-distribution of headquarters activity
toward smaller centers.
Where possible, we have attempted to explain changes in
levels from 1966 to 1970 in order to make the estimated system
explicitly dynamic. In the case of the sulphate pollution
rate, the data simply would not support such an enterprise
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and an attempt to explain the levels which prevailed in 1966
was made.
The headquarters location decision initiates a sequence
of social and economic changes in two ways: Directly, through
its impact on supporting finance, insurance, and real estate
activities and miscellaneous business services, and indirectly,
through its impact on aggregate SMSA income. The more far-
reaching effects are probably attributable to the impact on
aggregate income, so this phenomenon is considered first.
According to our theoretical model, changes in aggregate SMSA
income are imbedded in a four-equation simultaneous system.
After the changes in the four important aggregates (AS, AUR,
APAY, APOP) are determined, the remaining elements in the
headquarters location decision are determined recursively.
The following discussion will proceed equation-by-equa-
tion.
111-3 Changes in Tertiary Employment
The primary components of this employment category are
services and contract construction. Generally, growth in
tertiary employment must reflect changes in the number of
residents in an SMSA or in the total disposable income. Since
some tertiary activities are (increasingly) export-oriented,
it is also possible that changes in tertiary employment may
reflect a state of regional comparative advantage. This
particular equation presented no particular theoretical
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problems and was estimated simultaneously with the following
three equations (using two-stage least squares).
Quantitative Results
CHANGE IN TERTIARY EMPLOYMENT
EQUALS
38.483
(1.55)
+ .612
(4.82)
* CHANGE IN SMSA POPULATION
+ 1.360 * CHANGE IN SMSA INCOME
(29.97)
- 9.73 * ERIE (North East Central States)
(.36)
- 38.78 * NWC (North West Central States)
(1.38)
- 6.10 * WEST (Western States)
(.21)
+ 1.47 *
(.05)
- 50.45 *
(1.73)
- 25.50 *
(.93)
SE (Southeastern States)
SCENT (South Central States)
MIDA (Mid-Atlantic States)
= .97
Degrees of Freedom = 46
F-Statistic (8/46) = 219.25
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These results are as expected, with very little variance
in tertiary employment apparently attributable to regional
comparative advantage.
111-4 The Unemployment Rate
A truly satisfactory empirical study of SMSA employment
rates would, of course, absorb an entire volume in itself.
The best approach would probably be to specify SMSA macro-
structures at the two- or three-digit SIC levels and aggre-
gate after generating unemployment rates industry-by-industry
in response to changes in national and regional final demand,
as well as shifts in regional comparative advantage. Nothing
so ambitious will be attempted here, although the spirit of
the approach will be similar at a grossly higher level of
aggregation.
For the fairly short periods over which the change in
unemployment is analyzed, fluctuations in demand are quite
likely to result in quantity adjustments rather than price
adjustments. The appropriate structure for relating short-
run fluctuations to the unemployment rate is (ceteris pari-
bus) simply changes in business activity in the SMSA. The
rate will also be influenced, of course, by the rate at which
the labor force is growing. Youths or immigrants may be en-
tering the labor market at such a rate that even a steadily
growing local economy cannot absorb them.
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No urban economy exists in isolation; metropolitan areas
are in constant competition for export-oriented business ac-
tivity at both the regional and national levels. While some
parts of the local economy boom, others may lose their re-
gional or national comparative advantage and lay off workers
who lack the requisite skills for entry into the more dynamic
sectors. The result can be a drift upward in the unemploy-
ment rate, even in an economy whose net change in employment
is positive. It seems important for any analysis of the
unemployment rate to attempt to capture the result of this
interaction between local labor force immobility and shifts
in local and regional comparative advantage.
In attempting to explain shifts in the unemployment rate
at an aggregate level, then, we want to consider three rele-
vant phenomena:
1.) Short-run shifts in the local demand for labor as
a result of changes in business activity.
2). Changes in the size of the labor force.
3). Changes in comparative advantage.
In order for the equation itself to be estimated, the
inevitable compromises were made with the available data.
Tertiary and secondary employment changes during the period
in question were so collinear that only one could be employed.
Change in population was used as a proxy for changes in the
labor force, since net immigration data and data on the age
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structure of the population by SMSA were not available for the
period 1966-1970. Changes attributable to long-run shifts in
comparative advantage were indexed using lagged local unem-
ployment rates and regional dummies.
Quantitative Results
CHANGE IN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (IN UNEMPLOYED-PER-THOUSAND)
EQUALS
12.56
(1.98)
- .155 * INDEX OF CHANGE IN MANUFACTURING ACTIVITY
(2.22)
.083 * CHANGE IN POPULATION
(2.251)
.0448 * CHANGE IN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE DURING PRECEDING
(.32) FOUR YEARS
- 3.91 *
(.56)
- 2.02 *
(.30)
ERIE
NWC
- 2.67 * WEST
(.38)
- 10.15 * SE
(1.48)
- 10.28 * SCENT
(1.47)
- 5.33 * MIDA
(.80)
R = .204
Degrees of Freedom = 45
F-Statistic (9/45) = 1.283
+
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These relatively poor results clearly indicate the sup-
eriority of a more structural approach to the problem. Never-
theless, the two independent variables with which we were most
concerned, population and business activity, behave in con-
formity with our expectations. The general rise in the
national unemployment rate during the period 1966-1970 (con-
centrated during 1969-1970) is captured by the constant term.
Although none of the regional dummies is significant at the
.05 level, the results seem to reflect the superior growth
performance of the southern region during recent years.
111-5 Aggregate Income
The change in aggregate SMSA income will be examined
here from a structural perspective. That is, changes in
aggregate income will be seen as the result of changes in
business activity, with allowances made for regional differ-
entials. It is here that changes in corporate headquarters
activity have their most important indirect impact on the
urban system. Major corporate headquarters operations are
themselves major employers. In the most memorable move in
recent history, Shell Oil alone transferred 10,000 headquar-
ters jobs from New York to Houston, building an entire new
town within Houston for those employees who chose to move
with it. Headquarters operations also employ a dispropor-
tionately large number of high-salary personnel, and subsi-
dize a whole range of specialized business services whose
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prices are also quite high. It does not seem outrageous,
then, to claim that headquarters changes have an important
and independent impact on SMSA income. In addition, changes
in aggregate income must be related primarily to changes in
secondary and tertiary business activity.
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Quantitative Results
CHANGE IN AGGREGATE INCOME
EQUALS
- 32.685
(1.94)
.186
(3.49)
.204
(.97)
.477
(8.72)
8.73 *
(.47)
+ 17.18 *
(.91)
* CHANGE IN CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITY
* CHANGE IN MANUFACTURING ACTIVITY
* CHANGE IN TERTIARY ACTIVITY
ERIE
NWC
- 3.91 *
(.21)
+ .85 *
(.44)
+ 14.98 *
(.77)
+ 20.01 *
(1.06)
R = .97
Degrees of Freedom = 45
F-Statistic (9/45) = 183.30
WEST
SE
SCENT
MIDA
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Again, the results are as expected, with the exception
of failure to reject the null hypothesis for the coefficient
of changes in manufacturing. As in previous regressions, it
is clear that mean values differ substantially by region, but
that the standard errors associated with the estimated dummy
coefficients are too large to make any confident pronounce-
ments.
111-6 Population
The phenomenon of migration is viewed here as primarily
a response to changes in the economic environment. The fun-
damental assumption is that a fairly large number of people
(mostly youthful) maintain a high degree of mobility and will
move readily in response to economic incentives. Regarding
short-run population changes primarily as a result of immi-
gration or emigration, we view the population as constantly
shifting toward an equilibrium locational adjustment. Lags
in adjustment may well explain much of the movement, since
"true" conditions cannot be perceived immediately.
We will therefore attempt to explain population shifts
as the result of:
1). Changes in employment opportunities.
2). Changes in income opportunities.
3). The slowly-changing "reputation" for attractiveness,
which may well adjust with a lag to actual attractiveness.
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4). The present population. With a constant birth rate
across SMSA's, larger cities would clearly experience greater
population growth, ceteris paribus. However, the negative
externalities associated with very large populations may
stimulate so much out-migration that the negative effect
dominates.
5). Changes which are the primary result of attraction
to a region, rather than a specific local area.
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Quantitative Results
CHANGE IN POPULATION (1966-1970)
EQUALS
.457
(.015)
.0395 * CHANGE IN POPULATION (1962-1964)
(.519)
.259 *
(1.524)
- .073 *
(3.38)
+ 1.454 *
(3.321)
CHANGE IN POPULATION (1964-1966)
POPULATION IN 1966
CHANGE IN MANUFACTURING ACTIVITY (1964-1966)
- 1.351 * CHANGE IN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (1962-1966)
(2.091)
.081
(.409)
.760
(3.89)
+
- 20.54 *
(.57)
- 2.85 *
(.08)
+ 84.59 *
(2.47)
+ 1.39*
(.04)
+ 19.88 *
(.55)
CHANGE IN AGGREGATE INCOME (1962-1966)
CHANGE IN AGGREGATE INCOME (1966-1970)
ERIE
NWC
WEST
SE
SCENT
+ 2.916 * MIDA
(.09)
+±
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R = .68
Degrees of Freedom 41
F-Statistic (14/41) = 6.58
Our results are reasonably good. Mobile elements of the
population seem to respond significantly to current income
changes and lagged changes in employment opportunity (as
indexed by the unemployment rate and manufacturing activity).
The "reputation" of an SMSA appears to decay more quickly than
anticipated, with only the previous two years' growth per-
formance having any noticeable effect on behavior. Again,
regional variations seem to have some importance, but the
size of the standard errors (with the exception of the West)
makes it seem that a specific SMSA rather than a region is
the conscious destination for most movers.
Having completed our examination of the four-equation
simultaneous system, we now turn to its "fall-out" -- the
recursively determined set of social and economic variables
which will enter into future headquarters location decisions.
111-7 The Crime Rate
The Determinants of Short-Run Changes in Armed Robbery
Rates:
It is clear that crime rates are intimately associated
with the total pattern of indigenous culture. Although New
York and Tokyo have approximately the same population and
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economic function, for example, crime rates in the latter are
strikingly lower than those in New York. Various factors can
be offered by way of explanation, among them the greater
ethnic homogeneity of the Japanese population, the higher
degree of internal control founded on some variant of the
Confucian ethic, etc. The point is simply that if one were
attempting to explain differing levels of crime in American
SMSA's, he would have to take regional cultural differences
into account and would run into an immediate difficulty.
What defines a culture region in the U.S.? Broad geographic
areas? Single metropolitan areas? If the latter, of course,
no econometric work can be done on the question. The problem
of cross-cultural comparison is taxing, and fortunately our
data are sufficiently good to allow us to dodge the problem.
Our method will be to take the rather more convincing tack
of explaining changes in crime rates as a function of changes
in the social and economic environment. (We are, of course,
begging the question of whether regional cultural differences
could also affect response rates. However, our results sug-
gest that this factor may not be of much importance.)
Broadly, then, we posit the following kind of model
regarding armed robbery:
Armed robbery, like all criminal action, is essentially
anti-communal in nature. It takes no cognizance of any social
contract or common social status of the two participants (the
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criminal and the victim). In any community, perceptions of
the closeness of social kinship will vary drastically among
paired individuals for a wide variety of reasons. Thus, we
would expect any community to have a potential for various
sorts of anti-social behavior, with the possibility of such
behavior augmented by lack of personal acquaintance.
Armed robberies can thus be viewed as a stochastic
phenomenon within any relatively closed social group. We
assume a population whose general objective function puts a
common weight on consumption in an environment characterized
by scarce resources. We can root our examination of the
potential for crime in the assumption that different social
environments will generate differing numbers of people who
actively consider robbery as a way of augmenting their in-
comes. All those who are actively considering robbery will
then make cost-benefit calculations which will determine
whether they do, in fact, commit robbery. Such cost-benefit
calculations will be directed toward maximizing expected
return. Important factors will be:
1). Expected money gain from the robbery.
2). Frequency of arrests in the city in question.
3). Frequency of conviction in the city in question.
4). Average length of sentence weighted by the imputed
opportunity cost of incarceration.
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Given normal organizational inertia, we would not expect
the criminal justice system in a particular area to change
much in the sort of short time interval with which we are
concerned. The calculation of costs is likely to remain
rather stable over a four year period. Similarly for the
expected return per robbery. (We might expect it to stay
constant in real terms. The armed robber will usually at-
tempt to attack small businesses or individuals on the street.
Such economic units may well experience a fairly constant
transactions level within such a short time period and are
therefore liable to maintain a relatively constant stock of
real purchasing power. The armed robber may well find his
expected gain to be going up at the rate of inflation, which
is to say not at all in real terms).
So we are forced back to the first point -- In observing
short-run changes in the crime rate we are mainly observing
the effect of a fairly constant "propensity to rob" by those
who are actively considering it combined with a changing num-
ber who are considering it. This number may be said to change
for the following reasons:
1). A decline in the level of perceived social affinity.
2). Rising inability of the very poor to obtain the phy-
sical necessities.
3). The operation of the sort of relative evaluation of
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personal consumption levels which was assumed by Duesenberry
in his work on the consumption function. Given the sort of
psychological phenomenon which leads to the consumption
"ratchet", we would expect any decline in average real income
to widen the number experiencing feelings of relative depriv-
ation and the number at the a-social fringe of this group who
begin considering robbery as an alternative to conventional
"moonlighting".
We would expect this phenomenon to be augmented by any
noticeable increase in the number of very wealthy or very
poor people in a community. The former will demonstrate a
level of relative consumption which enhances feelings of
deprivation (and may up the expected return-per-robbery)
while those in the enlarged group of the very poor are quite
likely to conclude that they are being treated unreasonably
and to contemplate a variety of measures, including robbery,
to correct the situation.
Our task, then, is to estimate an equation which explains
changes in armed robbery as reflecting changes in the number
of potential robbers as a result of shifts in the three
general areas outlined above:
1). Changes in the commonly perceived level of social
affinity. Two variables were chosen as most indicative:
a). Changes in the proportion of the population which
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is black. (If data had permitted, this would have been
expanded to changes in the per cent black-Puerto Rican-
Chicano. For a whole host of obvious reasons, these
groups must feel no overwhelming love for the rest of
the population (and, certainly, vice-versa)).
b). The population growth rate in the immediately
preceding period.
A rapid enlargement of the population in any area has
long been pointed to by sociologists and psychologists as a
powerful factor in breaking down bonds of social affinity.
Carefully-drawn lines of social interaction are suddenly
ruptured by a large influx of newcomers. The phenomenon
has appeared frequently in American history, from the violent
boom towns of the old West to the divorce-prone and alcohol-
ridden space-age boom towns in the modern era. The recent
pop sociological book A Nation of Strangers has taken a very
detailed and sobering look at the impact of rapid population
movement on the degree of alienation.
2). Changes in the ability of the poor to get physical
necessities.
We generally regard the physical necessities as being
subsumed by the labels "food, clothing, shelter." In recent
times, in America, a new sort of "necessity" has emerged --
the narcotic drug which, once tried, leads to greater and
greater dependency; such dependency, in fact, that there
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ceases to be much trade-off with the old-fashioned "neces-
sities." And monopoly control of drug sales assures that in
terms of this necessity, almost anyone is "poor". So without
worrying at this point about why people move to narcotics
addiction, we know that if the number of narcotics addicts
begins expanding, the number of those driven to desperation
by inability to get a physical necessity will also rise.
3). Changes in relative consumption levels. As repre-
sentative of this phenomenon, three variables were employed:
a). Change in median family income.
b). Change in the proportion of upper-income residents.
For reasons discussed in Part I, change in control unit
activity is used as an index of this change.
c). Change in the proportion of the population making
less than $3,000 in 1962 dollars.
The following results are generally as expected, with
the exception of the change in per cent black (which, to any
humanitarian, must be quite gratifying).
- 115 -
Quantitative Results:
CHANGE IN PROBABILITY OF BEING THE VICTIM OF
ARMED ROBBERY (per 100,000 population)
EQUALS
724.801
T-STAT. (2.0)
BETA COEF. (.00)
+ 4714.250 * POPULATION GROWTH RATE IN PRECEDING
(2.6) FOUR YEARS
(.33)
85.87760 * CHANGE IN PER CENT BLACK
(-1.4)
(-.19)
+ 2412.40 * CHANGE IN PER CENT OF POPULATION ADDICTED
(6.3) TO HEROIN
(.94)
1.21670 * CHANGE IN MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME
(-3.3)
(-.47)
+ .82216 * INDEX OF CHANGE IN PROPORTION WEALTHY
(1.5)
(.21)
+ 458.022 * CHANGE IN PROPORTION OF FAMILIES WITH
(1.6) INCOMES UNDER $3,000 (1962 DOLLARS)
(.23)
Factors Ranked by Beta Coefficients:
POSITIVE BETA
Change in: Heroin addiction rate .94
Population growth rate .33
% Income under $3,000 .23
% Wealthy .21
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NEGATIVE BETA
Change in median family income -.47
R = .83
Degrees of Freedom = 15
F-Statistic (6/15) = 12.1
(For definitions of the indices used in this
equation and data sources, see Appendix A).
These results seem eminently reasonable. For the purposes
of this study, it is interesting to note that the change in
control unit activity does have a significant impact on crime
rates through its impact on the income skew. It also rein-
forces our idea that armed robbery in the location equation
must be serving as a proxy for this skew (as well, perhaps,
as the population growth rate, which may well affect the
"prestige" of different areas in executive estimation).
111-8 Air Pollution (Sulphate Suspension)
An Explanation for Observed SO2 Concentrations:
Unfortunately, the data on air pollution are simply not
of sufficient quantity or quality to support an investigation
of the changes in sulphate suspension. Rather, we will have
to investigate the levels of air pollution in cross section.
Fortunately, the quality of the estimate is so high that we
can place a good deal of confidence in our explanation and
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might well be able to use the equation for purposes of predic-
tion. Essentially, we make the claim that potential sulphate
concentrations in the atmosphere will depend on two factors:
The level of manufacturing activity in a particular area and
the efficiency with which heating and industrial fuels are
burned in the area. The best composite index of the latter
factor is certainly the "age" of the SMSA in question, since
newer SMSA's will undoubtedly have avoided dependence on now-
obsolete techniques of energy conversion. As our index, then,
we use the fraction of the 1966 population which resided in
the SMSA in the year 1900. The larger the fraction, the
greater the "age" of the SMSA.
The above factors are the primary contributors to "poten-
tial" concentrations in the atmosphere. But these are not the
concentrations in the atmosphere which are actually observed.
Prevailing wind conditions strongly influence the rate of dis-
persal and therefore the actually observed levels. We assert
that once these conditions are allowed for we can explain the
sulphate pollution level quite adequately employing only an
index of the level of manufacturing activity and the "age"
of the city in question.
We still face the problem of constructing an index for
wind conditions. Fortunately, an adequate expedient is
available. Although wind conditions inland vary according
to topography, we can be sure that there are two factors which
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will greatly enhance the dispersing potential of the atmos-
phere: Location on a coast and location on the Great Lakes.
One further expedient has been employed. When this regression
was originally run, it was noted that Los Angeles was charac-
terized by a huge negative residual, indicating that other
climatic factors combine to keep its sulphate level way below
its potential level. A dummy was therefore inserted for Los
Angeles.
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Quantitative Results:
The results are extraordinarily good:
SULPHATE POLLUTION
EQUALS
- 42.5255
(-2.7)
(.00)
+ .21975
(17.2)
(1.07)
+ 109.738 *
(1.9)
(.12)
* INDEX OF LEVEL OF MANUFACTURING ACTIVITY
INDEX OF SMSA AGE
- 19.2567 * LOCATION ON COAST
(-1.2)
(-.08)
- 40.4035 * LOCATION ON GREAT LAKES
(-3.1)
(-.16)
- 217.793 * LOS ANGELES DUMMY
(-7.8)
R = .98
Degrees of Freedom = 10
F-Statistic (5/10) = 94.5
(For details, see Appendix B)
Here our explanation for the phenomenon in question
appears to be quite satisfactory. The only variable which
appears likely to have much effect in the short run is the
level of manufacturing activity.
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111-9 Cultural Conditions
Determinants of Short-Run Changes in Community
Cultural Life:
Certainly a variety of factors can influence the cultural
life which prevails in a particular area. The presence of an
extremely influential artist or group of artists can attract
a disproportionate number of aspirants. Such intangibles
are difficult to measure. One thing can be said with some
confidence, however. Most serious artists depend for support
on a public which is receptive to their work. In a nation
which has no state support of the arts and in which art is
considered a "luxury" good, it seems clear that artists will
migrate to a community when there is sufficient income avail-
able for purchase of artworks. We wish to compare relative
"equilibrium" situations by attempting to explain the rela-
tive growth of cultural activity in different metropolitan
areas. Our explanation is essentially that cultural activity,
as representative of a pure "luxury" good, will change in
response to relative changes in total real income, with a
large error attributable to local idiosyncracies. Now,
given the phenomenon which has been so extensively treated
by Baumol, we would expect a general downward trend in employ-
ment in cultural activities during the late 1960's, with the
trend substantially reversed in those areas which have exper-
ienced a rapid increase in real income. (The Baumol phenomenon
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is posited on the notion that wage demands of employees in the
arts are generally linked to the wage levels of other employ-
ees in the economy. Since there are no real "productivity"
increases in the arts, the same activity costs more and more
from year to year and the number of activities demanded there-
fore drops).
Quantitative Results:
Our results seem to bear out the hypothesis:
INDEX OF CHANGE IN CULTURAL LEVEL
EQUALS
-285.944
(-2.8)
(.00)
+ 2.04012 * INDEX OF CHANGE IN REAL INCOME
(6.0)
(.80)
R = .64
Degrees of Freedom = 20
F-Statistic = 36.1
(For details, see Appendix C.)
Our explanation here has the added virtue of a high degree
of common-sense plausibility.
III-10 Clerical Wage Rates
A Simple Model for Explaining Observed Wage Differ-
entials:
- 122 -
We are left with the task of explaining clerical wage
rates. Now, in theory such rates should not be tremendously
difficult to explain. In practice, however, wage levels
often prove quite difficult to explain empirically. The
equation used here will be a reduced form which incorporates
elements of supply and demand. It combines the notion of
regional labor markets with elements of supply and demand
in determining the equilibrium price. We use the number of
headquarters in an SMSA in 1966 as an index of the relative
demand for clerical labor in 1966. Since corporate headquar-
ters levels are highly collinear with business services and
large concentrations of retail, finance, wholesale, insurance,
and real estate activities, corporate headquarters appear to
be an adequate proxy. We assume that all the cities in ques-
tion are of such size that there exists a pool of potential
secretarial labor adequate to fill all available positions.
We assume that the wage bargain struck will include the in-
fluences of three types of factors: 1). The relative level
of demand (although this is crude, since we haven't standar-
dized for population here); 2). Perceptions by demander and
supplier of the "fair wage" which is apparently a phenomenon
of regional rather than national dimensions. (There is a con-
siderable literature on this subject. The essence of the
phenomenon appears to be that intraregional mobility is con-
siderably greater than interregional mobility, so that
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equilibrium wage levels tend to become standardized quickly
within regions but not across regions); 3). Certain amenity
characteristics of cities which would tend to make them more
or less desirable as places to work within regions and will
therefore influence the equilibrium wage. Finally, we might
include any factors which would tend to place in the city a
fairly stable population of potential secretarial employees
whose wages could then be bid down by employers. Blue-collar
wives would appear to be the perfect candidates for such a
population.
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Quantitative Results:
Our results follow:
CLERICAL WAGE LEVEL IN 1966
EQUALS
122.069
(23.2)
(.00)
.00387 * NUMBER OF HEADQUARTERS UNITS IN 1966
(1.1)
(.76)
.00189
(-.41)
.00312
(1.8)
(.34)
.00203
(-2.4)
(-.52)
.00101
(-1.0)
(-.57)
6.83334
(-1.9)
(-.39)
8.05949
(2.8)
(.46)
8.45049
(3.0)
(.52)
* INDEX FOR PRESENCE OF POOL OF BLUE COLLAR
WIVES
* NUMBER OF ARMED ROBBERIES IN 1966 (/100,000)
* INDEX OF CLIMATIC ADVANTAGE
* INDEX OF CULTURAL LEVEL
* DUMMY FOR SOUTHERN REGION
* DUMMY FOR WESTERN REGION
* DUMMY FOR GREAT LAKES REGION
.81
Degrees of Freedom = 13
+
+
+
+±
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F-Statistic (8/13) = 6.90
(For details, see Appendix D.)
While not superb, these results do largely confirm our
intuition with regard to the market for secretarial labor.
The influence of the regionalization of labor markets can
clearly be seen in the regional dummies. The importance of
the level of higher-order white-collar services can perhaps
most clearly be seen in the Beta coefficient associated with
the corporate headquarters variable.
Although we clearly cannot reject the null hypothesis
with respect to the blue-collar index, we can see that it
at least has the right sign. We can see from the associated
Beta coefficient that this factor is not very important, in
any event.
Our notion that relative amenities play an important role
within regions seems amply born out by our results. All signs
are as expected: The results indicate that, ceteris paribus,
the higher the crime rate, the higher the compensatory wages.
Conversely, the higher the cultural level and the better the
climate, the lower the wages which must be paid.
This "explanation" for differing clerical wage rates
should probably be regarded as predictive rather than as
representing an explicit structure. In general, however, the
results seem surprisingly good.
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The cross-section results for clerical wage rates sug-
gest that the primary stimulus to short-run wage changes may
be found on the demand side. Accordingly, a simple demand
equation has been estimated for inclusion in the recursive
model. After allowance is made for regional disparities, its
basic elements are changes in finance, real estate, and in-
surance activity (the sector in which clerical labor is most
heavily concentrated) and changes in population. Since the
pool of potential clerical labor is considerable in any large
SMSA, even in the absence of immigration, we regard popula-
tion change as an index of economic growth and therefore
properly included in the demand equation. Four year changes
in immigrant population are probably not large enough rela-
tive to total SMSA size to retard demand-induced growth in
wage rates through competition for available positions.
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Quantitative Results
CHANGE IN CLERICAL WAGES
EQUALS
- 2.175
(.663)
.016 *
(2.42)
CHANGE IN POPULATION
.015 * CHANGE IN FINANCE, INSURANCE, AND REAL ESTATE
(3.83) ACTIVITY
.834 *
(1.69)
CHANGE IN CLERICAL WAGES (1962-1964)
.239
(.378)
.580
(.23)
.785
(.31)
+
- 4.977
(2.13)
.690
(.23)
- 2.548
(1.01)
* CHANGE IN CLERICAL WAGES (1964-1966)
* ERIE
* NWC
* WEST
* SE
* SCENT
+ 2.96 * MIDA
(1.25)
R = .78
Degrees of Freedom = 10
F-Statistic (10/10) = 3.57
+
+
+
+
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III-11 Summary
Thus, we have with at least some success estimated a
decision model which displays substantial feedback character-
istics. Corporate headquarters location decisions in a cer-
tain period result from an evaluation of relative attributes
at the start of the period, and moves which result have an
impact on the key attribute variables during the period in
question. Therefore, the initial conditions which will char-
acterize the next decision period will be new ones, and a new
set of decisions will result. This system is modeled as ex-
plicitly dynamic and recursive.
The following generalizations can be made: Corporate
headquarters movement is self-reinforcing with respect to
effects on the income distribution, cultural levels, and
supporting services. It is self-damping with respect to its
impact on crime rates, clerical wage rates, and rental rates
(and, probably, those kinds of air pollution which are related
to the presence of substantial motor vehicle traffic, although
we have not been able to measure this phenomenon).
One additional point about the nature of the model
should be made here. It is clear that the two primary fac-
tors underlying the growth of any city will be growth in in-
dustrial activity and growth in white collar services. Our
formulation pays some attention to the impact of industrial
activity on headquarters location decisions, but not vice-
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versa. We bow to the necessity of drawing the line somewhere
by leaving the location decision of manufacturing activity out
of our formulation.
111-12 The Impact of Control Location on White-Collar Services
We will now attempt to discern the influence of control
unit growth on other kinds of important white-collar activity.
No one needs to be reminded that the central business
districts of many American metropolitan areas grew at very
rapid rates during the 1960's. No urban economist, if asked
to explain this phenomenon, could fail to answer, "The ser-
vices revolution." Indeed, this was the case. And yet, what
seems so clear on the surface becomes somewhat more puzzling
if we attempt to form a mental picture of this revolution.
The existence of a service implies some receiver of the ser-
vice, and if one were asked to explain the content of the
term "services", personal service activities would probably
come to mind -- auto repair, laundry services, etc. And yet,
if anything can be affirmed with certainty, it is that the
skyscraper explosion has not been due to auto repair, laun-
dries, etc. Rather, the fundamental phenomenon in the growth
of the American skyline during the 1960's was the upsurge in
business services -- those organizations which channel or
mold the flow of economic and legal knowledge, maintain
the physical environment, and see to the various social needs
- 131 -
of employees. Now, we may be satisfied that we have the
answer. Unfortunately, our apparently simple explanation
again masks a deeper problem. What is the essence of this
"shift to white-collar services" which has become so familiar
a phrase? Did the central cities pull themselves up in one
spontaneous and massive bootstrap operation, each business
serving others in a self-reinforcing mesh? This, in fact, is
not a good description of what has happened. In looking for
the major stimulus to white-collar service activity, we must
consider the role which the rise of control unit activity has
played.
The two types of white-collar activity which we will
examine closely are finance, insurance, and real estate ac-
tivity, and the sort of sophisticated activity which is
grouped in economic censes under "miscellaneous business
services." Profit levels provide the essential mechanism
for stimulating changes in employment levels in these two
sorts of activity.
As control units move into an area, the following should
occur with respect to business services:
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Figure III-l
The Market in Bus:iness Services
P
(P2'9q2)
-(p (p ,3
In period 1, the equilibrium price and quantity for de-
livery of business services to headquarters units is (p1 , q1 ).
Now, assume that control units move into the area in question.
At any given price, more unit deliveries of business service
will be demanded. The demand curve has shifted to the right,
so that equilibrium is now at (p2 , q2 ). But unit prices are
now higher and so are profits. If all business activities
were in equi-profit equilibrium before the headquarters shift,
we would expect new units to enter the market, shifting the
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supply curve of business services rightward to equilibrium at
(p3  q3 ), where p 3 = p 1 and equi-profit 
equilibrium is re-
stored. Clearly, if we observe the level of employment in
business services at t3 ' it will be greater than at ti ,
reflecting the number of new units which have entered the
market. Here we are not observing the underlying structural
relationship (i.e. profit rates, unit service deliveries,
product prices) but the reflection of that relationship. For
econometric work, however, the underlying logic appears per-
fectly sound.
In the short period which we will observe, employment
changes are a satisfactory impact measure because factor sub-
stitution will not be a major phenomenon. The only signifi-
cant factor substitution during the four-year period will be
that which characterizes the economy as a whole, with only
minor local divergences from the pattern (Thus, in the es-
timated equations which follow, the negative signs on the
constant terms suggest that over-all substitution toward
capital-intensity is indeed occurring).
We are arguing, then, that central city expansion can-
not be understood fully if it is regarded as perfectly simul-
taneous in nature. Rather, one of the primary stimuli to
this expansion has been the "exogenous" influence of control
unit movements. Such movements should be a primary determ-
inant of changes in miscellaneous business service employment.
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With respect to finance, insurance, and real estate services,
control units should represent one source of expansionary
pressure. In addition, however, increases in population
and income should have a considerable influence on FIR employ-
ment.
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Quantitative Results:
The results are as follows:
CHANGE IN MISCELLANEOUS BUSINESS SERVICE EMPLOYMENT
EQUALS
-22.2
(-1.4)
(.00)
.18502
(3.3)
(.44)
* CHANGE IN CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS
.25190 * EMPLOYMENT CHANGE IN RETAIL SALES
(2.9)
(.43)
.37260 * CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT IN FIR (RESIDUALIZED
(3.1) TO REMOVE THE RESULTS OF CORPORATE HEAD-
(.30) QUARTERS EXPANSION)
R = .88
Degrees of Freedom = 18
F-Statistic (3/18) = 44.0
(For details, see Appendix E.)
These results confirm our prior expectations.
lar trend in business service activity is negative,
The secu-
which may
partially reflect the recession of 1969 - 1970, but also some
factor substitution. All three arguments of the equation
have t-statistics significant at the .05 level.
+
+
+
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Beta Coefficient Ranking
Change in:
POSITIVE
Corporate headquarters
Retail employment
Finance, insurance, real estate
We can see that a dominant factor is the change in con-
trol unit activity, which we had expected.
The results for Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
follow:
BETA
.44
.43
.30
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CHANGE IN
EQUALS
-20.7734
(-1.3)
(.00)
FINANCE, INSURANCE, AND REAL ESTATE EMPLOYMENT
.18596 * CHANGE IN CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS
(2.4)
(.29)
.73077
(6.5)
(1.16)
1.48852
(6.2)
(.78)
* INDEX OF CHANGE IN TOTAL INCOME (RESID-
UALIZED TO REMOVE THE EFFECTS OF CHANGED
POPULATION)
* CHANGE IN POPULATION (RESIDUALIZED TO RE-
MOVE THE EFFECTS OF CHANGED CORPORATE
HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITY)
= .92
Degrees of Freedom = 18
F-Statistic (3/18) = 69.5
(For details, see Appendix F.)
It is clear that factors specific to the metropolitan
area in question have more to do with changes in FIR employ-
ment than changes in control activity. Some proportion of
this "internal" growth is derivative, of course. In addition,
there is obviously a considerable derivative impact from
changes in control activity.
+
+
+
Change in:
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Beta Coefficient Ranking
POSITIVE BETA
Income 1.16
Population .78
Corporate headquarters .29
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111-13 A Simple Simulation Exercise
The net feedback characteristics of the dynamic model
estimated in this chapter can be fully examined only with the
aid of simulation.
For the purposes of this exercise, armed robbery (R) was
held constant over time, while all other endogenous elements
were allowed to vary. The Beta coefficients reported in Table
II-1 make it apparent that the direction of net feedback will
depend on the relative impacts of four variables -- control
cluster size (HQ), cultural level (CU), population (POP),
and the clerical wage level (CW).
The following system was employed for the simulation ex-
ercise:
The Simulation System
1). DHQ = 1322.5 + .058R - .144PLS(-l) + .02lCU(-l)
- .005CLI(-l) + .229HQ(-l) - 10.369CW(-l) - .028POP(-l)
- 322.88AGE + 86.479LAKE
2). HQ = HQ(-l) + DHQ
3). DS = .612DPOP + 1.36DI
4). DFI = SRAT(DS)
5). DUR = -. 155VAI(-l) + .083DPOP - .045DUR(-l) +
.045DUR(-2)
6). DI = .186DHQ + .204DVAI(-l) + .477DS
7). DPOP = -. 04DPOPl(-l) + .259DPOP2(-l) - .073POP +
1.454DVAI1(-l) - 1.351DUR(-l) - .081DI(-l) +
.76DI + .04DPOPl(-2) - .259DPOP2(-2)
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8). POP = POP(-l) + DPOP
9). DPOP1 = DPOP/2
10). DPOP2 = DPOP/2
11). DCU = 2.04DI
12). CU = CU(-l) + DCU
13). DCW = .016DPOP + .015DFI + .834DCW3(-l) + .239DCW2(-l)
-. 834DCW3(-2) - .239DCW2(-2)
14). DCW2 = DCW/2
15). DCW3 = DCW/2
16). CW = CW(-l) + DCW
17). DVAI = GRU(VAI(-1))
18). DVAIl = DVAI/2
19). VAI = VAI(-l) + DVAI
20). PLS = -42.526 +.22VAI + 109.74AGE - 19.257COAST -
40.404LAKE - 217.793LA
21). FI = FI(-l) + DFI
(The above equations are in the same format as the orig-
inals, except that "D" is substituted for "A".)
In order to study the general behavioral characteristics
of this system, we will compare the behavior of a typical
"old" city, probably in the Northeastern region, with that of
a "new"l city in the South Central or South East region. The
relevant variables are set at the following levels:
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Old City
200
130
500
300
350
2000
1500
.60
2800
.00
500
.25
New City
50
118
400
300
30
1000
200
.20
1500
.03
500
.25
We are examining two relatively small corporate control
centers, which begin with the same number of control units.
One city, however, is relatively old and is characterized by
relatively high levels of culture, clerical wages, population,
pollution, and manufacturing activity. This city is also
much colder. The new city is less developed from nearly all
standpoints.
Simulating at four year intervals, the comparative activ-
ity levels are as follows.
CU
CW
FI
HQ
PLS
POP
VAI
AGE
CLI
GRU
R
SRAT
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Simulation Table I: Old City
Year HQ CU CW POP
0 300 200 130 2000
4 250 100 128 1490
8 192 0 126 1250
12 95 0 124 1073
16 0 0 122 947
20 0 0 120 822
24 0 0 118 706
28 0 0 116 609
32 0 0 114 537
36 14 0 113 491
40 44 0 114 462
44 89 0 114 442
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Simulation Table II: New City
HQ
300
393
494
641
830
1045
1294
1585
1929
2341
2836
3436
CU
50
0
79
322
590
886
1263
1723
2278
2957
3791
4818
CW
118
120
118
117
119
121
123
125
127
129
131
133
POP
1000
840
818
864
897
930
989
1070
1172
1306
1477
1695
The differences between the two city
older city is much less attractive in the
types is clear. The
competition for
headquarters units than the new one. The old city goes into
a long decline in activity which only reverses itself when the
key cost variables (clerical wages and population) have fallen
substantially. The new city, on the other hand, is still ex-
periencing undamped growth as it approaches the fiftieth year.
Year
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
40
44
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It is interesting to observe the ways in which the dynam-
ics of the system can be affected by the exogenous variable
levels. The most important exogenous variable is clearly GRU
-- the growth rate of manufacturing activity. In the first
simulation, the old city is assumed to be experiencing no
growth in manufacturing. Let us change this assumption,
however, and allow manufacturing in the old city to grow at
3% per year. The result is a reasonably healthy city, but
the effects on corporate headquarters activity are interesting:
Old City
Year HQ CU CW POP
0 300 200 128 1491
4 250 100 126 1294
8 192 0 127 1313
12 94 0 127 1265
16 94 87 125 1170
20 94 63 123 1028
24 94 0 123 1006
28 9 0 124 1007
32 9 26 124 984
36 0 91 123 961
40 0 117 123 952
44 0 146 123 951
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Population stabilizes at a much lower level, and the city
experiences a return to its former cultural level by the 44th
year. However, no corporate headquarters activity returns to
the city. This seems to be partly because pollution levels
are rising with manufacturing, and clerical wage rates remain
relatively high, while population does not fall as disastrously
in this case.
While a whole series of simulations could be performed
with cities of various sizes and attribute levels, the basic
points are established by the exercises above. It is clear
that the system as estimated is capable of generating behavior
which is relatively complicated, and no simple conclusions can
be drawn concerning the relationship between headquarters
location and the key attribute variables. One clear lesson
is that large, relatively old cities in mature regions such
as the Northeast must have very large control clusters in
order to attract more control activity. Otherwise, the net
feedback effects will be negative. It seems quite likely that
rising cost factors are likely to result in negative net feed-
back effects in the largest urban centers, even though these
centers also contain large clusters of control activity.
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APPENDIX III-A: INDICES AND DATA USED IN ESTIMATING
THE ARMED ROBBERY EQUATION
1). AR -- Change in probability of being the victim of
an armed robbery, 1966 - 1970.
Definition: Number of armed robberies per one hundred
thousand population for the SMSA.
Data Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform
Crime Statistics, 1966, 1970.
2). GR -- Population growth rate, 1962 - 1966.
Definition: (Pop. 1966 - Pop. 1962)/Pop. 1962.
Population statistics are for the SMSA.
Data Source: Census projections in FBI, Uniform Crime
Statistics, 1962, 1966.
3). APB -- Change in per cent black.
Definition: (per cent black) (Black SMSA Pop.)/
Total SMSA Pop.
Data Source: Sales Management Magazine, Annual Survey
of Buying Power, 1966, 1970.
4). APA -- Change in number of heroin addicts per thousand
population.
Definition: (Total heroin addicts in SMSA)/Total SMSA
Pop.
Data Source: Unpublished statistics on the number of
registered addicts by city in the U.S. for 1971 pro-
vided by Professor Ronald Grieson. The corrected es-
timate of actual addict population was arrived at in
the following way:
a). All cities within each relevant SMSA were
combined to yield the total registered addict popu-
lation in 1971.
b). The ratio -- (Addicts in SMSA/Addicts in U.S.)
was calculated.
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c). The actual number of addicts in the U.S. in
1966 and 1970 was adopted from an estimate of the
Federal Narcotics Bureau found in U.S. News and World
Report. On the assumption that each SMSA retained the
same proportion of the national total, this estimated
number was multiplied by the ratios calculated in b)
to obtain the estimated number of addicts in each SMSA.
5). AMIF -- Change in median family income, 1966 - 1970.
Definition: A slightly modified variant of disposable
family income.
Data Source: Sales Management Magazine, Annual Survey
of Buying Power, 1966, 1970.
6). AHQ -- Index of change in proportion wealthy.
Definition: Change in weighted corporate headquarters
units from 1966 to 1970.
Data Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, County Busi-
ness Patterns, 1966, 1970.
7). APU -- Change in proportion of families with under
$3,000/year (1962 dollars).
Definition: (Families making $3,000/year or less)/
Total SMSA families.
Data Source: Sales Management, Annual Survey of Buying
Power, 1966, 1970.
- 148 -
APPENDIX III-B: INDICES AND DATA USED IN ESTIMATING
THE AIR POLLUTION EQUATION
1). PLS -- Level of sulphate pollution.
Definition: Average of geometric means for 1962 -
1970: Count of SO 2 particulate suspension per unit
volume.
Data Source: Unpublished EPA data.
2). MAN -- Index of the level of manufacturing activity
in 1966.
Definition: Index used is total wages paid to manu-
facturing labor in the SMSA in first quarter, 1966.
3). AGE -- Index of SMSA age.
Definition:
in 1966.
(Pop. of SMSA in 1900)/Pop. of SMSA
Data Source: U.S. Bureau of Census, Population Census,
1900, and estimate in FBI Uniform Crime Statistics, 1966.
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APPENDIX III-C: INDICES AND DATA USED IN ESTIMATING
THE "CULTURAL LEVEL" EQUATION
1). ACU -- Index of change in cultural activities from
1966 to 1970.
Definition: 2*(Number of employees in museums, art
galleries, and zoos) + (Number of those employed as
producers, orchestras, and entertainers) by SMSA.
Data Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, County
Business Patterns, 1966, 1970.
2). APAY -- Index of change in total real income.
Definition: Total wages paid to all employees in the
SMSA in the first quarter of 1966, and the first quar-
ter of 1970 (Both deflated to 1958 prices).
Data Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, County
Business Patterns, 1966, 1970.
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APPENDIX III-D: INDICES AND DATA USED IN ESTIMATING
THE CLERICAL WAGES EQUATION
1). CW -- Clerical wage level in 1966.
Definition: Relative clerical wages in 1960 (100
taken as the city average) corrected to 1966 using
time series indices of rate increases for each city.
Data Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Annual Survey
of Labor Statistics, 1966.
2). HQ -- Number of headquarters units in 1966.
As previously defined.
3). MAN -- Value added index as index of presence of pool
of blue collar wives.
As previously defined.
4). R -- Number of armed robberies per 100,000 population
in 1966.
As previously defined.
5). CLI -- Index of climatic advantage.
As previously defined.
6). CU -- Index of cultural level.
As previously defined.
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APPENDIX III-E: INDICES AND DATA USED IN ESTIMATING
CHANGES IN BUSINESS SERVICE EMPLOYMENT
1). ABS -- Change in SMSA employment in miscellaneous
business services, 1966 - 1970.
Data Source: County Business Patterns, 1966, 1970.
2). AHQ -- Change in weighted corporate headquarters
units, 1966 - 1970.
As previously defined.
3). ARET-- Change in SMSA employment in retail trade,
1966 - 1970.
Data Source: County Business Patterns, 1966, 1970.
4). AFIR -- Change in (residualized) SMSA employment
in finance, insurance, and real estate, 1966 - 1970.
Data Source: Ibid.
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APPENDIX III-F: INDICES AND DATA USED IN ESTIMATING CHANGES
IN FINANCE, INSURANCE, AND REAL ESTATE EMPLOYMENT
1). AFIR -- Change in SMSA employment in finance, insur-
ance, and real estate, 1966 - 1970.
As previously defined.
2). AHQ
3). APAY
-- As in Appendix E.
-- Changes in (residualized) SMSA income.
As previously defined.
Chapter IV
Hierarchical Production and the
Hierarchy of Cities
IV-1 Introduction
In the first empirical section of this paper, a dynamic
feedback model of the decision unit location decision was
formulated and tested. The results suggested that corporate
headquarters activity is having a powerful effect on the
evolution of American metropolitan areas. Thus far, however,
we have examined this impact at the micro-level -- from the
perspective of changes in social and economic activity at the
level of the SMSA itself. In order to obtain a clearer pic-
ture of the magnitude of this impact, we must look beyond
the short-run adjustment processes examined in the preceding
section and return to a discussion of the broader implica-
tions of our theory.
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It will be recalled that a discussion of the decision
unit location problem centers around a comparison of costs
and benefits which characterize different clusters of in-
formation services in the economy. Thus:
j-SI 6I(42(I) . = RS (l-e c) - Coe c]n
where
F. = the imputed profitability of a control3n unit at hierarchic level j in industry n.
S = the span of control.
R = the revenue attributable to each plant
unit under the control of the decision
unit.
I = the number of information services in
cluster c.
In this formulation, great importance is attached to the
hierarchic level j of the decision unit in question. Given
the ranked ordering of information clusters, Ic, we know that
dI *
c > 0 , where I * is the optimal-sized information cluster
d. c
J
for a decision unit at level j. One implication of the theory
is that service prices and rents should be higher in larger
service agglomerations, Ic , as a direct result of the pre-
sence of higher-order decision unit functions. The possibil-
ity immediately emerges that we can identify a national "hier-
archy of SMSA's" which has evolved from the interface between
the hierarchical organization of production and the co-loca-
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tion calculus previously described.
It is to this larger question and its implications that
we now turn. Instead of examining short-run adjustments, we
will consider the nature of the system which evolves from a
sequence of such adjustments. In doing so, we will develop
a system of analysis which revolves around aggregate land
rents as the appropriate measure of position in the hierarchy.
The development of this theoretical perspective will have two
significant by-products. First, it will shed additional light
on the extent to which headquarters location changes damp them-
selves through interaction with the market for space services.
Secondly, this section will yield a perspective from which some
comment can be made on the current debate concerning "optimum
city size".
The federal government may well throw its weight behind
some "national urban growth strategy" in the near future. The
potential for research funds and influence now associated with
this intrinsically fascinating subject has caused a consider-
able stir in the social sciences. The argument over "opti-
mum" city size has re-appeared, with different groups exam-
ining those parts of the question which their analytic meth-
ods can comfortably handle. One group of economists, domi-
nated by William Alonso, has sought to look at the relation-
ship between "productivity" and city size, drawing essentially
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upon wage differentials across SMSA's.1 Another group seems
to have coalesced at MIT. This group has chosen land values
as the base for analysis. 2
The present paper draws heavily upon the theoretical work
of the MIT group in attempting to stake out at least slightly
new ground. The econometric evidence presented draws heavily
on land value data, and a defense of this approach will there-
fore be presented. The evidence will be used to support an
argument of the following sort: Any American city exists as
one integrated part of a system of cities. Further, our
national cities form a hierarchical system. Different cities
perform different functional roles in the hierarchy which, as
must be true of hierarchies, has room only for a certain num-
ber of cities in each functional category. Although the
structure of the hierarchical system is in continuous evolu-
tion (measuring time on the broad scale), the competition of
cities for "higher" functional roles over short time inter-
vals (on the order of a decade) must be intense.
This argument will be presented in considerable detail.
1 See especially William Alonso, "The Mirage of New Towns,"
The Public Interest, (Spring, 1970); and Koichi Mera, On the
Concentration of Urbanization and Economic Efficiency (Wash-
ington, D.C.: IBRD, IOA Economics Department), Working Paper
No. 74 (March, 1970).
2The author expresses his thanks to the members of this
group (Professors Jerome Rothenberg, Ronald Grieson, Matthew
Edel, and John Harris) for many of the ideas which served as
the foundation for this chapter.
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A direct consequence must be the rejection of the term "opti-
mal" for general discussions concerning American cities.
Rather, there must be several "optimal" city sizes in the
system, each corresponding to a functional position in the
hierarchy. This hierarchical ordering is closely related to
observable patterns in the national economy whose basic shape
is unlikely to change without major social upheaval. Given
this pattern, the associated ordering of cities is unlikely
to display major shifts (although individual cities may cer-
tainly change positions). A feasible national urban strategy
will have to "optimize" within this (very considerable) con-
straint.
IV-2 The National System of Cities -- A Theory About its
Current State
A procession of thinkers from Losch to Brian J. L. Berry
has written about the central-place hierarchy which, in theory,
is generated by the overlap of markets for different goods and
services. Central place theory predicts a certain spatial
pattern under very restrictive assumptions about topography
and observed market processes. It is basically a regional
theory, and stops short of predicting what spatial patterns
will be observed once the evolved central places of different
economic sub-regions become linked in a national economic
system whose dominant organizational mode is corporate in form
and system-wide in scope. Thus, central place thoery does not
seem adequate for a full understanding of the American city
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system. This system most certainly has evolved since World
War II towards comfortable co-existence with the corporate
economy, and the current state of this system has been very
heavily influenced by one central phenomenon -- the physical
divorce of production and control.
"Control" refers to long and short range market planning
activities. "Production" refers to the generation of actual
capital and consumer goods. Chandler and Redlich's classic
treatment of this phenomenon distinguishes three levels of
corporate activity: Two -- long range planning in the general
headquarters; short range planning in the headquarters of each
marketing division -- are covered by the term "control".
Level III, in their schema, is physical production.3 Stephen
Hymer's work on the multi-national corporation has used the
Chandler-Redlich concepts in associating cities in the inter-
national arena with functions at Levels I, II, and III:
... one would expect to find the highest offices
of the multinational corporations concentrated in
the world's major cities.. .Lesser cities throughout
the world will deal with the day-to-day operations
of specific local problems. These in turn will be
arranged in a hierarchical fashion: the larger and
more important ones will contain regional corporate
3See Fritz Redlich and Alfred Chandler, "Recent Develop-
ments in American Business Administration and Their Concep-
tualization," Business History Review, (Spring, 1961).
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headquarters, while the smaller ones will be con-
fined to lower level activities. 4
A theory providing one explanation for the divorce of
production and control was developed in Section I. In that
section, no a priori restrictions were placed on the maximal
level j in the hierarchy of decision units, although it was
noted that the tendency for multi-unit firms to concentrate
in one or two two-digit SIC categories implice a jmax of four
dI *
or five. Although d > 0 , as previously noted, one would
J
not expect a system of cities to evolve which reflected only
the co-locational requirements of hierarchical decision units.
Other historical processes have undoubtedly played their role
in shaping the current system of cities. Nevertheless, if our
theory has any relevance for examining the structure of the
urban economy, we would expect to observe at least some reflec-
tion of such co-locational effects in the national system of
cities. The empirical results in this section will suggest
that such effects are indeed observable: That one can observe
a three-tiered hierarchy of SMSA's, shaped at least in part
by the nationally-oriented location decisions of hierarchical
control and production units, which is superimposed on a system
Stephen Hymer, "The Multinational Corporation and the
Law of Uneven Development," in J. N. Bhagwati, ed., Economics
and World Order, (New York, World Law Fund, 1970) pp. 16-17.
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of smaller cities which have developed primarily as local
market centers.
Our abstract decision units, then, will be considered
here from the perspective of Chandler and Redlich's classic
treatment of corporate organization. A somewhat similar
schema is adopted here. Rather than three levels, we will
be mainly concerned with two -- "control" and "production".
Each function is subject to economies of agglomeration,
although the factors underlying spatial clustering in each
case are relatively independent. Urban growth in the past
has been strongly tied to the dynamics of production. The
rapid growth of business service activities, which are closely
linked to corporate control functions, indicates at least the
possibility that future urban growth will be tied to the dy-
namics of control.
Table IV-l
Employees in Central Administrative Offices and
Auxiliaries of Manufacturing Corporations, 1954-1967.
% of Total
Year Employees (000) % Change Employment
1954 453 -- 2.8
1958 602 32.9 3.8
1963 726 20.6 4.3
1967 830 14.3 4.3
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census of Manufactures,
(Washington: USGPO, 1967).
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Table IV-2
Business Service Expansion, 1958-1967
Receipts
Year Firms (000) ($billion) % Change
1958 114 9.9 --
1963 148 15.2 53.2
1967 212 21.4 48.7
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census of Business,
(Washington: USGPO, 1963 and 1967).
An analysis of the dynamics of control must consider three
important phenomena: Growth in the number of control units,
which is linked to growth in productive activity and technical
change in the economy; strong agglomerative forces which pro-
mote the concentration of control units in certain locations;
and changes in the location of these concentrations within the
system.
As Table I indicates, the number of people engaged in
control activity has grown markedly in recent years. While
the number of control units has grown apace with total employ-
ment, the total number of such units has remained relatively
small. The total number of major decision units has remained
very small. In 1958 and 1963, the proportion of CAOA employ-
ment accounted for by companies in the largest employment size
class (10,000+) was approximately 60%. There were only 207
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such multi-unit firms in 1958 and 258 in 1963. Their total
numbers of subsidiaries were 4046 and 5143, respectively.5
This limited number of control units is by no means
spread evenly throughout the system of cities. Rather, power-
ful agglomerative forces are operative. Stephen Hymer has
described the general nature of these forces. (Recall that
in Hymer's schema there are three levels):
Level II activities, because of their need
for white-collar workers, communications systems,
and information, tend to concentrate in large
cities. Since their demands are similar, corpo-
rations from different industries tend to place
their coordinating offices in the same city...
Level I activities, the general offices, tend to
be even more concentrated than Level II activities,
for they must be located close to the capital mar-
ket, the media, and the government. 6
Finally, we must consider the phenomenon of intra-system
shifts in control activity. The dynamic development of the
city system may lead to changes in the relative attractive-
ness (to control) of different cities over time. The growth
of decision units over time may also generate new clusters
whose conditions are so favorable that older control units
are attracted. For whatever reason, different cities have
certainly attracted differing numbers of control units during
recent years. The following table illustrates the point.
5Data taken from Central Administrative Offices and Aux-
iliaries (1963), a publication of the U.S. Department of Com-
merce.
6 Hymer, op. cit., p. 16.
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Table IV-3
Changes in Control, 1958-1963
Number
of UnitsSMSA
Jersey City
Buffalo
New York
Cincinnati
Detroit
Chicago
Los Angeles
Atlanta
Dallas
Paterson
1958
67
94
1518
128
323
724
562
173
201
77
1963
71
104
1738
149
392
965
780
252
306
131
Change %Change
4
10
220
21
69
241
218
79
105
54
6
10
13
16
21
33
39
46
52
70
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Central
Offices and Auxiliaries, (Washington: USGPO,
Administrative
1963).
In the present and near future, we may speculate, cities will
grow not only by attracting production, but also by attracting
control. The limited quantity and agglomerative tendencies of
the latter assure that some cities will attract more than
others.
How does all this relate back to our initial discussion?
In somewhat simplified form, we offer the following general
hypothesis: American cities of SMSA size occupy a three-tier
hierarchy: At the bottom are SMSA's whose activity centers
around coordination of hinterland marketing processes. At the
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next level will be those cities which have, in addition, at-
tracted major production activity. Finally, on top, will be
the regional cities which have become foci for control (Fol-
lowing Hymer, we could divide control cities into Level I and
Level II cities). In looking at SMSA's, then, we can distin-
guish three (four, if we employ the Level I-Level II distinc-
tion) functional levels in the hierarchy, each of which might
be characterized by an "optimum" city size. We do not attempt
a functional classification of smaller urban areas, but there
is no reason to rule out the "optimal hamlet", the "optimal
small town", etc. The mind boggles. We take the more prudent
course and forget about cities smaller than 50,000 in popula-
tion.
IV-3 On Optimal Size
American cities are not easily divided into "pure" hier-
archical types. A rise in the hierarchy apparently depends
upon minimum threshold effects (e.g. some set of activities
associated with operation as an important marketing-production
center may make a city eligible for consideration as a locus
of control). Cities which rise through a threshold retain
their lower-level functions. New York and Chicago are both
good examples of this phenomenon. When we speak of a hier-
archy of cities, then, we are characterizing cities by their
highest-level activities. In looking for an "optimum" size
at each hierarchical level, we must recognize the existence
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of this pyramiding of functions. Production cities retain
regional marketing functions. In general, then, they should
have larger populations than marketing cities. Similarly,
control cities should be larger than production cities. This
is only a general rule. A small production city might have a
combination of conditions which attracted important control
functions. The smallest city at each hierarchical level will
undoubtedly be smaller than the largest city at the next level
down.
Our "optimum" sizes, then, are within the context of func-
tion-pyramiding. No one knows whether it would be possible to
separate cities into pure hierarchical types with much smaller
populations for those at higher levels. We will be concerned
with asking whether certain populations are apparently optimal,
given the system of pyramiding. In our examination of this
question, we propose to use metropolitan land values as a
measuring device.
IV-4 Land Values as a Measure of the Net Benefits to Urban
Agglomeration
We have posited a national system of cities coexisting
with a nationally organized market system. It is not unreason-
able to assume that the national population exhibits a high
degree of mobility -- flowing within the system to the points
where expected benefits (either from employment or amenities)
are greatest. Similarly, since the greatest part of production
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is organized for national markets by national firms (which
therefore face a composite national demand curve at each
point in time), we would expect the production units of these
firms to exhibit considerable sensitivity to differential
production costs associated with conditions in different
SMSA's. We can be sure that control functions, whatever the
determinants of their location patterns, are very spatially
mobile.
Let us hope that we do not stretch credibility too much
further by assuming that the following are true:
1). The supply of space services in any SMSA is less
than perfectly elastic. In the absence of such a condition,
our mode of analysis would not lead us to expect ground rents
to reflect more than the reservation value of the land. By
"space services" we mean the amount of floor space available
for commercial and residential purposes. The supply of such
services can be increased at the intensive margin in two ways
-- vertically, through the construction of taller buildings,
and horizontally, through transport investments. The impli-
cit assumption is that both activities are characterized by
increasing marginal costs within the relevant range.
2). There exists an efficient land market which capit-
alizes net benefits in the form of ground rents.
3). Costs of movement within SMSA's are sufficiently
high to guarantee that a good percentage of land market
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transactions in any period will be with new arrivals (whether
persons or firms). This assumption is a way of eliminating
the simultaneity problem with respect to urban site bidding.
If all actors are free to move in every period and each actor's
bid will be determined by every other actor's location, then
an atomistic decision structure will not yield determinate
results. In fact, such an assumption would represent a very
poor approximation to urban reality in the first place. Our
assumption seems observably closer to the truth and has the
virtue of stabilizing enough locations so that a coherent set
of choices can be made by new entrants and the comparatively
few resident activities which choose to move.
4). Each in-migrant generates real benefits for his
fellow citizens (capturing of service scale economies, greater
production potential -- others could easily be imagined) but
also real costs in the form of increasing congestion, pollu-
tion, noise, etc. Given the functional role assigned to the
city in question, the costs associated with additional in-
migrants will at some point begin to outweigh the benefits
they bring.
None of these assumptions is unrealistic. If we accept
them, we can use land values as a good measure of the net
benefits (from the standpoint of the economic system) associ-
ated with any SMSA. Given this measure of benefits, which
can be related to population, we will be in a position to
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look at the question of optimum size.
We enlist land values as a measuring rod in the following
way: Assume that moving costs generate substantial spatial
immobility within an SMSA so that new entrants can evaluate
respective locations with respect to the locations of other
urban activities and an existing pattern of parcel valuations.
Let P. be the market value of the jth parcel and Vi be the
J J
valuation put on this parcel by the ith entering household
or firm. Then the activity pattern in the urban area in ques-
i
tion will be stable under an allocation such that V. - P. >J J -
Vn - P , where n represents any other parcel, from the stand-
point of the ith actor in the system. A whole set of parcel
prices will then exist, and the total value of the land in the
J
metropolitan area will be LV = EP.
J
Now we bring in our assumptions about household and firm
mobility. Among all metropolitan areas in our sample, we can
arbitrarily choose one as numeraire (let it be the smallest),
and subscript it 0. Since all i's are mobile, we know that
i -i - i
V -P. > V -PJ - 0 0
J . J I . I .
We then sum: EV. - EP. > EV' - EP . Note that the right
. J .J -. o .0oJ J 1 1
hand side measures the "numeraire" level of consumer surplus
or profit for each i. Rearranging:
J J . I . I .
(1) LV = EP. < EV± - (EV - EP
J - . 3 0 o . 0
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Land value under the given assumptions provides a lower
bound estimate of the differential benefits accruing to loca-
tion in a certain SMSA relative to location in the numeraire
area. But this, in turn, allows us to compare land values in
different SMSA's. A difference in land value will be a lower-
bound estimate of differences in V's relative to numerical
welfare values for the respective populations of the two
7
areas.
Let us divide the i's into homogeneous sub-groups (e.g.
banks, middle-class college students, etc.), and take the
k k k
liberty of assuming that we can define a Zk = V0 - P0 as the
same for all members of the kth sub-group. We would expect
there to be equal LV's in two areas with identical populations
(both with respect to numbers and composition. This estima-
tion would include factors such as the agricultural reserva-
tion price of the land).
The above can be re-cast into graphical form and used to
give visual substance to our notion of the hierarchical city
system. Our formulation reflects a balancing of benefits and
costs of the arrival by all actors in the system. But, con-
7In order to make the analysis go through in this form,
we require the additional assumption that resources for invest-
ment in real estate are themselves geographically mobile, so
that prevailing rent structures represent equal-profit condi-
tions for land-owning interests in different SMSA's. Without
this assumption, we can compare SMSA's to the numeraire area,
but not to each other.
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ceptually, these benfits and costs can be separated. Let us
deal temporarily with a city at one level in the hierarchy.
The "benefits" associated with different population sizes are
system benefits. Without a change in hierarchy status, the
market benefits of increasing population will not exhibit con-
stant increase, since the city will be characterized by a
rather fixed upper bound on the allowable set of activities.
These activities can generate useful employment over a certain
range, but toward the upper end of the range the benefits
associated with each new arrival are bound to begin dimishing.
Pollution and congestion costs, however, increase at least
linearly with new arrivals and probably more so (Baumol has
argued that the relationship is quadratic). 8
Assume that the degree of elasticity of in-migration with
respect to net benefits is the same across metropolitan areas
and that the degree of elasticity of supply of urban space
services is similarly constant. In terms of the numeraire,
then, we can say that P = eV , where c is the constant per-
cent of surplus accruing to landholders after the (constant)
elasticties of demand and supply mentioned above are taken
into account. Similarly, (1-c)V is the surplus accruing to
the actor i.
8 See William Baumol, "Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth:
The Anatomy of Urban Crisis," American Economic Review, (June,
1967).
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Given k homogeneous sub-groups respectively occupying
all the land in k composite parcels, we can say the following:
K K K K K
(2) LV = EPk = Vk = Z(Bk - Ck) = e[EBk - k
k k k k k
K K K
AR = (EPk)/N = sE [k - ECk] = c(AB - AC)
k kN kN
Where P k = The rental price of the kth composite parcel
Vk = The valuation put on its composite parcel by
kth group
Bk = Total benefits associated with activity k
Ck = Total costs associated with activity k
N = Total population of the SMSA
AR = Average rental
AB = Average benefits
AC = Average costs
We can use the following diagram as a summary:
Figure IV-l
Hypothesized Cost-Benefit Curves and Population Size
AB
ACC
B = EABA= EAC/MB = eMB
M = ECMC
MB
POP
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When we look at the general pattern of in-migration, we
can see that each potential in-migrant will look at Vk but
that the resulting pattern will reflect the difference between
AB and AC. As long as (AB - AC) is positive, we can expect
units to continue to in-migrate. But in this case, average
net benefits (and therefore average rent) will be maximized
at the point where marginal benefits and costs intersect. But
in-migration may well continue beyond this point, since
(AB - AC) > 0 implies that at least some groups enjoy a wel-
fare improvement from continued in-migration. The process
will probably cease before AB = AC, because this somewhat
artificial construct disguises the fact that elements of some
groups will be suffering negative net benefits and out-migrat-
ing before this point is reached. To be view realistically,
the use of averages must be considered in the following con-
text:
It seems reasonable to suppose that migration is largely
a response to available employment opportunities (An impor-
tant exception is, of course, the "retirement cities" of the
West and Southeast). But employment is not automatically
available in every metropolitan area. Employers enjoy certain
benefits of agglomeration. Their combined appeal draws people
into a metroplitan area. But there is a brake on the process.
Associate "benefits" to workers purely with wages for a moment.
k
Let S be the prevailing real wage for workers in group k in
0
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k k k k k
the numeraire area. Let welfare V = B - C = S - C ,
0 0 0 0 0
k
where C represents the necessity for putting up with the
level of crime, pollution, congestion, etc., associated with
the size of the numeraire area. Now, contrast the situations
in control and production cities. We pass no judgment on
relative marginal productivities, but wage scales in control
and subsidiary processes are generally higher than those in
production processes, for whatever reason. For group k, then,
given two cities of equal population, one of which has control
k k k k
as well as production functions, we see that S - C > S - C ,
c c p p
because Ck = Ck and Sk > S (We could couch the latter in terms
c p c p
of "expected", or "mean" values, if we chose).
k > k
Obviously, then, V > V and migration from p to c will
c p
k.
occur. As this migration occurs, however, C increases and
c
Ck decreases. Workers in C who have scarce skills essential
p
for control will demand and get wage increases to balance
k
increasing C up to a certain point. Beyond this point,
c
profit-oriented firms must balk. One of two things will
khappen. Control will migrate, or S will stabilize. At
c
k k
some differential population level, then, V = V . Intra-
c p
hierarchical migration will be shut off by this effect long
before average rents have declined to zero. If real wage
differentials are sufficiently high, however, the process
may continue well into the region of declining average rents.
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Now, we cast all this reasoning into a multi-level system.
The following diagram characterizes the situation:
Figure IV-2
Multi-Level Benefit-Cost Curves and Population
AA
AB2
ABI
POP
0 10 2
One AC curve prevails, but in this two-level hierarchy,
two average benefit curves are needed. Two "optimum" sizes
(0 , 02) are generated. The above curves reflect the fol-
lowing total value relationship:
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Figure IV-3
Total Benefit-Cost Curves and Population
$
TC
TB
POP
The above in turn indicates the following shape for a
land value curve which reflects net benefits:
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Figure IV-4
Land Value and Population
$
POP
0 C
Some cities may have passed beyond the optimum size for their
function, but we would expect the population of any SMSA to
stabilize well before point C. Our two-tiered hierarchy
might well look like the following:
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Figure IV-5
Hypothesized Two-Tiered Land Value Curves and Population
$
POP
The two solid curves are the curves which would be ob-
served if SMSA's were disaggregated into the two functional
types. If all SMSA's were taken together, a curve of the
type shown in the dotted line would be observed.
We have arrived, finally, at a point where the implica-
tions of our theory become empirically testable.
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IV-5 Econometric Model I: An Aggregated Look at Land Value
Patterns in 165 SMSA's
Our theory would lead us to expect a systematic relation-
ship between total land values in a metropolitan area and
population. The relationship is, however, of reduced form.
A truly structural specification would relate external econ-
omies and diseconomies directly to the underlying forces
responsible. At the present state of knowledge, this is
extremely difficult to specify with precision. We can, how-
ever, relate land values directly to activities which are
known to have important impacts on the desirability of any
area as a site for agglomeration. These values must, of
course, also reflect the bidding of those activities which
are attracted to the site. Our reduced form combines ele-
ments of supply and demand in determining the value of urban
land.
Because of the difficulty in providing an explicit
structure at this stage, the primary empirical effort has to
be directed toward finding a good approximation to the curve
relating land values and population. If such a curve can
provide a reasonable statistical fit to the observations,
one can examine the implications of the apparent curvature
for the presence or absence of net economies or diseconomies
of agglomeration.
Our first cut at the problem lies in estimating these
relationships from a cross section of U.S. metropolitan areas
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without any attempt at hierarchical disaggregation. We do
include the elements which would distinguish cities at dif-
ferent hierarchical levels, since these would obviously
have an effect on land value.
We postulate that total land values in a metropolitan
area are functionally related to population and a series of
other variables. The first set of these variables might be
termed "location theoretic": Obviously, the situation of
the city with respect to the national transport network has
implications for the locational advantage of a core of ac-
tivities. In particular, access to the national rail network
and presence of a harbor on either ocean or inland waterways
would seem important. Some measure of the agricultural po-
tential of land and the presence of mineral deposits affects
the reservation price of land on the margin of settlement and
provides a measure of the potential of the regional market
which the city may serve. Also, if a city is part of a
larger complex of cities, the distance of the city from the
nearest metropolitan area with population more than one mil-
lion may provide a proxy for agglomeration effects not fully
reflected in the city's own population.
The second set of variables might be termed "structure-
specific": Non-profit activities compete with other activi-
ties for urban space, and these organizations may be less
sensitive to narrowly economic criteria in their choice of
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location. Academic institutions are significant in this
respect as they draw student populations to an area for
reasons other than migration of working households. Also,
academic institutions are frequently regarded as providing
important externalities in research and development work.
The use-specific nature of structures and infrastructure
makes land relatively difficult to adapt to subsequent uses
once it has been developed for one use. Thus, areas with
large parts of land already committed to outdated or inap-
propriate physical structures should have lower land values,
ceteris paribus. The ratio of metropolitan population in
1900 to the 1960 population is used as a measure of this
structural rigidity.
Finally, we include two "hierarchy-specific" factors:
We have posited that a substantial influence on the dynamics
of urban growth is exerted by control as well as production
activities. We have thus included an index of the presence
of control activities and an index of the presence of pro-
duction activities.
Given our theory of hierarchical ordering, we would
expect the smaller cities in our sample to exhibit land
values heavily influenced by the "location-theoretic" vari-
ables. These would be predominantly local (regional) market
centers.
Larger metropolitan areas should be more heavily influ-
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enced by the "hierarchy-specific" variables. While the in-
fluence of academic institutions would be expected to be
paramount at upper levels in the hierarchy, the index of
structural rigidity should make its influence felt throughout.
The theory suggests that these are the appropriate vari-
ables and indicates the likely importance of different vari-
ables in explaining land values in cities of different sizes.
Theory does not suggest particular functional forms for these
variables and, as indicated earlier, the econometric investi-
gation at this stage of knowledge must be primarily a curve-
fitting exercise.
Equations to be estimated will have the general form:
LV = F(NRF,VAM,VAPT,CS,FF,CD,PG,PR,DIO) where
NRF = An index of access to the national rail network
VAM = An index of the value of subsurface mineral deposits
VA = An index of value of agricultural production at the
urban periphery
PT = An index of importance as a port
CD = An index of the number of corporate divisional
headquarters
CS = The number of college students
FF = An index of the level of manufacturing activity
PG = Population in 1960
PR = Ratio of population in 1900 to population in 1960
DIO = Distance from the nearest SMSA with more than one
million population
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This relationship was estimated from data relating to
165 American metropolitan areas for 1960. Cities in the sam-
ple range in population from 50,000 to 10,000,000. Subsequent
sections describe in detail the definitions and sources of
data for the variables used and report the results of the
regression analysis.
IV-6 Derivation of Indices and Data Sources
The 1967 definitions of American SMSA's were used in this
study. All indices were derived from data for the year 1960.
The NRF index was compiled from data available in Plant
Location (1960). It represents the number of major rail
lines serving each SMSA directly. To qualify as "major",
rail lines had to be listed in Fortune's top 50 transport
corporations for the year 1960.
The American legal precept that land ownership conveys
all rights to subsurface mineral deposits necessitated the
use of VAM. VAM is the value added in mining for all SMSA
countries as listed in the City-County Data Book (1962).
The choice of an appropriate index for agricultural
reservation price was somewhat difficult. Available data on
agricultural land values for SMSA or neighboring counties
was rejected as suffering too obviously from the effects of
speculation. The value of agricultural product per acre
(of farm land) was chosen as a superior index, although truck
gardening opportunities probably lead to more intensive
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cultivation than would otherwise be the case. The relevant
data was drawn from the City-County Data Book (1962).
The locational advantage resulting from access to water-
borne commerce was indexed by using data drawn from the Survey
of Waterborne Commerce of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
The basic index is simply the total of foreign and domestic
tonnage handled by port facilities on oceans, lakes, and
rivers.
The number of college students in each SMSA was used as
a proxy for the space demands of academic institutions. This
variable was considered significant because of the strategic
location of many such institutions and the consequent attrac-
tion of student populations not related to economic decisions
with regard to location.
The pressure of manufacturers' space demands was indexed
by compiling data from the Fortune Plant and Product Directory
(1960) on the total number of plants owned by the top 200
manufacturing corporations in each SMSA. As a check, most
regressions were also run with the substitution of value
added in manufacturing. Substantially similar results were
yielded.
The number of divisional headquarters of Fortune's top
200 manufacturing corporations was selected as an appropriate
index of demand for administrative space. Serious problems
are associated with the construction of an appropriate index
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for headquarters activity. In 1960, even the 200 largest
corporations exhibited considerable variation in degree of
decentralization. The number of operating divisions ranged
from less than five to more than 40.
Our purpose in constructing the index was to generate
an indicator or the importance of the demand for space for
control and associated activities in an SMSA. Given two
corporations with roughly the same number of assets, we would
not expect each of the 40 divisions of one to have as impor-
tant an impact as each of the five divisions of the other.
For this reason, the following convention was employed: The
median number of corporate divisions was found to be ten.
For those corporations with fewer than ten divisions, each
division was assigned a weight of one and the residual weight
was assigned to the location of the corporate headquarters.
For those with more than ten divisions, a fractional weight
(10/x, where x = the number of divisions) was assigned to each
divisional location and to the headquarters location.
Data for this index were compiled from various advertis-
ing directories and the Thomas Register of Manufacturers for
1960.
Population in 1960 was totaled for SMSA's under the
1967 county definition. Population for 1900 was obtained
from the 1900 census using the 1967 SMSA definition.
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The index DIO is simply the rail distance from the SMSA
in question to the nearest SMSA whose population is one mil-
lion or greater. Distances were taken directly from a com-
mercial atlas of the United States.
Land value data were derived from assessment data in the
Census of Governments (1962) by county. Adjustments toward
true market value were made using assessment ratios also
available in this publication.
IV-7 Statistical Results
The adequacy of the specified functional relationship was
first tested by estimating the equation over the whole popula-
tion range:
LV = -355.8 - 62.8NRF + 6.9VAM + 6.2VA - 12.2PT + 125.9CS
(-1.7) (-1.5) (4.2) (4.3) (-1.9) (9.7)
+25.5FF + 78.5CD + 1.lPG - 722.9PR R = .99 N = 165
(4.2) (11.5) (2.5) (-1.6) DW = 2.00 D.F. = 155
Given 155 degrees of freedom, the appropriate t-statis-
tics for rejection of the null hypothesis with 95% and 90%
confidence are, respectively, 1.96 and 1.64 (t-statistics
for coefficients are always presented in parentheses beneath
the regression coefficients themselves). We can immediately
see, then, that the null hypothesis of parameters equal to
zero can be rejected at least at the .10 level for all vari-
ables except NRF which is significant only at the .2 level.
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The overall fit appears to be excellent, and the individ-
ual coefficients make sense. The negative signs associated
with the coefficients of NRF and PT are the only seemingly
contradictory results. It must be remembered that the orig-
inal hypothesis held that these variables would exert a posi-
tive, significant influence primarily in small SMSA's. Re-
gressions run on sub-parts of the sample indicated this to be
the case, and the negative bias over the whole sample has ap-
parently been introduced by SMSA's in the range 500,000 -
1,000,000 for reasons which will subsequently be discussed.
It must be noted that some potential problems exist here.
One has to do with multicollinearity among the independent
variables. Given the data from which CS, CD, and PG are
computed, one might expect a high degree of multicollinearity.
Surprisingly, this problem does not materialize, either in
the whole sample estimation or in subsequent piecewise esti-
mations. A simple correlation matrix was computed for all
variables in each size range and an appropriate test for
serious multicollinearity utilized. The test was passed in
every case (The high degree of intercorrelation observed among
several independent variables in the higher population ranges
may introduce some bias into the coefficients, but will not
invalidate the t-tests or seriously distort subsequent elas-
ticity estimates, given the fact that all these variables
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passed the basic test). 9
It seems that we can place some faith in the general
functional form which we originally specified. We now break
our SMSA sample into different size ranges for two reasons:
1). Some preliminary evaluation of the influence of
hierarchical functions on land values in different size ranges.
2). Some preliminary work in infering the shape of the
best fit curve relating land values to population.
The results of separate linear regression on different
ranges of SMSA size follow; estimates of elasticities at
points of means appear in parentheses two lines under the
coefficients:10
A. (Population 50,000 - 250,000)
LV = -55.6 + 44.0ONRF + 5.6VAM + l.6VA + 7.5PT + 2.4CS
(-.8) (2.5) (4.4) (3.7) (1.8) (.6)
(.18) (.06) (.14) (.01) (.01)
-6.7FF + 10.3CD + 3.7PG - 420.6PR R = .75 N = 74
(-1.1) (1.4) (7.7) (-3.6) DW = 1.90 D.F. = 64
(-.08) (.02) (.97) (-.23)
9 The rule of thumb, suggested by Professor F. M. Fisher,
is if the simple correlation coefficient between two indepen-
dent variables is smaller than the simple correlation coeffic-
ient between each of the independent variables and the depen-
dent variable, multicollinearity will not introduce serious
bias. All of our simple correlations between variables in
all ranges pass this test.
A separate series of regressions were run with DIO in-
cluded. This variable proved to be negative and statistically
significant only in the size range 150,000 - 500,000, indicat-
ing that such cities have higher land values, ceteris paribus,
the nearer they are to a large metropolis.
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B. (Population 250,000 - 500,000)
LV = -270.6 + 34.9NRF + 3.8VAM + 2.6VA + 5.6PT + 3.5CS
(-1.0) (1.1) (4.3) (2.6) (1.0) (.2)
(.07) (.09) (.13) (.02) (.01)
+ 8.2FF - .15CD + 3.7PG - 417.4PR R = .68 N = 47
(.9) (-.02) (4.2) (-1.5) DW = 1.91 D.F. = .37
(.0) (.00) (.91) (-.09)
C. (Population 500,000 - 1,000,000)
LV = 747.1 - 403.8NRF + 9.7VAM + .6VA - 1.3PT + 66.4CS
(.7) (-3.1) (1.3) (1.0) (-.1) (1.6)
(-.51) (.06) (.02) (.00) (.21)
+ 56.4FF + 60.6CD + 1.9PG - 1742PR R = .62 N = 25
(1.8) (2.2) (1.1) (-1.3)DW = 1.86 D.F. = 15
(.51) (.16) (.42) (-.17)
D. (Population 1,000,000 - 10,000,000)
LV = 1378.6 - 63.ONRF + 3.4VAM + 11.2VA - 16.8PT + 158.OCS
(1.0) (-.5) (.6) (1.5) (-.8) (4.2)
(-.5) (.01) (.08) (-.03) (.45)
+ 57.1FF + 116.9CD - 1.6PG - 6933.3PR R = .99 N = 20
(3.7) (6.7) (-1.4) (-2.1) DW = 1.46 D.F. = 10
(.32) (.48) (-.27) (-.12)
The negative and statistically significant coefficient
of NRF in range C is apparently responsible for its negative
coefficient in the entire sample. The coefficients of NRF
are positive in ranges A and B as expected. The result in
range C appears to be dominated by Miami and San Diego, both
of which lie on extreme ends of the national rail network and
have relatively high land values influenced by tourism and
naval bases respectively which are not accounted for by other
independent variables. It is also possible that cities well
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oriented to the rail net (which has not changed appreciably
since the early 1900's) have internal transport and infra-
structure not well adapted to highway-dominated transport of
the mid-century.
Theoretically, the most important result of this piece-
wise approach is some basic reinforcement of our notions con-
cerning hierarchical interrelationships. The key here lies
in the observed t-statistics and in our calculation of land
value elasticities with respect to the independent variables.
The former confirm our general notion concerning the impact
on "net benefits" of different activities at different size
levels. For SMSA's in the range 50,000 - 500,000, the "loca-
tion-theoretic" variables emerge as significant. For SMSA's
in the range 500,000 - 10,000,000, these variables become
insignificant and the "hierarchy-specific" variables
emerge. The calculated elasticities furnish further sup-
porting evidence. These elasticities (of the form X - 3LV
LV 5X
each independent X) give a measure of the relative respon-
siveness of land values to changes in independent variables.
Both factories and control activities survive the 95% t-test
for ranges C and D. The balance of importance obviously
shifts, however. In the range 500,000 - 1,000,000 LV is
more sensitive to changes in factories than to changes in
control activities, while the reverse is true for cities over
1,000,000.
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All of the estimations reported so far have been based
on a simple linear specification. We should examine the
possibility of a non-linear relationship between LV and PG.
Before proceeding further, however, we must clarify the sense
in which a "ceteris paribus" relationship exists between the
two variables.
In discussions which relate "population" to net agglom-
eration benefits, the population variable is actually being
used as an index for levels of various urban activities. To
isolate a "ceteris paribus" effect through multiple regression,
on the other hand, somehow implies that population affects
net benefits in isolation from the other activity indices.
Although some exceptions (such as retailing) should be noted,
we can assert that in general the level of net benefits in an
SMSA is not independently related to population in the normal
sense. We cannot justifiably fit a curvilinear relationship
between population and land value as if all other variables
could be held at a constant value.
Given this qualification, our analysis is forced to pro-
ceed on two fronts. First, we join the current discussions
of optimum city size by estimating the curvilinear relation-
ship between LV and PG, allowing the latter to serve as an
activity index. The same non-linear form of PG is then used
in the original regression format to determine whether the
general results remain the same.
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Our examination of the relationship between LV and PG
begins with a review of the piecewise linear function esti-
mated in four parts above. Taking advantage of the prior
results, we estimate over ranges A through D using only those
variables which proved significant in the original regres-
sions. The results are as follows (A is the composite sum
of all variables except PG):
A. LV = A + 4.9PG
(5.9)
B. LV = A + 4.2PG
(4.0)
C. LV = A + 2.4PG
(1.5)
D. LV = A - 2.OPG
(-2.2)
The results suggest a curvilinear relationship in which
the slope continuously declines toward the 1,000,000 point.
At this point, a gross discontinuity throws the shape of the
rest of the curve into considerable doubt. Also, examination
of residuals raises question about the negatively sloping
segment. We can test this piecewise approach by using alter-
native specifications which introduce PG non-linearly.
The following results represent the best fit when land
value is regressed purely on non-linear specifications of PG:
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A. (50,000 - 250,000)
LV = -1429.69 + 36.15PG - .23(PG ) + .00052(PG )
(-1.81) (2.07) (-1.90) (1.95)
R = .52
DW = 1.84
N = 70
D.F. = 66
B. (250,000 - 500,000)
LV = 2870.07 - 480245(1/PG)
(9.96) (-5.54)
R = .39
DW = 2.08
N = 51
D.F. = 49
C. (50,000 - 10,000,000)
LV = -607.47 + 6.94PG - .0013(PG ) + .00000021(PG )
(-3.45) (12.28) (-4.27) (5.47)
R = .95
DW = 2.42
N = 164
D.F. = 160
These three equations can in turn be plotted as the fol-
lowing:
Figure IV-6
Land Value vs. Population (Fitted)
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Figure IV-7
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Given the above "best-fit" specifications, we now include
the same population specifications in the whole estimation
procedure in order to compare the results with the original
linear estimations:
A. (50,000 - 250,000)
LV = -1367.64 + 30.23NRF + 6.19VAM + 1.81VA + 3.81PT + 2.85CS
(-2.11) (1.62) (4.84) (3.95) (.85) (.64)
+ .85FF + 6.14CD + 33.89PG - .22(PG ) + .00050(PG ) - 434.11PR
(.12) (.69) (2.33) (-2.13) (2.16) (-3.64)
R2 = .75 N =70
DW = 1.99 D.F. = 58
B. (250,000 - 500,000)
LV = 2075.5 + 59.73NRF + 4.34VAM + 3.15VA + 6.05PT - 1.08CS
(5.03) (1.69) (5.73) (3.25) (1.29) (-.07)
+4.79FF - 5.36CD - 382902(1/PG) - 466.46PR
(.62) (-.81) (-4.68) (-1.82)
R = .70 N= 51
DW = 1.73 D.F. = 41
C. (50,000 - 10,000,000)
LV = -188.2 - 101.ONRF + 7.9VAM + 5.3VA - 17.4PT + 100.4CS
(-1.0) (-2.6) (5.4) (4.1) (-3.0) (8.3)
+ 67.8FF + 31.3CD + .5PG - .00009(PG ) + .00000004(PG ) - 803.9PR
(8.0) (3.4) (1.1) (-.9) (3.9) (-2.0)
R = .99 N = 165
DW = 2.3 D.F. = 153
These results are quite satisfying. We can see that the
fits for population are generally better for the non-linear
specification and that the fit for the other variables is,
if anything, somewhat improved.
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We are confronted, then, with a curve which apparently
has three population turning points -- one near 150,000, one
near 500,000, and one in the vicinity of 3,000,000. Our
four-tiered hierarchy of cities seems to have taken form.
Our results suggest that average net benefits associated
with marketing cities begin declining around 100,000. The
average benefits associated with production cities apparently
increase to somewhere around 300,000 and then begin decreasing.
The same point for Hymer's Level II cities is around 1,000,000,
and the evidence for Level I cities is ambiguous. Although
we cannot be sure that New York's population had reached the
point of declining average benefits in 1960, recent evidence
suggests that it has now done so.
An econometric exercise of the type employed above is,
of course, open to the charge of "data mining," since no
explicit :theory is really being tested. In order to reassure
the reader that the estimated curves really are a "best fit"
to the data, actual plots of the data over the appropriate
ranges are presented below. The problem of scaling prevents
presentation of the entire plot on one sheet.
When the plots are examined, there can be little doubt
that the trend of the data is the same as that which emerges
from the estimated curves. Especially clear are the two
turning points at around 500,000 and around 4,000,000.
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Our results suggest that the relationship between popu-
lation and land values in large American cities reflects an
overlapping four-tiered hierarchy of total net benefit curves.
In view of these results, it seems worthwhile to examine the
whole question of hierarchical ordering more closely. In
order to do this, we must construct a new, somewhat different
format.
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IV-8 Econometric Model II: A Disaggregated Approach
Our fundamental interest is in the differential impacts
of production and control on metropolitan economic activity.
The model which we are using generally lends itself to dis-
aggregation and examination of different land value patterns
in control and production cities. We are looking for evidence
concerning the presence of restricted opportunities for bene-
ficial expansion at each hierarchical level and some indica-
tion of the relationship to the "optimal" size of various
SMSA's within each functional category.
The 165 SMSA's from the aggregate study were separated
into two groups. One group, which numbered 41 SMSA's, con-
sisted specifically of control cities -- cities exhibiting
the strong presence of corporate headquarters activity. These
cities ranged in population from 122,000 to 10,000,000. The
other group, numbering 124 SMSA's, was a combined sampling of
production and marketing cities. 1 1
The basic task is an attempt to distinguish three thresh-
olds: Between production-marketing cities, Level II control,
and Level I control. We would expect to distinguish three
1 1 The criterion for the division of SMSA's should be clar-
ified. The separation of control cities as a group was done
purely on the basis of ranking according to their corporate
divisional weighting. A clear discontinuity was observed at
the weighting of "8", and this was therefore chosen as the cut-
off point for discrimination between control and production
cities.
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curves -- each exhibiting the previously noted shape and each
characterizing cities in different population ranges.
The basic estimation procedure was left intact. The
problems with multicollinearity were no different than in the
first estimation process and were thus not serious. The in-
dex of control was left out of the estimations within the
two sample groups, since the basis for separation was the
presence or absence of control activities.
IV-9 Statistical Results
We present separate estimates for each group of SMSA's.
First, the production group. Several sets of piecewise
linear and logarithmic regressions were first run on the
data. The piecewise linear results were as follows:
A. (50,000 - 150,000)
LV = -215.3 + 35.7NRF + 6.5VAM + 1.4VA - ll.8PT - 8.lCS + 2.
(-2.07) (1.94) (3.91) (1.22) (-1.17) (-1.34) (.
(.21) (.09) (.13) (-.02) (-.05) (.
+ 5.2PG - 363.3PR R = .69 N = 42
(5.63) (-2.39) DW = 2.34 D.F. = 33
(1.35) (-.26)
9FF
32)
03)
B. (150,000 - 225,000)
LV = -260.8 + 29.4NRF + 6.lVAM + 1.7VA
(-1.05) (.63) (2.73) (2.50)
(.09) (.06) (.15)
+ 4.7PG - 393.7PR R 2=
(3.91) (-1.51) DW =
(1.25) (-.16)
+ 7.3PT + 9.4CS - 9.7FF
(1.27) (1.3) (-1.03)
(.02) (.06) (-.11)
.69 N = 29
1.74 D.F. = 20
- 203 -
C. (225,000 - 500,000)
LV = -429.1 - 15.5NRF + 4.3VAM + 3.3VA + 5.OPT + 14.2CS
(-1.58) (-.37) (4.93) (2.99) (.92) (.83)
(-.53) (.20) (.52) (.01) (.44)
+ 17.9FF + 3.7PG - 205.7PR R = .75 N = 40
(1.88) (4.18) (-.71) DW = 2.02 D.F. = 31
(.45) (.41) (-.47)
D. (500,000 - 1,000,000)
LV = -792.1 - 258.7NRF + 7.7VAM + ll.lVA - 2.5PT + 120.2CS
(-.45) (-1.57) (.69) (2.73) (-.15) (2.30)
(-.02) (.03) (.07) (.02) (.05)
+ 46.9FF + 1.72PG + 2107PR R = .86 N = 16
(1.37) (.71) (1.7) DW = 1.86 D.F. = 7
(.39) (.71) (.01)
In general, these results conform to our expectations.
A continuous decline in the slope of the line relating popu-
lation to land value can be noted throughout.
Examination of the end points in the range of production
cities revealed the fact that the final four may not properly
belong in this category and may have biased the estimated
coefficient on population upward. The four are Atlanta,
Dallas, Miami, and New Orleans. Miami, as previously noted,
is a special case. Subsequent research on the dynamics of
urban growth in the 1960's has shown that Atlanta, Dallas,
and New Orleans were in a state of dynamic disequilibrium
in 1960 -- all were apparently headed toward control status
at the time. A closer look at the shape of the value-popu-
lation curve was done with these final four SMSA's excluded,
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utilizing non-linear specifications. The results give quite
ample support to the hypothesis that average net benefits in
production cities are declining well before the 500,000 popu-
lation point:
A. (50,000 - 250,000)
LV = -669.31 + 17.86PG - .093(PG ) = + .00020(PG )
(-.94) (1.17) (-.91) (.90)
R = .51
DW = 1.74
B. (250,000 - 1,000,000)
LV = 3820.6 - 760222(l/PG) R = .62
(15.0) (-9.03) DW = 2.11
N = 70
D.F. = 66
N = 51
D.F. = 49
These equations are represented by the following plots:
Figure IV-9
Land Value vs. Population, Non-Corporate Cities (Fitted)
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Figure IV-10
Land Value vs. Population, Non-Corporate Cities (Fitted)
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Again, we see the apparent presence of a net benefit
curve associated with smaller marketing centers. It is per-
haps not accidental that it is over precisely the same range
that DIO proved a significant variable in earlier estimation
routines. It should also be noted that in the course of
running the huge number of regressions that formed the back-
ground for this project, the author noted that a piecewise
linear estimation over the range of the first relative maxi-
mum yielded a significant t-statistic for control activity.
Examination of the data revealed the presence of some control
activity in certain cities in this range. These cities,
while possessing too few control activities to be considered
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control cities themselves, were generally located near large
SMSA's which were control centers. All these points, then,
fall together into a neat pattern. The first relative maxi-
mum apparently reflects the net benefits curve of local mar-
keting centers which may occasionally, by virtue of proximity
to large SMSA's, attract some "satellite" control activities.
After 150,000, we encounter the "production cities",
whose average benefit curve begins declining around 300,000
and continues to flatten toward 1,000,000. This would suggest
that cities like Gary and Birmingham were too big in 1960.
In addition, cities such as Tampa, Portland, and San Antonio
had outgrown their role as production cities without attract-
ing the control functions requisite for advancement in the
hierarchy.
We can now move to the case of the control cities. Al-
though some control cities of small size were discerned,
these were too few in number to permit piecewise estimation
to be attempted. As a result, the shape of the best-fit
curve was deduced purely from a non-linear specification:
(Population 122,000 - 6,000,000)
LV = -1907.72 + 9.85PG - .0025(PG ) + .00000034(PG )
(-1.86) (4.98) (-2.88) (3.39)
R = .94 N = 40
DW = 2.56 D.F. = 36
This equation plots as the following:
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Figure IV-ll
Land Value vs. Population, Corporate Cities (Fitted)
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Inclusion of the other independent variables yields the
following whole-range estimation:
LV = -176.88 - 53.2NRF + 7.26VAM + 6.36VA - 16.llPT + 119.88CS
(-.22) (-.60) (1.89) (1.75) (-1.11) (4.73)
+ 101.20FF + .66PG - .00071(PG ) + .000000ll(PG ) - 4145.42PR
(5.60) (.36) (-1.16) (1.61) (-2.61)
R = .99 N = 40
DW = 2.38 D.F. = 29
The changeover from constant to declining average bene-
fits for the Level II control curve is somewhere between
700,000 and 1,000,000, and a general pattern of decline is
observed until 3,000,000, at which point we encounter the
iI '
0)
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Level I curve.
The results suggest that, in 1960, Denver and Indianapolis
were near the optimal size for control cities while a group
of cities including Seattle, Milwaukee, Buffalo, Houston,
Minneapolis, Baltimore, Cleveland, St. Louis, and Pittsburgh
were suffering from declining average net benefits as a result
of growing too large for optimal Level II control operation.
The only redress would seemingly be through elevation to Level
I status, and research on the 1960's indicates that Houston,
Minneapolis, and perhaps St. Louis may be headed toward this
goal. Pittsburgh, by contrast, has apparently failed to at-
tain Level I status and is suffering more openly at the
present time. Pittsburgh was the only SMSA in the U.S. to
lose population between 1960 and 1970.
Again, in order to counter the charge of "data mining,"
actual data plots for control cities and production cities
are presented below. The crucial plot is the comparison
between the trend for control cities and the trend for pro-
duction cities over the range (50,000 - 800,000) which is
common to both. The juxtaposition of the two trend lines
reveals the divergence which characterizes these two SMSA
types.
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LINE 12 ECONOMETRIC SOFTWARE PACKAGE * ESP *
Plotted Data, Land Value vs. Population in .1960
(Non-Control Cities)
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IV-10 Conclusion
We present here an overlay of the three curvilinear re-
lationships deduced:
Figure IV-12
The Four-Tier Hierarchy in Land Value Patterns
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We have assumed from the beginning that congestion and
pollution costs increase more than linearly with population.
Given the real costs associated with living in Level I SMSA's,
we can suggest that the residents of such areas must be given
a considerable "bribe" in the form of higher wage levels than
those characterizing smaller SMSA's. It is possible for
50 250
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economic activities in the largest SMSA's to pay these higher
wages only because of the higher net benefit curve associated
with Level I status. Alonso has suggested that higher wages
reflect higher average productivity in large urban agglomera-
tions. Our hierarchic model would lead us to recast this
argument somewhat: The historical pattern of function-pyr-
amiding has led to huge SMSA's at Levels I and II. The
organizations whose hierarchic ordering has reinforced this
pattern are forced to pay higher wages in order to induce
labor to tolerate the many social nuisances which character-
ize such large agglomerations. The observed higher wage
levels are, from this viewpoint, an outgrowth of this form
of social ordering. Without such a form, one might well
wonder whether such huge SMSA's would come to exist in the
first place. It may be that the corporate mode of organiza-
tion is more efficient than some non-hierarchic mode which
could be envisioned, but this is a separate question. Given
the viewpoint presented in this paper, one could agree with
Alonso that higher wages in larger SMSA's resulted from higher
productivity only if one also believed that the hierarchic
structuring of control and production was relatively effic-
ient. The resources used in compensating residents of large
SMSA's for high costs of pollution and congestion are, then,
very real costs of this mode of organization.
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There would appear to be three ways to improve the situ-
ation:
1). Reduction of the real cost of function-pyramiding
in hierarchical production through technical progress. The
emphasis in such an approach would be on more efficient
organization of large SMSA's (through improved mass transit,
exhaust emission controls, etc.). It must be emphasized
that this study has only drawn conclusions on the basis of
the technical environment existing in 1960. Many ways of
improving the operation of large urban areas are known. Some
have been implemented or will be (e.g. the apparent intent of
the Environmental Protection Agency to apply the principle of
"maximum technology" to the requirements for emissions con-
trol). Others appear more uncertain, given the vagaries of
the political process.12
We have no way of ascertaining the limits to the reduc-
tion of pollution and congestion costs through technical pro-
gress. We can say that the costs associated with larger
SMSA's will always be higher (in the absence of increasing
returns to the cost-reducing operations over the whole range)
than those of smaller SMSA's, even if both cost levels are
drastically reduced.
1 2 For a more detailed discussion of possible technical
improvements, see Edwin S. Mills and David de Ferranti,
"Market Choices and Optimum City Size," American Economic
Review Papers and Proceedings, (May, 1970).
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2). Sponsorship of out-migration of some lower-level
production activities in large SMSA's which have remained as
a result of pyramiding but are no longer necessary for ef-
ficient operation at the higher level.
3). It is perhaps best simply to quote Hymer here:
The new technology, because it exercises inter-
action, implies greater interdependence, but not nec-
essarily a hierarchical structure. Communications
linkages could be arranged in the form of a grid in
which each point was directly connected to many other
points, permitting lateral communication as well as
vertical communication. Each point would become a
center on its own and the distinction between center
and periphery would disappear. Such a grid is made
more feasible by aeronautical and electronic revolu-
tions which greatly reduce costs of communications.
It is not technology which creates inequality. Rather
it is organization that imposes a ritual asymmetry on
the use of intrinsically symmetrical means of communi-
cations.13
1 3 Hymer, op. cit., p. 19.
Chapter V
Incorporating the Theory of Control Location into
a Model of Historical Explanation
V-1 Introduction
The theory of profit-maximizing decision unit location
has been utilized by this paper for three econometric studies
of progressively broader scope. First, the theory of profit-
maximizing location was itself tested. Next, the dynamic
feedback relationship between the corporate headquarters and
its host metropolitan area was examined. Finally, the broader
relationship between an evolving corporate structure and an
evolving hierarchy of cities was studied. This section will
attempt to broaden the treatment of the last section by con-
sidering the evolution of an urban hierarchy in a developing
regional economy whose industries are subject to imperfect
information and capital markets. The basis for analysis will
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be a simple simulation exercise which draws upon all the pre-
ceding sections. The results of the theoretical exercise
will be compared with the various regional economies in the
United States and some tentative inferences drawn concerning
the relationship between relative growth rates across the urban
hierarchy and the level of regional economic "maturity".
Since this section must draw on information dating back to the
mid-nineteenth century, it will not develop the statistical
inferences in a rigorous way. Rather, a broad argument will
be sketched, with population growth rates substituted for more
substantive (but unavailable) indices of relative economic
performance.
V-2 Simulating Regional Development From an Information
Perspective
We will attempt to utilize our theoretical structure in
simulating the growth path of a hypothetical regional economy.
The confluence of search costs, risk, and market size ad-
vantages generates a hierarchy of co-ordinating units within
an industry as the economy expands:
(1) X= N/S _5
where X. = the number of units at hierarchical level j
J
N = the number of production units in the system
j = the hierarchical level of the control unit in
question
S = the span of control
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Assume that production units grow at the same rate as
the economy. Then
(2) N = N (1 + r)t
where N = the number of units in to
r = the yearly growth rate of the economy
t = the time period of question
Therefore,
(3) X = N (1 + r)t /Sj-jt 0
We are interested in the mechanism by which control units
order themselves in the urban system as the economy develops.
Before we make a detailed exposition of the process, we should
review several elements of the analytical framework appropriate
for considering the location of control units.
As noted in Chapter I,
(1) Tr. R(j, I ) - C(I I
c c' Ic
where f. = the profitability imputed to a decision unit
at the jth hierarchical level
j = the hierarchical level of the decision unit
in question
I = the size of the information cluster in ques-
c tion
P = the population of the metropolitan area to
c which the information cluster is attached
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Recall that
(la) > 0 2R < 0
c Ic2
(lb) > 0 2R > 0
J
(lc) DC> 0 2 > 0
e 31c
If we adapt this analytic framework to a system with four
hierarchical levels (and therefore three decision unit levels),
we can derive the following:
(2) R 4 (Ic) > R3 (c) > R2 (c
(2a) R 4' (I c - R3 (1c 
- R 2 1 c
(2b) C4 (1c I 3 c' I 2 c'P I > 0
c c c
Graphically, these inequalities can be expressed in the
following way:
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Figure V-i
Revenues, Costs, and Information Cluster Size
R., C
C
The graphical relationship between 1f . and Ic is there-
fore the following:
Figure V-2
Imputed Profitability and Information Cluster Size
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c
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For control units at levels 4, 3, and 2, then, the maxi-
mum profits will be at I4,1 13 and 12' respectively. Without
any a priori statements concerning the actual number of in-
formation units which would form the "optimal cluster"
for units at each hierarchical level, let us attempt to use
this framework in tracing out a historical path for a regional
economy.
For purposes of exposition, the following values will be
assumed:
N =1
0
J
max
= 4
S =4
t = 200 years
r = 6%
These values generate the following table:
The Growth of a Decision
Table V-1
Hierarchy in an Expanding Economy
t 0 25 50 75 100 125
N 1 4 16 64 256 1024
X2 0 1 4 16 64 256
X3 0 0 1 4 16 64
X 0 0 0 1 4 16
150
4096
1024
256
64
175
16384
4096
1024
256
200
65536
16384
4096
1024
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It is clear that at first the only towns in this system
are going to be factory towns with a few attendant information
services. Around year 25, however, several X2 units enter the
system. Reference to Table V-1 makes it clear that in this
range it would be more profitable for all these units if only
a few composite information clusters existed. As year 50 ap-
proaches, then, information clusters should be forming in one
or two cities. During the period t = 0 to t = 75, we should
see the following pattern assert itself in the region:
Figure V-3
The Pattern of Early Information Cluster Growth
2t
7550
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As X units begin forming, a natural process of simultan-2
eous decision will stimulate their co-location with information
clusters in some of what were originally factory towns. The
business sector of such towns will experience a surge of ac-
tivity which will be self-reinforcing as new control units
are automatically attracted to these towns because of the
relatively large number of information units.
Of course, the process does not stop here. As the econo-
my moves through year 75 toward year 100 we can see that an
increasing number of X3 units begin appearing as well. From
among the few cities which "took off" with the appearance of
X2 units, the most advantageous sites will attract X3 units.
Another explosive surge of growth will result as high profit
levels in information services and supporting activities at-
tract entrepreneurs. Population increases rapidly as employ-
ment opportunities expand. By the period (100 - 125) several
phenomena are occurring simultaneously:
1). Because it seems likely that no more than two
cities could have attained third order (X3 ) status at this
intermediate stage of regional development, the appearance
of large numbers of these units should signal the beginning
of a sharp boom in both centers. As one city becomes the
locus for new X4 units, whose demands for services should
provide a powerful economic stimulus, one city will exhibit
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another sharp jump in growth. As the regional economy ap-
proaches maturity, then, it seems quite likely to be domi-
nated by one third-fourth order center which is still growing
rapidly and one third-order center whose growth has slowed
to approximately that of other cities in the region.
A quick reference to Table V-1 again will make it clear
that by the time X4 units are appearing in quantity, a huge
number of X2 units have already come into existence. While a
few cities are in competition for regional dominance, where
are these lower-order control units likely to locate? Figure
V-2 should be suggestive here. The graph of ff. v. I makes
J c
it evident that for X2 units profitability begins to diminish
once an information cluster has grown beyond 12. The growth
of higher-order control units in what were initially X 2 cen-
ters will stimulate growth in both information services and
population, with a resulting increase in space service rental
rates. As any cluster grows past 13, it seems that X2 loca-
tion in it becomes less profitable. With respect to X2 loca-
tion as the region develops toward maturity, then, we would
expect the following:
a). Relocation of substantial numbers of X2 units from
the central city areas to the suburban fringes of cities which
are attracting X 3 and X4 units. Since groups of X2 units al-
ready exist in these cities, relative simultaneity of movement
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should assure the presence of an adequate supporting group of
information units.
b). With the development of a huge number of X2 units
in the maturing region, a new set of smaller cities should
attract these units. In their central cities, some of the
requisite information services will already be located and
rents will still be at levels which are tolerable for such
units. As rents in the larger cities continue to rise, and
as groups of new X2 units stimulate the growth of informa-
tion services in the smaller centers, we would also expect
some X3 units to begin locating there.
As the region approaches economic "maturity", then, we
would expect a hierarchy of cities to be observable which
corresponds roughly with the distribution of control units.
It is interesting to note the consequences of this concept
of system development for comparative urban growth rates.
As a region approaches maturity, we would expect population
growth rates to rise as we move upward in the urban hier-
archy, reflecting the stimulus of higher-order information
and control functions.
Our hypothetical urban system should exhibit something
like the following pattern of behavior:
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Figure V-4
The Full Pattern of Information Cluster Growth
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The time has come to see how well observable patterns of
development correspond with the pattern suggested by our
I
I
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grossly simplified analysis.
V-3 Historical Evidence: The Similarity of Six Regional
Patterns of Urban Growth
Because the fiction of the urban system as purely an
"information system" has been used as an expository device,
we would not expect historical data to corroborate our analy-
tical framework with perfect precision. It is hoped, however,
that this approach will provide some insight.
Using city population data, it is possible to observe
urban growth patterns within each major American region from
the beginning of development until economic maturity is
reached. Although there are of course variations which are
attributable to the impact of manufacturing, trade, and trans-
port activity, the pattern of urban development within each
region appears to bear some resemblance to the pattern sug-
gested by our theory.
a) . The Northeastern Seaboard: Development of
"Megalopolis" from 1830 to 1930
The Northeast was the first region to reach economic
maturity. As canal and rail lines began linking early indus-
trial sites to the coast in this region, the early advantage
for control activity was apparently enjoyed by New York,
Philadelphia, Boston and Baltimore. It appears that central-
ity of location led here to the rapid surge of growth which
accelerated New York and Philadelphia into positions of
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third-order dominance before 1860. Somewhat later, Boston
and Baltimore consolidated their position as second-third
order centers at opposite ends of the budding megalopolis
and exhibited a remarkably similar growth pattern as the
region moved toward maturity. Second-order centers such as
Providence and Newark emerged clearly as the region approached
maturity (note the coincidence with the X3 "boom" in New York
and Philadelphia -- Figure V-5), while a whole host of smaller
cities (of which Springfield, Mass., Hartford, Paterson, New
Haven, and Albany are samples) continued growing at a steady
but lower rate. Two phenomena are particularly striking here:
1). The "lead" of the larger cities, once established,
appears to have been very difficult to erase.
2). A pattern of competition emerges in which the pro-
gressively fewer winners continued to grow at high rates while
those which "lost" at each hierarchical level tended to stab-
ilize their positions at lower growth rates. As this region
approached maturity in the 1880's and 90's, a cross section
of growth rates would obviously have related them positively
to position in the hierarchy.
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b) . The Midwestern Region: 1840 to 1930
With the expansion of the frontier and the development
of the rail network, the Midwest began a period of vigorous
economic growth (In this case, we are considering the entire
region bounded by Canada, Omaha, Kansas City, St. Louis,
Louisville, Cincinnati, and Indianapolis). In this region,
competition for control was to center around agriculture,
transport, and heavy industry. Again, in examining population
patterns, we can see that the growth of dominant centers
emerges as a central theme.
The early pattern of competition among Chicago, St.
Louis, Cincinnati, and Louisville for control status is in-
structive. From a fairly uniform pattern of growth in the
1830's and 40's, first Louisville and then Cincinnati began
lagging as St. Louis and Chicago became dominant second-
order cities and moved into the third-order "boom". The ques-
tion of X4 location was clearly decided around 1870, when
the crucial decisions concerning rail headquarters location
were made. Again, as in the Northeast, new second-order
centers emerged as the region began its approach to maturity.
By 1930, a hierarchy had again formed in which rates of
growth appeared to be associated positively with position in
the hierarchy.
From the standpoint of functional correspondence we
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might compare Northeastern and Midwestern cities in the follow-
ing way:
Table V-2
Functional Correspondence of Cities
x 4
x3 4
New York
Philadelphia
Boston3 Baltimore
Providence
x 2-x3 Newark
Jersey City
etc.
Springfield
Hartford
Paterson
2 New Haven
Albany
etc.
Chicago
St. Louis
Minneapolis
Cincinnati
Milwaukee
Kansas City
Indianapolis
Louisville
Omaha
etc.
Peoria
Duluth
South Bend
Des Moines
etc.
(The "etc." refers to the fact that these cities
are only a sampling of the cities in these categories.)
Without stretching a simple analogy too far, our analytic
framework seems to offer some insight into the working of the
system.
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Figure V-6
Patterns of Urban Growth in the Midwest
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c). The Erie Triangle: 1830 to 1920
Continental expansion and the demand for construction
materials and transport machinery stimulated the growth of
America's "Ruhr" during the early 1800's. With expansion
most pronounced after the Civil War, however, rapid growth
of the urban system in this area did not actually being until
after the surge of the marketing and transport centers further
to the west (e.g. St. Louis and Chicago). The term "Erie
Triangle" refers to the region approximately bounded by Buf-
falo, Charleston, West Virginia, and Grand Rapids, Michigan.
With remarkable persistence, the growth pattern we pre-
viously observed asserts itself again in this region. Four
cities -- Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Cleveland, and Detroit -- grew
to second-order status at approximately the same rate. As
the third-order boom began occurring around 1890, Buffalo
lagged behind, as did Pittsburgh after 1910. In the ensuing
competition between third-order cities, Detroit seems to
have acquired a substantial advantage from the fortuitous
surge of the auto industry. Again, with the approach of
regional maturity, we witness the development of second-third
order centers (Columbus, Toledo) and second-order cities
(Youngstown, Lansing, Fort Wayne, Grand Rapids).
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Patterns of Urban Growth in the Erie Triangle
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d). The Far West: 1900 to 1970
The expansion of the frontier to the West Coast heralded
the beginning of its rapid economic development. We shift the
relevant time period forward somewhat in examining regional
development in the Far West. Here a cluster of second-order
cities (San Francisco, Portland, Seattle, Los Angeles)
clearly yielded to third-order competition between Los Angeles
and San Francisco, which in turn resulted in fourth-order
status for Los Angeles. In 1970, this region had reached
maturity, and we can again see the full pattern of hierarchi-
cal dominance which has emerged. The rapid growth of southern
California has accelerated two more second-order centers
(Anaheim and San Diego) into third-order status matching that
of Seattle. Portland, meanwhile, has been joined by Sacramen-
to and San Bernardino as a second-third order center.
(It may be sensible to regard the Far West as two essen-
tially separate regions, with the dividing line at the south-
ern border of Oregon. If we separate our cities into these
two categories, the development of the regional hierarchy
emerges as an even more striking phenomenon.)
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The New South: 1900 to 1970
In the fast-developing regions of the South, we have the
opportunity to observe two areas which are only now in the
phase of the "third order boom".
e). South Central
In the South Central Region, early second-order status
was enjoyed by Houston, Dallas, New Orleans, and Memphis.
With the appearance of third-order control units in the re-
gional economy, however, Dallas and Houston began developing
quite rapidly as loci. During the 1950's and 1960's, both
cities surged away from the others as the third-order boom
fully began. The question of fourth-order status is still
uncertain, but recent evidence suggests that Houston may be
the prime candidate.1
Meanwhile, the rest of the dominance hierarchy seems to
be establishing itself fairly clearly. San Antonio, Memphis,
and New Orleans are important third-order centers, while
Tulsa and Oklahoma City have reached second-third order status.
Among several second-order centers, the chart in V-9 distin-
guishes Shreveport, Abilene, and Baton Rouge. Again, as this
region moves toward maturity, we see the positive association
between growth rates and position in the dominance hierarchy.
1 See "Houston Becomes a Headquarters City", Fortune,
November, 1971.
POP ('000
2000 -r
1800 -4-
1600 +
) Figure V-9
Patterns of Urban Growth in the South Central'Region
e Houston (A)
* Dallas (B)
* New Orleans (C)
* San Antonio (D)
* Memphis (E)
* Oklahoma City (F)
* Tulsa (G)
* Shreveport (H)
* Baton Rouge (1)
9 Abilene (J)
1400 -i-
1200 -
1000 -
800 -
600 -t
400 -
200
0
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
- 237
/
H
- j
p I I * I
_
A
B
C
D
F
a
II I I
- 238 -
f). South East
At present we can observe the South East Region at a
stage of development similar to that of the South Central
Region, although perhaps at a somewhat earlier point in this
stage. By 1970, it had become clear that Miami and Atlanta
were moving into the third-order boom, with some indication
that Atlanta would emerge as the region's fourth-order cen-
ter. Consider the following statement by a former mayor of
Atlanta:
There is no adequate word to describe Atlanta's
physical and economic growth during the sixties...
In that short span of ten years Atlanta grew as much
as it had in all of its previous history, moving
from being a somewhat sluggish regional distribution
center to a position as one of the dozen or so truly
"national cities" in the U.S.
... we had raised our sights considerably beyond
merely trying to attract new industry. Now we were
shooting for national headquarters operations...2
Birmingham and Tampa are moving into third-order posi-
tions, while Jacksonville, Orlando, and Chattanooga have
emerged in the 1950's and 1960's as second-third order
centers. Cities such as Huntsville, Macon, Montgomery,
and Savannah seem to be continuing as second-order cities.
2 Ivan Allen, Mayor: Notes on the Sixties (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1971), pp. 145-150.
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We have surveyed the growth of the urban system in each
American region as the wave of economic development washed
toward the West Coast and rebounded into the South. No claim
is made that our hypothesis can do more than provide some
rough insight into the pattern observed. Nevertheless, we
have observed striking similarities in:
a). The size of the clusters at different control levels
as the hierarchy sorts itself out.
b). The consistent pattern of competition which results
in regional dominance by one fourth-order and one third-fourth
order center.
c). The timing of the stages of hierarchical development
in each region (which incidently corresponds in a rough way
with the timing of the simple numerical model used for ex-
plaining our hypothesis).
d). The positive association between population growth
rates and hierarchical status as the region approaches econo-
mic maturity.
V-4 National Cities: A Hypothesized Set of Relations
Between Regional Sub-Systems
As research for this paper proceeded, the author was
repeatedly struck by the way in which the ordering of the
microcosm and the macrocosm in the urban system are consis-
tent. In order to introduce this topic, we raise our scale
of vision temporarily and look at the entire continent as
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one region. Mentally slipping our scale back, we acknowledge
only the existence of cities whose dominance position in
regional hierarchies is third-order or higher. If we let all
else recede into a plain below our field of perception, a
striking phenomenon asserts itself.
As we proceed along the time scale from 1800 to 1970
(See Figure V-ll), new fourth-order centers come rising out
of the plain at regular intervals after accelerating away
from a small group of third-fourth order cities which then
continue growing at a slower rate. The pattern of serial
acceleration is New York-Philadelphia-Chicago-Pittsburgh/
Detroit-Los Angeles-Houston/Dallas-Atlanta/Miami. In the
twentieth century, as the multi-unit corporation has ad-
vanced to a dominating position in the economy, the question
of the relationship between X units and the national system
of great cities has become increasingly important. In a
national economy which consists of interlocking economic
regions, X4 units must have a national perspective. A better
understanding of the current developmental stage of the
national system of cities requires that we attempt to continue
our theoretical analysis of control location from this higher
perspective.
We continue our analysis by considering the case of a
region which is well into the stage of economic maturity. For
convenience, we recreate here the graph of R. and C v. I
J c
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Figure V-12
Revenues, Costs, and Information Cluster Size
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Imagine that the fourth-order
still in the neighborhood Ic 13*
about this city:
center in this region is
We can assert two things
1). For a long period of time, net benefits to location
1C
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in this city will be at such a level that new X4 units in its
own region will continue to flow into it. As they do so, I
will grow steadily.
2). This fourth-order city, with its already developed
national perspective, will have the advantage over lower-order
centers in developing regions as X4 units begin forming in
these regions. For this reason, the dominant centers of older
regions are likely to experience an additional surge of growth
as newer regions begin developing. This is simply because
existing information clusters in older dominant centers assure
that profits attributable to control will be higher than in
the growing third-order centers of the new region. To be
clear on this point, we recreate one of our earlier graphs:
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Figure V-13
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is in fact replete with instances of this phenomenon. Agrarian
bitterness concerning the hegemony of New York capital in the
railroad business was a potent force in Midwestern politics
during the middle nineteenth century. The oil concerns of
the Erie Triangle and later the South Central Region both
located their headquarters in New York once they had developed
into large organizations. Very recently, the South East and
South Central regions were still exporting X units to New
York and Chicago (and -- as it rose to "supercity" status --
Los Angeles). A study of message flows by Bell Telephone
Company in 1970 revealed the striking degree to which such
dispersed centers as Denver, Atlanta, and Houston are still
subordinate to New York.3
A look at the previous two graphs, however, makes it im-
mediately apparent that this situation cannot persist forever.
At some point in the growth of large information clusters in
the older dominance centers, the curve depicting gross revenue
associated with location in these centers flattens consider-
ably. With the continuing influx of X4 units, however, costs
keep growing at a steady rate. Two consequences must follow:
1). Within the older region: At some point, as f.J
declines in the older center, it will dip below the profit
3 See Ron Abler, "What Makes Cities Important," Bell
Telephone Review, March-April, 1970.
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levels associated with smaller third-order centers. At some
point in this process, the smaller centers should experience
accelerated development as they begin absorbing an influx of
X4 units. Consider the benefit-cost graph again and suppose
that X4 units are choosing between cities A and B as location
sites:
Figure V-14
Revenues, Costs, and Location Choices
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We assume that we begin observing the system when IA = IA(t).
A comparison on the basis of profitability will lead new X4
units to locate in A, and as they locate there, stimulating
the growth of IA' profitability actually grows for a time.
As more units move into A, profitability begins declining
again, until at IA(t f) it has dipped below fB* At this point,
new X4 units begin flowing into B and the phenomenon becomes
self-reinforcing. In this extreme case all X4 movement into
A should halt. Indeed, some outflow should begin.
2). We now turn to the second consequence of this growth
beyond the point where the net benefit curve flattens. In
the newer regions, new third-order centers may well find
their ability to attract new X4 units in the region enhanced.
(If the new third-order centers are sufficiently small, we
may expect the developing region to export X4 units to the
older center, even if this center has lost its own regional
advantage. This is because the older center will still dom-
inate communications networks and services which are crucial
from the national standpoint but not the regional.)
Once the new X4 center has grown to a relatively high
profitability level, then, it should be able to retain all
new X4 units.
We have considered the probable path of development of
smaller centers as a consequence of the "over-development" of
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an older fourth-order center. We have inferred that smaller
centers, both in the older and newer regions, should experience
a surge of growth as a result. We have yet to consider the
relations between fully established national dominance centers.
As regions come to full maturity, their fourth-order centers
capture part of the X4 activity which is truly "national" in
perspective and they develop a set of information services
which are specialized to such an outlook. Once a set of such
"national cities" is available, the X4 units in question should
employ the same profitability calculations just discussed at
the regional level in determining the best location site. In
addition, of course, X4 units migrating away from as yet im-
mature regions should shop among such national cities on the
same basis.
In a system of interlocked regions at various stages of
maturity, then, the total pattern of activity flows will prob-
ably be quite complicated. The following is an outline of the
probable flows which the development of our hypothetical sys-
tem entails.
I. Within one region:
A. Mature regions: Relatively low profitability levels
in the older dominance centers stimulate more rapid growth of
second-third order centers. The observed growth rates should
be the inverse of hierarchical dominance positions.
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B. Developing regions: As discussed previously, the
observed pattern in such regions should be the inverse of that
in A. As a region approaches maturity, the observed growth
rates should be positively associated with hierarchical dom-
inance positions.
II. Between regions: If the oldest dominance centers
are "over-developed", we would expect the inverse regional
development pattern to be duplicated, with greater numbers
of X4 units flowing into the newer national centers. If the
oldest centers are not over-developed, we would expect the
reverse to be true.
The sort of system described will, of course, exhibit a
certain stochastic quality in its operation. Given the sort
of perception differences discussed in the section on econo-
metric estimation of the location function, we would not
expect all activity units to exhibit consistent behavior.
Rather, we would expect the balance of flows to proceed in
the directions indicated by this analysis. With this in
mind, we can review the evidence on growth rates during the
1960's.
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V-5 Statistical Evidence:
Rates During the 1960's
Comparative Population Growth
Northeast Region
New York(7.8)
Philadelphia (10.9)
Baltimore(14.8)
Wilmington(20.5)
Newark(9.9)
Allentown(10.4)
Paterson(14.5)
Boston(6.1)
Albany(9.6)
Syracuse(12.
Providence (10.9)
8) Hartford(20.9)
Rochester(20.5)
Midwest Region
Chicago(12.2)
St. Louis(12.3)
Minneapolis(22.4) Omaha(18.0) Kansas City(14.8) Indianapolis (17.5)
Far West Region
Los Angeles(16.4)
San Francisco(17.4)
Anaheim(101.8)
Phoenix(45.8)
Sacramento(28.0)
San Diego(31.4)
Portland(22.8) Seattle(28.4)
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Erie Triangle
Detroit (11 .6)
Cleveland(8.1) Pittsburgh(-.2)
Grand Rapids(16.7) Dayton (16 .9) Columbus (21.4) Akron (12 . 2)
San Antonio(20.6)
Birmingham (2.5)
South Central Region
Houston (40.0)
Dallas (39.0)
Ft. Worth(32.9)
Okla. City(25.2)
Tulsa (13.8)
South East Region
Atlanta (36 .7)
Miami (35.6)
Tampa (31.1)
New Orleans(15.3)
Memphis (14.2)
Nashville (16.7)
Jacksonville(16.1)
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Almost all of the larger metropolitan areas in each region
are included in the statistical tables. The SMSA's are ordered
with the regional fourth-order center at the top, then the
third-fourth order center, and then the second-third order
centers in sub-regional groupings. The great mass of these
statistics are consistent with the view that all three major
national centers (New York, Chicago, Los Angeles) are over-
developed from the regional standpoint while over-development
from the national standpoint is stimulating new national
activity flows into the three cities in inverse relation to
their maturity.
With the exception of statistical anomalies in the cases
of Boston, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh, the pattern of flows in
all four "mature" regions is clear. The progression of growth
rates is in inverse relation to hierarchical position. In the
two developing regions this situation is exactly reversed.
While a spurious relationship with our hypothetical system is
possible, the fit is so good that the hypothesis should be
entertained seriously until some better system of explanation
can be developed.
This system of explanation seems to have more content,
for example, than systems which seek to examine relative
metropolitan growth rates without taking into account the
position of the cities in the regional and national hierarchies
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of economic information processing and control. Many works
(most notably that of Stanback and Knight 4) have pointed out
that the intermediate-size metropolitan areas grew at the
fastest rate in the 1960's. While the gross fact is true, no
explanation for the phenomenon can be valid unless one real-
izes that some of these cities were in the middle of mature
regional hierarchies while others were at the top of devel-
oping regional hierarchies and that the bases for rapid
growth in the two sets of intermediate-size areas were
fundamentally different.
4 See Thomas M. Stanback, Jr. and Richard V. Knight,
The Metropolitan Economy (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1970).
Chapter VI
Conclusion
VI-1 Summary of Findings
The cornerstone of this thesis has been the notion of a
functional hierarchy which results from efficient market
behavior in an economy whose information flows are imperfect.
Hierarchical corporations and hierarchical urban systems both
result. The two structures are tied together by the economies
of agglomeration which cause corporate headquarters units to
locate at the center of large urban areas. In examining the
links between headquarters location decisions and the pattern
of urban development, we have been concerned with analysis
at two levels.
At the micro level, our study has attempted to contribute
to the debate concerning whether urban growth tends to be "con-
vergent" (i.e. self-damping) or "divergent" (positively self-
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reinforcing). Large cities are characterized by large economic
benefits and high costs, and the development debate concerns
the relative strength of benefits and costs with increasing
size. By examining one component of the growth process through
a feedback model, this thesis has hopefully made some contribu-
tion to a resolution of the debate. Headquarters movements
seem to generate structural changes whose net effect is posi-
tive at small and medium sizes, but diminishing with growth
to extreme size.
The examination of the urban feedback model leads to an
analysis at the macro level in the second part of the thesis.
A functional hierarchy of urban areas is discerned, and posi-
tion in the hierarchy is shown to depend at least in part on
relative status as a focus for corporate control activity.
The macro-analysis leads to the conclusion that a discussion
of "optimum city size" must take the hierarchical status of
the city into account. Rather than one "optimum size," there
will be several optima in a multi-level hierarchical urban
system.
The two levels of analysis in the thesis yield certain
insights which may have implications for urban policy in the
United States. The most important implications are twofold.
First, any national urban policy must take the existence of a
functional hierarchy explicitly into account. Secondly,
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policies directed toward influencing the dynamics of urban
development must be cognizant of the extremely important role
played by corporate control unit movements in the development
of large metropolitan areas. Both sets of concerns will come
together in any attempts to move cities toward a specified
"optimum" size. The following series of points may be offered
as a contribution to rational urban policy formulation.
1). Hierarchical cities reflect hierarchical economic
structures. "Optimum" city sizes are only so in relation to
current structures. Before attempting to change the size of
cities, then, the policy-maker should be sure that the exist-
ing economic structure is organized in a proper way. The
ultimate judgment here is likely to be normative rather than
positive.
2). If the first question is resolved, the question of
identifying optimum sizes in the hierarchy becomes paramount.
Our results suggest that at each hierarchical level it is pos-
sible for cities to grow too large. The problem arises from
the divergence of marginal and average benefits and costs.
Although land values may not be the only instrument for meas-
uring the divergence between benefits and costs, they do seem
to be one potentially useful index with which to infer optimum
sizes from observed market outcomes.
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3). With an empirically-determined set of optimum func-
tional sizes in mind, the planner is faced with the task of
guiding urban growth paths toward the appropriate targets.
As always, the planner's task will be much easier if he
identifies and augments forces in the system itself which are
working in the proper direction. Our analysis of the head-
quarters location movements and the structural changes which
result suggests that the system itself tends toward balanced
growth in the long run. This notion receives further support
from observed growth rates in regional urban systems. The
slower growth rates of larger cities in mature regions seem
to reflect the "farming out" of functions as high-level control
activities crowd too densely into urban centers and raise
costs to prohibitive levels. The planner may well be able to
facilitate this decentralizing trend by identifying agglomera-
tions of lower-order functions in such "over-developed cities"
and through appropriate tax and subsidy policies, to move them
to smaller urban areas.
The general implication of this study is that urban
growth at all levels is balanced in the long run. Once the
number of hierarchical levels in the corporate economy stab-
ilizes the explosive growth of the largest urban centers will
no longer occur. This is because no units with exponentially-
increased imputed profitability levels will appear after the
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stabilization. As new units at the highest level in the newly-
stabilized hierarchy crowd into a few urban centers, diminish-
ing returns will set in. The largest cities will begin ex-
periencing much slower growth rates as smaller urban areas
begin attracting new control activities. Although the system
tends to move sluggishly toward balance, the planner clearly
has a role in encouraging all positive trends through approp-
riate tax and subsidy policies. In addition, the system itself
will never be able to approach the optimum unselfconsciously,
since the movements of isolated economic actors will be in
response to average benefits and costs rather than the approp-
riate marginal measures. We have pictured the urban system as
evolving slowly toward some decentralization and stabilization
of population in the largest centers. These finds, however,
are contingent upon the continuation of currently-observable
trends. The future foreseen by this study appears quite a bit
like the present. Other futures are possible, however, and
the concluding section of this work will speculate on one of
them.
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VI-2 An Alternative Future: The Information Elite and the
"Final Suburbanization"
As a conclusion to this study of certain facets of urban
growth, it seems appropriate to discuss the general trend of
American development that has emerged in the author's mind as
a result of undertaking this study. It has to do with the
"Limits to Growth," but involves conclusions quite different
than those of Randers, Meadows, and the Club of Rome.1 In
general, the pattern of development in its most recent form
seems to indicate that the Club of Rome study emerged just
in time to fulfill a classic observation by Hegel:
lSee Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Ran-
ders, and William W. Behrens, II, The Limits to Growth, (New
York: Universe Books, 1972).
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When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then
has a shape of life grown old. By philosophy's grey
in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood.
The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the
falling of the dusk. 2
To term the Club of Rome report "philosophy" is perhaps
to glorify it unduly, but it is nevertheless evocative of a
philosophy. The general thrust of the system dynamics model
proposed by Randers, et. al., is a system developing without
self-consciousness. In a way, this report and the work of
Alonso and associates at Berkeley have formed the perfect
Janus-faced pair. Alonso's study of urban growth world-wide
has led him to suggest that there are no observable limits to
urban size from the point of view of efficiency.3 But just
as the Alonso school of "realism" seems perfectly evocative
of the growth-mania of the early 1960's, so the Randers-
Meadows study seems to evoke in symbolic form the contra-
puntal theme: Ecological crisis precipitated by the very
growth whose efficiency limits have not been detected by
Alonso (It is important to remember that in American society
2G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, translated with
notes by T. M. Knox (London: Oxford University Press, 1967),
p. 13.
3See William Alonso, The Economics of Urban Size, Working
Paper 138, Center for Planning and Development Research,
University of California, Berkeley.
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as presently constituted economic growth and urban growth are
equivalent terms. The economy is, after all, an archipelago
of city-economies).
Now, one factor which is never (indeed, could hardly be)
included in such studies is the change in consciousness which
is frequently their result. And this is perhaps the true
function of social science analysis, for as Hegel notes, it
is necessary for the owl to bestir itself. The real utility
of projection from presently observable trends is not planning
for a clearly observable future but the shift in consciousness
which results from viewing revealed tendencies which are
thought to be undesirable. As one critic of the Club of Rome
study so trenchantly put it, a similar analysis done in 1880
would have predicted with utter confidence that London would
be totally buried in horse manure by the mid-twentieth century.
Thus, we can see that the social critic has an essential place
-- It may well be that the disasters which do occur are only
those which were not clearly foreseen. Futurist doom pro-
phecies may always (happily) be self-defeating.
So with this in mind, we turn to putting our own owl to
flight. How can this be defended, in view of what has just
preceded it? Two points may at least be offered:
1). If the trends observed do not seem particularly
pernicious, then perhaps they will be allowed to proceed apace.
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2). As the collection of data continually broadens and
computer techniques greatly speed analysis, the sort of dial-
ectical process which Hegel discusses may become more mental
than actual. Thesis to antithesis to synthesis may become
more and more a part of the world of simulation.
In order to understand the implication of what seems to
have emerged from this study, it is necessary to make a brief
point concerning the author's conception of the way the mech-
anism of social consciousness-formation works in this country.
Books like the Meadows report are addressed to a "mass
audience" only in the sense that our population is so large
that the number in positions of social, political, and
economic influence can be counted in the multi-hundred thou-
sand. Their decisions will be multiplied many hundred-fold
as the levers of power are shifted. So the appropriate ques-
tion to ask about the "externalities-consciousness" of the
recent era is perhaps not "What are the implications for
policy?" in the sense that there are a series of rational power
centers which move with dispatch when presented with judicious
arguments, but rather what are likely to be the ultimate
effects of the change in consciousness which will result from
the sort of analysis we are talking about? The following
points may be offered:
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1). So long as a prevailing preference function is set,
the only analysis accepted as "rational" will be that which
concerns maximizing with respect to the given function. Anal-
ysts whose given preference function is different will re-
peatedly batter their heads against stone. But let the pre-
vailing preference function shift and "social reality" may
shift quite rapidly to match.
2). In a society whose activity shifts steadily toward
the processing and analysis of information, the preference
function which counts is that of two groups: Those who know
the requisite techniques and those who, for whatever reason,
are rich enough to hire them.
3). The preference function within this group seems to
be shifting. An observer recently noted that while the growth
centers of the South and West are still booming under the old
"cowboy" philosophy, the sons and daughters of the northern
elite seem to have taken a strong turn to the left. This is
perhaps naive, reflecting only the truth that the sons and
daughters of the northern elite seem to have taken a strong
turn somewhere. For want of a better term, the author called
this "the left". We may be a little more specific.
It may be somewhat more accurate to say that the direction
that these sons and daughters have taken is toward a suburban-
ization which makes comparatively pale the movement which
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their parents accomplished. If the truth were known, few of
these sons and daughters show any strong inclination to rub
shoulders with the masses. In the "back to the land" movement
we may well see reflected the fact that the lower classes are
suburbanizing and that the traditional upper class desire to
keep the lower classes at a distance is simply thrusting its
way to the fore once again. Most of the images which irritate
the "ecologically conscious" children of the suburbs are pre-
cisely those which moving 20 miles out of town made it suffic-
ient to escape 15 years ago: Noise, congestion, air and water
pollution, excessive neon -- Every bugaboo of the new culture
is actually just a correlate of "lower class" lifestyles.
So this time the exodus is going to be truly spectacular
and may, in fact, be the final solution to the problem of
liberalism in the U.S., in a way which will be explained
shortly. With zero population growth apparently actually on
the horizon, the possibility becomes even more imminent.
Huge areas of the U.S. which are quite livable have been
emptying out for several generations. The social returns
are now beginning to come in and, as always, have first
changed the consciousness of those with the best access to
information. Now, the dialectic has begun its inevitable
resurgance. The frontier hovels of the most sensitive souls
of the 1960's have been the first trickle of what is going to
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become a flood. Among the sons and daughters of the northern
elite who have turned "left" there is one dominant and decidedly
non-leftist theme: The urge to buy land -- as far away from
the "city" as practicable. Increasingly, there is talk of
taking long periods of time off, as the value of leisure as a
substitute for more material goods becomes enhanced. The cen-
tral idea is an escape from the experienced tension which now
binds "work" and the city together in the mind of upper class
and upper middle class youth.
So they are going to leave and the primary lesson which
they will take with them is not, perhaps, what left analysts
would wish. The only critique of the suburbs which has sunk
home with a vengeance is that centered on the inadequacies of
the nuclear family in such surroundings. So when the young go,
they will probably show a tendency to go in clumps -- not
ethnically or economically mixed "communes" in the classical
utopian sense, but quasi-communes which exhibit remarkable
internal homogeneity and the lack of any particular authori-
tarian structure. If history is any guide, the second charac-
teristic may create some problems, but the first seems admir-
ably suited to a reasonably stable communal structure.
This "new wave" of quasi-communes will be peopled mostly
by men and women with few illusions about the virtues of ab-
ject poverty. Insofar as possible, they will want to bring
their infrastructure with them -- a not-insurmountable problem
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for those who live in the legacy of the space program with its
attendant miniaturization.
But, one may ask, where will these people work? Un-
doubtedly those who predicted the first wave of suburbanization
met with the same argument. And the answer, as then, is simply
the following: The jobs will go with them because this is now
technically feasible. Most of the sort of people being dis-
cussed here are in the information business: The collecting,
analysis, and use of information. At present the vast bulk
of such activity takes place in the central regions of
American metropolitan areas, mostly in the service or direct
support of the corporate headquarters decision-making which is
the subject of the attendant study. The question becomes,
why should such activities locate in central city areas? The
answer is essentially that:
1). Anthropological forces are powerful. Those who ex-
ercise power have a preference for personal interchange which
is so powerful that it is deemed worth the astronomical ren-
tals, etc., of central city areas. While some information may
be tradeable only in this way, it seems likely that many face-
to-face conferences are not particularly necessary. Never-
theless, the phenomenon to date has been nearly all-pervasive.
2). Thus far, those who have been essential as employees
have registered no particular objection to such a location.
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But 1) seems largely a function of prevailing levels of
technology and 2) seems to be a matter of tastes which might
well change.
There is a continuum from simple telephony and telegraphy
through Xerox transmissions and conference calls to perfect
three-dimensional laser image projections. We are currently
somewhere to the left of center on this continuum. It seems
arguable that the further toward the right we move, the more
location-cost conscious will be those in the great control
centers. It also seems arguable that class-consciousness
in America is one highly durable component of personal taste.
With the increasing move of the lower-middle class into the
suburbs and the intrusion of "urban" (i.e. lower class) prob-
lems, we should not be surprised to see the prevailing struc-
ture of tastes assert itself again once this becomes tech-
nically feasible.
So let us see, then, if the following image is so out-
landish. Suppose some group of information specialists settle
in a rural setting in Appalachia or far rural New England or
in the western mountains a few miles from a small airport.
They rent space in a computer system somewhere, put in the
requisite time-sharing software and hardware, and begin con-
sulting for business and government. They are no further
(perhaps closer) by air from Washington, D.C., than Abt
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Associates of Cambridge, Mass. They are certainly no further
from Latin America than Arthur D. Little, Inc.
They make a profit. The word gets around. Soon other
groups are forming. A few venturesome corporate managements
with many young executives decide to try the same thing. Some
attempt to relocate top management as a group. Others simply
set up the appropriate communications linkages and tell their
people to locate anywhere, while setting up regular personal
conferences. All discover that their efficiency is enhanced
as the staff, living unencumbered by the "benefits" of city
life, begin bringing much more zest to the job. What was a
small movement becomes a boom.
Several points should be kept in mind here:
1). With the U.S. population beginning to stabilize,
we can be reasonably sure that there will be plenty of habit-
able space for such activity. Even now, the number of Ameri-
cans per square mile is reasonably small, and we are only
talking here about the relatively small number who will con-
stitute the information elite.
2). Such a shift will be possible only for those whose
need for constant exposure to a dazzling variety of consumer
goods is minimal. If there is any element of the new ethos
which appears stable, however, this is it.
3). Such a shift will be facilitated by the growth of
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cable TV with attendant cultural possibilities. One suspects
that the resurgence of the wandering minstrel show (of which
Hugh Romney's Hog Farm Commune was no doubt a precursor) will
also occur.
The picture which emerges is one which is at the same time
faintly amusing and alarming. Imagine a little village in the
Adirondacks where several people simply don't go to work, al-
though their income is substantial. In a close-knit sub-
village of friends live a director of Xerox, a partner in a
big law firm (formerly based in New York) and several con-
sultants. All requisite information processing, accounting,
and library functions are automated and are available in home
communications terminals. All work extremely hard, but most
of the operation is mental. Extensive consultation by pic-
turephone goes on. An imaginative videotape system allows
each man to work his own hours while staying in touch with
the organization.
In the past, the image of Babylon has been powerful in
radical critiques of capitalist society. The great whore
New York is pointed to, with the gleaming towers juxtaposed
against rampant savagery in the streets below. How does this
image square, however, with organizations which have no vis-
ible embodiment above the plant level at all? Where does
one point the finger?
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It seems safe to predict that neither the radical-human-
ist nor the pessimist-realist-authoritarian schools of social
thought will disappear. Their conflict may well alter its
terms to reflect the new technical environment. It will be
fascinating to see what forms actual physical confrontation
may take when control has utterly dispersed. In the blue box
and the black box, the current nemeses of the phone company,
we may well see the precursors of the instruments of future
retaliation against those whose penchant for excessive control
threatens basic human dignities.
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